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Foreword
What Happened to Shared Prosperity
and Full Employment and How to Get
Them Back: A Seussian Perspective
Richard B. Freeman
Harvard University and
National Bureau of Economic Research

The conference “Reconnecting to Work” was held on April 1–2,
2011, as the United States suffered its worst job market since the Great
Depression. Reconnecting to work, indeed! With 9–10 percent unemployment and little sign of substantive job growth in the foreseeable
future, American workers needed more help to find work than at any
time since the 1930s. Even if job growth were to miraculously pick up,
most workers would have trouble keeping their heads above water for
years to come. For nearly four decades the benefits of economic growth
have gone almost entirely to a small sliver of wealthy Americans. The
vast bulk of workers struggled with stagnant real wages and high consumer debt to remain in the middle class. Inequality rose to levels off
the map for a major advanced country and exceeded levels in most
third-world countries. Contrary to what many Americans believe, social
mobility in the United States was below that for most other advanced
countries.1
Something or someone had taken shared prosperity and full employment from the American people. Something or someone was dismantling the road to the middle class on which the United States was built,
and with it the American dream. Who or what could that be?
The first place where economists seek an answer to changes in economic outcomes is in the operation of markets. Viewing the U.S. labor
market as highly competitive and responsive to market forces, some
economists explain the stagnation of real wages in terms of (unmeasured) technologically driven shifts in demand for labor that favor
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the highly skilled over the less skilled. But changes in skill premium
explain only a small proportion of increased inequality. Most of the
rise in inequality occurs within observationally equivalent groups—
among persons with the same age, gender, race, education, math and
literacy test scores, and so on—rather than across skill groups. And it
is difficult to understand why in a highly flexible job market firms cut
employment rapidly in recession but failed to increase employment in
the ensuing recovery. To fit the observed pattern of change, analysts
must go beyond the basic flexible market model to consider institutions,
unions, executive compensation, modes of corporate governance, and
governmental policies.
In the spirit of the interdisciplinary Reconnecting to Work conference, I explored what other social sciences said about the loss of shared
prosperity and jobs crisis. Sociology focuses on the behavior of the poor
and the measurement/meaning of class but also offers network analysis
that quantifies the connections among the elite. Political science documents the importance of lobbying in determining the rules that govern
how markets operate and of the revolving door between public service
and lobbying activities. Social psychology shows how readily authority
figures and settings can influence people to behave with little regard to
others even without monetary incentives. But neither economics nor the
other social sciences gave me the overarching vision or narrative about
who or what was undoing the U.S. middle class.
With the time for my presentation at the conference growing short,
I widened my search. As a youth I read widely in literature, from the
Greek tragedies to Alice in Wonderland to Charles Bukowski. Did the
world of literature offer an analogy or a clue to the story? Eureka! Yes,
there was one narrative that seemed to provide insight into the economics of lost prosperity and jobs, and it was by the world’s most famous
and accomplished writer and poet of children’s verse—Dr. Seuss, master of the trisyllabic meter.
Dr. Seuss? Many of the experts at the conference would recall The
Cat in the Hat (1957a) and wonder what hat I was wearing when Seuss
popped into my head as offering a framework for understanding the
country’s economic woes. Hopefully the evidence would convince them
(and you), as it convinced me, that the answer to who stole American
prosperity and full employment lies in the classic Seuss tale How the
Grinch Stole Christmas (1957b) and its successor stories.
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THE GRINCHES OF WALL STREET
The Grinch is an illustrated book. Rereading your copy, you will
surely notice, as I did, the uncanny resemblance of the illustrations of
the snarly heartless cave-dwelling Grinch to the bankers, mortgage
brokers, and Wall Street–dwelling financiers who sold “liars’ loans”
to Americans seeking home ownership, sliced and diced mortgages to
hide the risks to investors seeking safe assets, created credit default
swaps and exotic derivatives that paid if businesses collapsed or people absconded on debts, and sold clients financial products that they
believed would fail. Those dark brows, sour Grinchy grin, and piercing
eyes—if the Grinch were a bit pudgier or Bernard Madoff a bit leaner,
they’d be kissing cousins.
So who plays the Grinch in the U.S. economy? According to the
Wall Street occupiers, it is the upper 1 percent of the income distribution. More accurately, it is the upper 0.1 percent that gained essentially
all of the economic growth of the past 40 years. In 1970 the top 0.1 percent in income had 2.7 percent of national income. Their income was 27
times the mean income. In 2007 the top 0.1 percent had 12.3 percent of
national income.2 Their income was 123 times the mean. But these figures understate the disparity in income between the top 0.1 percent and
the average American. The average includes the income of the top 0.1
percent. Comparing the income of those in the top 0.1 percent with the
income of those in the bottom 99.9 percent raises the estimated ratio to
140 times in 2007. Moreover, income distributions are “right-skewed”
so that a person in the median of the income distribution makes less than
the average. In 2007 the median income of families was 77.8 percent
of the mean income in the United States, suggesting that the income of
the upper 0.1 percent was on the order of 180 times the median income
(U.S. Census Bureau 2011, Table F-8).
Who, you may ask, comprises the upper 0.1 percent? Bakija, Cole,
and Heim (2010, Table 3) find that in 2005, about 64 percent of the
top 0.1 percent were executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals, or worked in real estate. The 403 or so billionaires
in the annual Forbes list are there. The top corporate executives and
Wall Street bankers are there. Following the 1999 repeal of the GlassSteagall Act provisions that separated commercial banks that hold
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deposits from the riskier investment banks that issue securities, the
finance sector expanded. Finance absorbed a disproportionate 40 percent of business profits. It hired some of the country’s best and brightest
to develop new financial instruments, which it peddled as essentially
risk free, all the while enveloping the real economy with a highly leveraged financial house of cards—an estimated $22 of derivatives for
every dollar of goods and services produced in 2009 (Matai 2009)!
While some high-income recipients made their money primarily
through salaries, for many, million-dollar salaries were chump change,
dwarfed by earnings from stock options or restricted shares that gave
them ownership claims on the firm or by bonuses paid as incentive pay.
When the firm’s share price rises, the owners of the options and shares
benefit even if the price rise was due to factors outside their control.
When the stock market crashed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some
firms gave out new options at the abnormally low market prices, which
paid off handsomely when the market recovered. In general, when
share prices fall and drive options “under water,” boards of directors
give out new options at the low prices to “reincentivize” executives. At
the top of the income distribution, the IRS reports that the 400 persons
with the highest adjusted gross income earned 10 percent of all capital
gains, 4 percent of all interest, and 4 percent of all dividends received
in the United States in 2007 (Mi2g 2009). Great ways to make a living
if you can get it.
The implosion of Wall Street and ensuing recession affected the
entire economy. The federal government bailed out the banks with
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) monies. The Federal Reserve
loaned $1.2 trillion dollars to the banks to help them recapitalize. The
Obama administration’s stimulus package—tax cuts, support of state
and local governments, and spending initiatives—helped the economy
recover while adding to the federal deficit. But just as the gains from
the economic growth had gone disproportionately to a small number,
the gains from the recovery went disproportionately to a small number.
Firms gave out options at low share prices when the stock market was
weak, which allowed executives to clean up in a market that owed its
recovery to the bailout and stimulus. On the day the Reconnecting to
Work conference began, USA Today reported that CEO pay had jumped
27 percent in 2010 under the headline “CEO Pay Soars While Workers’
Pay Stalls” (Kantz and Hansen 2011).3
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But while executive pay and corporate profits recovered smartly,
there was virtually no recovery in the job market. And the recessioninduced deficits in the public sector produced cutbacks in government
employment and spending with threats of more to come.
The Resilience of the Grinches
How the Grinch Stole Christmas ends when the Whos overcome
their disappointment at the stolen Christmas stockings, presents, and
cookies, and join hands to celebrate Christmas because Christmas
meant more to them than material goods bought in a store. This behavior shocked the Grinch to a born-again moment. Seuss reports the event:
“ . . . in Who-ville they say, That the Grinch’s small heart grew three
sizes that day.”
Given the physiological problems of tripling even a small interior
organ, note that Seuss does not himself claim this is what happened. He
just reports what folks in Who-ville say. In any case, caught up with
the Christmas spirit, the Grinch returned the stolen goods to the community. Then, to the surprise of all, “He himself . . . The Grinch carved
up the roast beast” for Christmas dinner.
This is where Seuss and economic reality part. No one, least of
all an economist, expects Americans to take the loss of prosperity and
full employment in the Christmas spirit of the Whos, holding hands
and singing. Unemployment reduces happiness, creates mental distress,
worsens lifetime career prospects, and reduces family income, leading
some into poverty.4 Surveys show that the vast majority of Americans
have a dim view of the direction in which the country is heading: less
than 25 percent believe that their children will do better economically
than they do (Bendavid 2011; Rasmussen Reports 2011).
Similarly, no one, least of all an economist, expected the Wall Street
Grinches to have a spiritual rebirth and return their bailout-created gains
to the country. But given the near-death experience of finance, I anticipated some change in behavior: apologies for what Wall Street had
done to the country, thanks to taxpayers for bailing them out, and special thanks to the Obama administration for not siccing the FDIC and
FBI onto them, as Presidents Reagan and Bush had done to the bankers
who created the 1980s savings and loan crisis, and as New Deal investigators had done to their predecessors in the Great Depression. Given
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that even conservative Americans harbored distrust and anger toward
the bankers, it seemed a good time for them to lay low, take a modest
million or two in pay, donate to philanthropic causes, and maybe even
volunteer to help the nation rebuild shared prosperity for all.
Instead, the Grinches of finance behaved just as the economists’
model of homo oeconimicus predicts people behave when money is
at stake. Evincing neither remorse nor interest in any interest but their
own, Wall Street financiers fought to restore the past economic order
in which they and their compatriots in the upper income brackets garnered all the gains from economic growth. A consumer financial protection agency to protect citizens in financial transactions? A Tobin tax on
financial transactions? The Volcker rule? Higher capital requirements
on banks? A policy to break up the banks too big to fail? Strengthened regulatory powers for the Securities Exchange Commission? Tax
increases on the wealthy? “Nevermore,” quoth the Grinch—or was that
the Raven? Increased unionization to protect the interests of the middle
class? Unions? “Forget them.” The middle class? “Charge them debit
card fees, the dumb marks.”
After the conference, I worried that How the Grinch Stole Christmas had too rosy an ending to represent the U.S. economy. The Grinch
looked like a Wall Street operator, but his born-again soft spot would
have made Gordon Gekko and his cronies cackle. After all, “Greed
is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the
essence of the evolutionary spirit.”5 Perhaps I needed a tougher vision
of the grinches of the world than Dr. Seuss offered.
Fourteen years after he published the Grinch, Dr. Seuss developed
that tougher vision in The Lorax (1971). This is the only Seuss book that
puts economic behavior at the heart of the story. It is a dark, grim tale
of how the entrepreneurial Once-ler found a way to turn Truffula trees
into Thneeds, “which everyone, EVERYONE, EVERYONE needs!”
Crazy with greed, the Once-ler pushed production to the point where
it destroyed the environment, destroyed every Truffula tree, turned the
land into a horrific rustbelt of empty factories and buildings fallen apart,
with “no more work to be done.” Sadly, the book displays only the
Once-ler’s green hands and beady eyes, so whether the Once-ler looks
more like Gordon Gekko or Mr. Madoff or—name your favorite or least
favorite Wall Street banker—I do not know. My guess is that the Onceler is in the Grinch family, but I could be wrong.
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I did a Google search to find out more about the Grinch after his
Christmas epiphany. The slithery sneering creature starred in a 1977 TV
show called Halloween Is Grinch Night. Here Seuss painted a harsher
character whose sole goal was to terrorize the Whos on Halloween
by releasing his bag of horrors onto Who-ville. The only thing that
stopped the Grinch was a brave, bespectacled little Who, who delayed
the Grinch until past the witching hour. At the show’s end the Grinch
threatens to come back the next Halloween to do his evil work. In the
Hollywood remake of the show, I envision Brooksley Born, the head of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under President Clinton,
playing the brave little Who. Born wanted to regulate the risky derivatives market, a move for which she was viciously attacked by Bob
Rubin, Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and Arthur Levitt, and forced
to resign from her job. As for the bag of horrors, we all know what it
contains: more and more dangerous derivatives, credit default swaps,
mortgage-backed securities. If the Christmas Grinch is too soft for you,
think of Once-ler or the Grinch of Halloween.

THE WAy FORWARD: HORTONOMICS
There is another side to the economics of Dr. Seuss—a positive message that economists of every political stripe find particularly appealing. This is the story of investment in Horton Hatches the Egg (1940).
Recall, if you will, the situation. Mayzie, a lazy bird, has laid an egg and
wants someone to replace her atop the nest so she can have a “short” holiday. She inveigles Horton to sit on the egg—not an easy task for a huge
elephant—but he fixes the tree branch to hold him until Mayzie returns.
Horton sits on the egg through summer, autumn, winter, and spring, and
all the while, Mayzie does not appear. Seuss reports that she was partying
in Palm Beach, but I heard that she was actually on the Cayman Islands
with the corporate Grinches who find the tax haven more profitable than
building job-creating businesses. If only we had her Tweets to resolve
the issue. In any case, Horton kept sitting on the egg, repeating the motif
that we all know so well. “I meant what I said, and I said what I meant . . .
An elephant’s faithful—one hundred percent.”
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Hunters capture Horton and sell him, the tree, and the egg to a circus, which sees money-making potential in an elephant hatching an egg
in a tree. It charges 10 cents a peek. When the egg hatches, Mayzie
suddenly appears and tries to foreclose the property: “It’s MY egg!”
she sputters. “You stole it from me. Get off of my nest and out of my
tree.” But when the egg pops, out comes “something brand new”—an
elephant-bird with elephant ears, tail, and trunk and wings, who stays
with Horton.
Horton Hatches the Egg has two messages for understanding our
current economic situation. The first is that economic growth requires
long-term investments—sitting on the egg. Investment in infrastructure, in R&D, in new plants and equipment, in risky innovations, and,
in the case of the egg, the investment in human capital. Economic
growth is harmed by short-term investments based on balloon loans or
financial manipulations. The second message is that trust is important
in a well-functioning economy. “I meant what I said, and I said what I
meant.” Sellers of securities who are faithful to their clients instead of
betting against them. Management and employees who work cooperatively knowing that they will divide the resultant profits. Consumers
who know that when they pay their debts, the bank will apply their payments to the debt with the highest interest rate.
In the tradition of attaching names to economic policies—the New
Deal, the Fair Deal, Reaganomics, Clintonomics—I propose that policies to reverse the trend in inequality and restore full employment be
labeled Hortonomics. I offer one specific policy that would fit the Horton label. This is to modify the corporate tax code so that firms cannot deduct as a cost of business huge payments to top executives in
the form of pay for performance unless the incentive plan covers all
workers.6 Currently firms cannot deduct health and retirement plans as
costs of business unless the plans cover all workers, so this modification
would extend that practice to incentive pay plans. The proposal would
increase the proportion of American workers covered by incentive pay.
The workers would benefit from their firms’ economic performance to
a greater extent than now, which would motivate them to produce more.
During the Great Recession, firms in most OECD countries adapted
work-sharing policies that traded lower productivity to save jobs while
firms in the United States did the opposite, shedding workers so rapidly
that productivity increased at record levels (Bureau of Labor Statistics
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2011). In developing countries also, policies were shifting in favor of
workers. Brazil and other Latin American countries raised minimum
wages, used tax monies from the wealthy to fund education and transfer programs for the poor, and experienced both falling inequality and
increased economic growth. Perhaps most telling, China adopted a policy of strengthening unions and labor laws to fight inequality.
But while Hortonomics had traction in other countries, it seemed
outside U.S. political discourse, which was focused on cutting the federal deficit, and where many viewed discussion of inequality as raising
a red banner of class warfare. The Whos in the United States who suffered from stagnant real earnings and unemployment seemed invisible
in debates over economic policy. In April I could not see what would
change the situation.
And Then . . . the American Whos Speak
They spoke up first in New York City on September 17, 2011, when
the Occupy Wall Street protestors sat down in Zuccotti Park around
Wall Street under banners that read “We are the 99 percent.” The protestors targeted economic inequality, corporate greed and corruption, and
the dominance of Wall Street over the government as the main problems that troubled them. But they offered no explicit political or policy
agenda and were suspicious of both Democrats and Republicans. The
New York event set off similar protests in other U.S. cities and communities and spread to other parts of the world.
It is unclear how much staying power the occupiers have or whether
their protests will influence policy. Unions, environmentalists, and
many others on the left support them. Many leaders, from the president
of the United States to the mayor of New York to the head of the Federal Reserve, expressed sympathy for and recognition of the validity of
their concerns. Republican politicians have been more critical of the
occupiers and defensive of Wall Street. At the minimum the occupiers
have brought the rise in inequality and joblessness to the forefront of
national discourse.
The 1954 book Horton Hears a Who! offers Seussian insight into
what happens when Whos speak up and others hear their voice. The
book begins “on the fifteenth of May” (in the big scheme of things,
just a smidgeon away from the occupiers’ first protest on September
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17). Horton is taking a bath when he hears a small noise from a speck
of dust in the air. His elephant ears allow him to hear the voices of the
Whos even though he cannot see them. The smaller-eared denizens of
the jungle mock Horton for hearing voices until the mayor of Who-ville
gets every Who “to make noises in greater amounts.” Crying out as a
group, “Their voices were heard! They rang out loud and clear.” Horton
and the other animals then join to protect the Whos because “a person’s
a person, no matter how small.”
Now that the Whos in this country have spoken and some leaders have begun to listen to their concerns, I am more optimistic than I
was at the Reconnecting to Work conference that the United States will
come out of Wall Street’s financial implosion and the Great Recession
with reforms that will restore full employment and prosperity for all
citizens. I hope that economics and social science and, more broadly,
policy analysis, are up to the task of developing efficient programs to
help attain this goal.
Notes
1. For data on inequality, see the Gini coefficients from the Central Intelligence
Agency and the United Nations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries
_by_income_equality (accessed June 5, 2012). For data on social mobility, see
OECD (2010, Chapter 5).
2. These data are from Piketty and Saez (2003). The figures for 2008 show a small
drop in the share of the upper 0.1 percent due to the collapse of the stock market.
I use 2007 data as likely to be more representative of the situation after the market recovered. There are only modest differences in the shares between 2007 and
2008.
3. An updated and lengthier analysis is available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/companies/management/story/CEO-pay-2010/45634384/1
(accessed
June 5, 2012).
4. See Chapters 2 and 4 in this volume. In Chapter 4 of the 2008 Employment Outlook, the OECD documents the deleterious effects of unemployment on mental
health using panel data for several countries. Sullivan and von Wachter (2009)
show that job displacement of blue-collar males increases mortality by 50 percent to 100 percent. Studies of college graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von
Wachter, and Heisz 2006) show that a cohort that graduates in a recession suffers
lower income for the bulk of its working life. Finally, Gallup polls show that
the proportion of unemployed Americans diagnosed with depression is twice as
high as the proportion of fully employed persons, and rises with the length of unemployment. http://www.gallup.com/poll/139604/worry-sadness-stress-increase
-length-unemployment.aspx (accessed June 5, 2012).
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5. IMDb’s page for Wall Street, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes (accessed June 5, 2012).
6. For the details of this plan see www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/worker
_productivity.html (accessed June 5, 2012).
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1
Introduction
Lauren D. Appelbaum
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment
University of California–Los Angeles

The Great Recession, the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression, was like none other in most of our lifetimes. No other recession in recent history has had comparable job losses. The second-worst
recession, in 1981–1982, saw a drop of 2.8 million jobs, or 3.1 percent of payroll employment. By comparison, job losses from the Great
Recession reached 7.9 million jobs, or 5.7 percent of payroll employment from December 2007 until jobs started to consistently increase in
October 2010. As recently as February 2012, an additional 8.1 million
people found themselves in part-time jobs when they actually wanted to
be working full time, either because their hours had been cut or because
there were no full-time positions available. At the recession’s peak, the
unemployment rate in the country was 10 percent, and over 26 million people were either unemployed, working part time for economic
reasons, wanted a job but stopped looking because of personal reasons
(e.g., school or family responsibility), or had become too discouraged
to continue searching for a job (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012a,b,c).
After nearly two years of recession, the U.S. economy entered a
period of slow recovery in the third quarter of 2009. However, despite 11
quarters of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, jobs have just barely
started to recover. Job growth was not consistent until October 2010, 16
months after the official end of the recession. Even after this point, job
growth remained tepid, and the average job growth for the six months
prior to and including February 2012 was still only about 200,000 jobs
per month. At this rate, it will take more than eight years—until the end
of 2020—to recover the jobs lost since the start of the recession and the
approximately 100,000 jobs that should have been gained each month
to account for the growth in the working-age population. Even if jobs
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continue to grow at the rate of almost 245,000 jobs per month that the
country has experienced over the past three months (at the time of this
writing, December 2011 to February 2012), it will take six years to get
back to prerecession jobs levels (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011a).
Furthermore, real GDP, which grew at a rate of 3 percent in 2010,
slowed in 2011, and grew at an annual rate of 1.7 percent in 2011,
according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012). In order to make
a dent in the jobs deficit and to decrease the unemployment rate, the
economy needs to gain about 300,000 jobs each month, and GDP needs
to grow at a rate of 5–6 percent annually until the labor market recovers.
As a result of the anemic job growth experienced since the official end
of the recession, the unemployment rate in the United States, which has
fallen from 9.1 percent in August 2011 to 8.3 percent in January 2012
(and remained as of February 2012), is expected to stay above 8 percent
for all of 2012 and 2013 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011b; Congressional Budget Office 2012). In February 2012, 12.8 million people still
remained unemployed, 2.6 million were only marginally attached to the
labor force, and as noted above, 8.1 million people were working part
time for economic reasons (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011c).1
Most notably, long-term unemployment in the United States has
become a significant problem. As of February 2012, among the officially unemployed, 5.4 million, or 42.6 percent, had been out of work
for more than six months, and 29.2 percent had been unemployed for
a year or more; the average time to find a job had reached more than
nine months (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011c,d).2 Furthermore, by
February of 2012, the working-age population of the United States
had grown by about 9.3 million people from the start of the recession,
but the labor force had only grown by less than 1 million (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2011b). Since the labor force usually grows with the
increase in the working-age population, this is a remarkable development. Certainly, some jobless people are looking at the poor economic
climate and choosing not to enter the labor force, deciding instead, for
example, to return to or stay in school. However, there are doubtless
many others who—having had no luck in finding a job for six months,
a year, or two years or more—have simply given up and left the labor
force. This exodus of working-age people from the labor force suggests
that the current unemployment rate understates the extent of joblessness, and as many of these discouraged workers reenter the labor force,
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the unemployment rate may remain high for some time to come, even
as jobs continue to be created.
Extended periods of high joblessness have detrimental economic and
financial impacts on workers and the economy that continue long after
jobs have recovered. Such economic scarring has been demonstrated in
previous recessions and is bound to be more severe and longer-lasting
now, as a result of the Great Recession, given the nearly unprecedented
levels of unemployment, underemployment, and long-term unemployment facing workers in the United States (Irons 2009). Indeed, a recent
study of people who lost a job between 2008 and 2009 finds that only
7 percent had recovered or surpassed their previous financial status and
maintained their lifestyle. Over one-third (36 percent) of survey respondents were classified as currently being devastated or wrecked. That is,
they were either in fair or poor financial shape and believed that their
lifestyle had faced a major change. Twenty-one percent of respondents
believed that this major change in their lifestyle was permanent (Zukin,
Van Horn, and Stone 2011).
Several areas that are negatively affected during recessions, particularly education, opportunity, and poverty, influence the extent to
which an economic downturn will have a long-term economic effect.
Unemployment can lead to decreased educational achievement among
both children and adults. Children in families with an unemployed or
underemployed parent may be faced with poor nutrition and the loss
of a supportive learning environment. These children are less likely to
excel in school. Young adults as well as returning students are struggling to achieve their educational goals because of reduced family
incomes due to unemployment and underemployment. Since children
and their parents have highly correlated levels of educational attainment, the abandonment of educational goals among young adults today
is likely to have a negative impact on their children’s education levels
in the future. This loss in educational achievement is likely to continue
to negatively impact the economy, as wages increase with educational
success (Hertz et al. 2007; Irons 2009).
Researchers have found that people entering the workforce during
an economic downturn fare worse than do workers who enter the workforce when the economy is healthy. As the unemployment rate rises, the
impact on wages also increases. One study found a decrease in wages
of 6–7 percent for each percentage-point increase in the unemployment
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rate at the time of entry into the workforce. For workers who have not
graduated from college, the extent to which unemployment depresses
wages is even more severe. In addition, these effects are long term,
lasting as many as 15–20 years (Kahn 2010; von Wachter, Song, and
Manchester 2007).
Furthermore, lower wages result in fewer opportunities and
decreased economic success, not only for the workers themselves, but
also for their children. Research has found that while we would expect
job loss to result in reduced family incomes in the present, this decline in
wages is surprisingly passed down to the next generation. The children
of male job losers earn 9 percent less than their peers whose fathers did
not lose a job (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2005). Given the millions
of people who have lost a job during the recent economic downturn and
continuing jobs crisis, wages and family incomes are likely to remain
depressed for decades.
Not surprisingly, the current poverty rate in the United States is
higher than it has been in nearly 30 years. At 15.1 percent in 2010,
the poverty rate was just below its 1982 peak of 15.2 percent. Furthermore, the poverty rate is generally recognized as an outdated measure
of poverty. In 2010, over one-third of Americans had an income that
was below 200 percent of the poverty line, which is generally recognized as what it actually takes to get by (Fremstad 2011). Poverty in
childhood has been correlated with future problems, such as criminal
activity, poor health, and low earnings. Thus, the increase in poverty in
the United States following the economic crisis is likely to be a drain on
the economy into the next generation (Irons 2009).
These effects of unemployment do not tell the whole story, however. A substantial number of studies have found that unemployment
has a negative effect on a large number of outcomes ranging from the
physical to the social to the psychological. Decades of research have
demonstrated a relationship between unemployment and poor overall
health, increases in deaths due to cardiovascular problems, cirrhosis,
and suicide, decreases in well-being, increases in depression, anxiety,
and mental hospital admissions, and increases in alcohol abuse, violence, and arrests. A Rutgers University survey fielded in the summer
of 2009 found that about two-thirds of unemployed respondents felt
anxious, helpless, or depressed, and over three-quarters felt stressed.
Furthermore, the length of unemployment makes a difference—a study

Introduction 5

of both blue- and white-collar workers found that psychological symptoms were greater after four months of unemployment than after one
month (Blakely, Collings, and Atkinson 2003; Brenner 1967, 1979; Burgard, Brand, and House 2007; Catalano 1991; Catalano et al. 1993a,b;
Catalano, Novaco, and McConnell 1997, 2002; Dooley, Catalano, and
Rook 1988; Dooley, Catalano, and Wilson 1994; Dooley, Fielding, and
Levi 1996; Eliason and Storrie 2009; Hagen 1983; Hamalainen et al.
2005; Iversen and Sabroe 1988; Kessler, Turner, and House 1988, 1989;
Kposowa 2001; Liem and Liem 1988; Liem and Rayman 1982; Linn,
Sandifer, and Stein 1985; Payne, Warr, and Hartley 1984; Rutgers University 2009; Smart 1979; von Wachter 2010; Warr, Jackson, and Banks
1988).
One outcome of the psychological trauma caused by living in a
world of economic uncertainty is the impact it has on the decisions we
make. For instance, researchers have shown a connection between job
loss and marital and family dissolution. While marriage can help to
soften the blow of unemployment, unemployment can lead to marital
dissatisfaction. When one loses a job, one suffers not only financial
hardship, but also a loss of identity and social networks. These losses
may create difficulties in personal relationships. This strain may result
in decisions to dissolve marriages or postpone getting married. Recent
anecdotal evidence supports this research. Polls indicate an increase in
the dissatisfaction among married couples and a decrease in the number
of marriages in areas particularly hard hit by the recession (Grant and
Barling 1994; Liem and Liem 1988; McKee-Ryan et al. 2005; Nasser
and Overberg 2011; Peck 2010; Price, Friedland, and Vinokur 1998;
Shrieves 2010; Wilcox 2009).
Unemployment creates insecurity and the disruption of plans, both
current and future. Unemployment may also lead to limited finances,
which may constrain personal choices. Furthermore, the time frame
for reaching goals and milestones, such as buying a home, continuing
on in education, becoming financially independent from one’s parents,
or beginning retirement, may be altered by poor economic conditions.
There is some evidence that disruptive economic events during the life
course can have consequences reaching well into the future (George
1993; Moen 1983; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2007).
Polls indicate a recent increase in college applications, but also
suggest that people working their way through college have had to
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leave school. There has been a decline in the United States in both the
fertility and birth rates since the start of the recession. The number of
births in the United States fell by 2.6 percent in 2009, at the height
of job loss, despite an increase in the population. We have witnessed
an increase of female workers between 30 and 34 years of age since
the start of the recession. These women may be delaying having children and thus staying in the workforce. In a 2009 survey, almost half
of low- and middle-income women indicated that they planned to delay
pregnancy or reduce the number of children they plan to have. Almost
two-thirds of those surveyed said they could not affort to have a baby
(Guttmacher Institute 2009; Hamilton, Martin, and Ventura 2010;
Norris 2011; Tejada-Vera and Sutton 2010).
The growth in labor force participation since December 2007 among
men between the ages of 62 and 64, as well as those above age 65, indicates that people may be delaying retirement and working longer. Furthermore, there was a 7.6 percent increase in the number of people over
55 with jobs during the three years from the start of the recession in
December 2007 to December 2010 and an associated rise in the unemployment rate for this group. And, when asked about retirement, nearly
a quarter of the people participating in the 2010 Retirement Confidence
Survey indicated that the age at which they plan to retire increased over
the previous year (Arenson 2008; Foderaro 2009a,b; Employee Benefit
Research Institute 2010; Norris 2011; Public Agenda 2009; Scheiber
2009; Sok 2010).
The decisions made not only by the unemployed but also by
employed workers facing a difficult job market affect the workers
themselves, as well as their families and communities. They could have
serious implications for the future health of the U.S. economy, even
decades beyond the end of the recession. Given the multitude of negative outcomes of job loss, the United States must find a way to recover
from the current jobs crisis. It is important to understand both the economic and psychological outcomes of this crisis in order to have a more
robust response that goes beyond economic stimulus and financial markets reform to address the lingering social and psychological impacts of
prolonged weakness in the labor market.
In the context of the Great Recession and its aftermath, in April
2011 the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at the University of California, Los Angeles, held a conference called Reconnect-
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ing to Work. Researchers, advocates, and practitioners from across the
United States, Canada, and Europe came to Los Angeles to participate
in the conference. The goal of the conference was to enable a better
understanding of the consequences of long-term unemployment and the
policies that are needed to address it. Speakers presented research that
examined the psychological and economic consequences of experiencing a prolonged spell of joblessness. Discussion of policies to increase
job creation and get the long-term unemployed back into jobs engaged
both researchers and practitioners, and drew lively responses from the
audience.
Presentations focused on what it means to be out of work for
long periods, and the consequences, both economic and psychological, of this experience. One of the more unusual presentations examined responses of employers to the recession and high unemployment.
Speakers discussed policy options for adjusting to declines in demand,
including reducing hours of work rather than laying off workers. Speakers from Europe and the United States addressed these issues both from
a national and international comparative perspective.
Several major themes arose from the conference presentations and
are represented in the chapters in this volume. One recurring theme
is that losses experienced as a result of unemployment will be felt for
years. Economic losses persist for up to two decades, with measurable
negative effects on the health of unemployed individuals and their families. It is not only physical health that is impaired by long spells of
unemployment—long-term unemployment causes psychological distress that is not easily overcome. On the policy front, many speakers
identified short-time compensation, in which workers are not laid off
in a downturn but instead their hours are reduced and they draw partial
unemployment benefits for the lost hours, as a policy that has proven
successful in keeping unemployment from rising. Countries that have
used this approach for dealing with declines in demand have experienced smaller increases in unemployment in relation to the decline
in GDP than occurred in countries where this policy was not widely
utilized.
World-renowned economist Richard Freeman gave the keynote
address at the Reconnecting to Work conference. His address focused
on Wall Street’s role in the jobs crisis and the policies needed to return
to full employment. A more formal version of Freeman’s keynote
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address forms the foreword to this volume. With this provocative presentation, Freeman sets the stage for the substantive chapters of this
book. Drawing on the whimsical writings of Dr. Seuss, Freeman makes
serious points about the nature of the jobs crisis in the United States and
focuses attention on what must change in order to resolve the problems
of extreme inequality and high and persistent joblessness.
Because policymakers failed early on to recognize the severity of
the economic problems facing the country and to adopt macroeconomic
policies adequate to address them, the United States has experienced a
period of persistent and long-term unemployment. As noted by Till von
Wachter in Chapter 2 of this book, losing a job has economic repercussions for workers that take 15–20 years to overcome. Von Wachter says
that although there is variation in degree, these economic losses are
felt by all unemployed workers regardless of demographic factors or
industry. Furthermore, poor economic outcomes can lead to poor health
outcomes, which can extend to workers’ families. Von Wachter’s chapter explores the negative impact of unemployment and policy options
for relieving the economic costs of job loss.
In Chapter 3, John Schmitt addresses the question of whether steep
declines in GDP inevitably lead to sharp increases in unemployment.
He examines the role that various labor market institutions play in muting or transmitting demand shocks to jobs. He does this by comparing
national labor market institutions in Denmark, which is noted for the
flexibility of its labor market and its use of retraining and job search
assistance to match unemployed workers with jobs, with those in Germany, which include a range of measures that facilitate adjustment
by firms to demand shocks via changes in hours of work rather than
changes in number of employees. Schmitt looks to the example of Germany as the road not taken and argues that the nature of labor market
institutions may explain the varying experiences of different countries
during the downturn. In particular, Schmitt argues that Denmark, which
had the most successful labor market of the 2000s, lacked the ability
to adequately respond to periods of slack demand. The German labor
market on the other hand, which allowed for a great deal of flexibility
in adjusting hours worked, was able to prevent a steep decrease in GDP
from resulting in skyrocketing unemployment. Quite to the contrary,
Germany’s unemployment rate decreased during the economic crisis,
despite a decrease in GDP greater than that of the United States.
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Thus far, the United States has not followed the German example,
and the sharp decline in GDP during the economic crisis led to a doubling of the unemployment rate from 5 percent in December 2007 to
10 percent in October of 2009. While dropping fairly consistently since
October 2010, unemployment remains at 8.3 percent (at the time of this
writing), despite more than two and a half years of economic recovery.
In Chapter 4, Timothy M. Diette, Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick
Hamilton, and William Darity Jr. examine the psychological footprint
of unemployment and demonstrate a causal link between unemployment and emotional well-being. Using a new method for identifying
this causal link, these authors are able to estimate the impact of unemployment on emotional health. Diette and colleagues also explore the
way in which particular social characteristics interact with the detrimental effects of experiencing a bout of unemployment. Their research
points to differing impacts of long- and short-term unemployment.
Understanding the relationship between psychological well-being and
unemployment is critical, given the unprecedented length of time it currently takes the average unemployed person to find a job.
In view of the failure of job growth to recover in the United States,
different approaches to labor market policies that may increase employment must be explored. The next three chapters of this volume look
at varying options for encouraging firms to step up hiring and/or to
reduce layoffs, either of which will result in net increases in jobs in the
economy.
In Chapter 5, Hilbrand Oldenhuis and Louis Polstra argue that getting employers to cooperate with social service agencies is essential
to improving the jobs outlook. They determine that different psychological factors are important in predicting whether the people making
hiring decisions at small, medium, and large firms will cooperate with
social service agencies. The authors argue that these factors must be
taken into consideration when attempting to elicit cooperation between
firms and social service agencies. Oldenhuis and Polstra conclude that
getting firms to cooperate is important for reducing the unemployment
rate now and for preventing long-term unemployment as time goes on.
With the German example in mind, two of the chapters examine
the implementation of short-time compensation programs, such as work
sharing—the shortening of workers’ hours in order to create work and
increase employment by decreasing layoffs (Baker 2011). Through
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work sharing, employers can save money and resources by reducing the
hours of their current employees while avoiding the costs of hiring and
training a new workforce later. Employees benefit by keeping their jobs
and maintaining their skills while receiving a proportionate amount of
their unemployment benefit for the time not worked, and the government spends little or no more than it currently does for unemployment
benefits.
Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume demonstrate the importance of
labor market institutions and the value of work sharing as a solution to
the current jobs crisis. Vera Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman in Chapter
6 discuss the features of short-time compensation and examine its use
in the United States thus far. They then compare the programs in the
United States with short-time compensation programs in Canada, Germany, and Belgium. Brusentsev and Vroman conclude that the program
needs to be expanded in the United States in order to have a meaningful
impact, and they discuss a legislative proposal that could do just that.
In Chapter 7, Michele Tiraboschi and Silvia Spattini examine how
different EU member states have responded to the economic crisis and
the impact of different policy choices on the unemployment rate in
these countries. The authors conclude that while there is no one best
solution to reducing job loss during a recession, a short-time work
arrangement is a necessary element for preventing job loss and holding
down increases in unemployment. Finally, these authors note that there
has been a convergence of systems; short-time work arrangements as
well as active labor market policies (such as training) that are intended
to facilitate reintegration of the unemployed into employment are being
utilized in European countries to respond to the crisis.
Recent slow growth is not enough to lead to a significant increase in
jobs and reduction in unemployment. The Congressional Budget Office
(2012) considers the current natural rate of unemployment to be about
6 percent and estimates that it will take about five years for the unemployment rate to reach the natural rate of unemployment, dropping to
an average of 5.7 percent in 2017. Thus, despite 11 quarters of GDP
growth, the recovery is both tenuous and jobless.
While political leaders in Washington are unable to agree on how
to stimulate the economy and create jobs, the authors in this volume
present a fresh approach to understanding the nature and causes of the
jobs crisis, the economic and psychological consequences of high and

Introduction 11

persistent unemployment, and the policy approaches that can begin to
make a difference, even in the current fraught political environment.

Notes
1. People who are marginally attached to the labor force are out of work and have
stopped looking for work either because they are too discouraged or for personal
reasons. However, they are available for work and would take a job if offered one.
2. While the percentage of the unemployed who have remained out of work for more
than six months is seasonally adjusted, the percentage of the unemployed who
have remained out of work for a year or more is not seasonally adjusted.
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As the U.S. economy continues to recover from the Great Recession,
an important unknown is the fate of the millions of workers affected by
layoffs and lengthening spells of unemployment. This chapter focuses
on the short- and long-term consequences of layoffs and unemployment for affected workers, and on potential policy options to ease the
burden of adjustment on workers and their families.
Judging from experience in past recessions, the consequences of
layoffs for job losers are severe and persistent across several dimensions. The average mature worker losing a stable job with a good
employer will see earnings reductions of 20 percent lasting over 15–20
years. While these earnings losses vary somewhat among demographic
groups or industries, no group in the labor market is exempt from significant and long-lasting costs of job loss (von Wachter, Song, and
Manchester 2011a).
A job loss is also typically followed by an extended period of instability of employment and earnings. During this period, job losers can
experience declines in health. In severe downturns, these health declines
can lead to a significant reduction in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years
(Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). The consequences of job loss are also
felt by workers’ children—who can suffer even into adulthood—and
their families. All of these costs are likely to be greater for the long-term
unemployed.
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Government programs can alleviate part of the short-term earnings
loss associated with job loss and unemployment. As a typical measure,
extensions of unemployment insurance (UI)
• ease the burden of adjustment for laid-off workers,
• are likely to prevent entry into more costly government programs
such as disability insurance,
• provide a degree of demand stabilization, and
• are unlikely—at least in recessions—to be associated with significant reductions in employment in the short or the long run.
However, policy is unlikely to be able to prevent the large and lasting reductions in earnings that eventually follow a typical job loss.
The majority of long-term losses are due to factors that are not easily manipulated by government policy, such as losses in the value of
certain skills as industries decline, the loss of long-term career jobs, or
slow wage-adjustment in the labor market. Some policies, though, have
been shown to be able to reduce unemployment, such as targeted efforts
to help workers in their job search, or programs reducing the costs of
long-term adjustment, such as the costs of retraining.
Given the difficulties of helping job losers and unemployed workers
recover from long-term earnings losses after the fact, it may be worthwhile to explore available options to prevent large-scale layoffs in the
future. Such options include programs of work sharing to subsidize
employment before workers are laid off and become unemployed, to
encourage the introduction of flexible work-time arrangements, or to
encourage the provision of credit to economically viable firms affected
by distress in financial markets.
For example, the cost of UI benefits for a typical worker is a small
fraction of the total earnings lost due to a layoff over the remainder
of the individual’s working life. If the same benefits were paid during
employment to avoid job loss, the cost of recessions would be substantially reduced. This would be beneficial even if the worker were to be
let go eventually, since earnings losses tend to be significantly smaller
for layoffs that do not occur in a large recession.
Overall, job loss and unemployment during severe recessions can
impose substantial and lasting costs on affected workers in terms of
earnings, health, and strain on their families. The short-term burden
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of these costs can in part be alleviated at a comparatively small cost,
such as by extensions in UI. Less is known about how to help reduce
the substantial long-term costs. While cost-effective policies may be
available to help reemploy the long-term unemployed, the potential of
policy interventions to significantly aid recovery of long-term earnings
declines appears bleaker. Given these large and long-term costs, preventive measures to avoid massive layoffs are a policy option worth
considering.

THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM CONSEqUENCES OF
LAyOFF AND UNEMPLOyMENT
An increasing literature has documented that job losses during
recessions have severe and lasting consequences for earnings. For
example, workers displaced in the recession of the early 1980s—which,
until 2008, was the strongest U.S. recession since World War II—on
average had earnings reductions of 30 percent or more in the first year
after layoff. These losses declined somewhat over time, but even 15–20
years after job loss, the earnings reduction was still 20 percent (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester
2011a). Such lasting earnings reductions occurred for job losers in all
age ranges, in all industries, for men and women, and throughout the
earnings distribution. This phenomenon is not limited to the early 1980s
recession or to particular regions of the country, and it does not depend
on the particular way of measuring the cost of displacement.1 Older
workers suffer larger losses in earnings, but these losses extend over
shorter periods of time, since remaining lives are shorter and job loss
hastens retirement (Chan and Stevens 2001). Workers in the middle of
the education distribution, such as workers with some college or only
a high school degree, appear to lose more than very low- or very highskilled individuals (von Wachter and Handwerker 2009).
These long-lasting reductions in earnings occur alongside, and may
be partly augmented by, increases in job instability, recurring transitions
to nonemployment, and repeated switches of industry or occupation
(Stevens 1997; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Some of
this increased mobility between jobs may be a sign of beneficial adjust-
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ment, but on average those workers who immediately find a stable job
in their predisplacement industry do significantly better. The increase in
job instability lasts up to 10 years after layoff. During the same period,
these workers experience continuing increases in earnings instability.
Thus, there is no sign that laid-off workers trade lower earnings for
more stable employment. While heightened regional mobility appears
beneficial in the short run, as mobile workers may eschew a particularly
depressed local labor market, movers do not have lower long-term earnings losses.
There is also increasing evidence that laid-off workers suffer shortand long-term declines in health. In the short term, layoffs and unemployment are associated with an increasing incidence of stress-related
health problems, such as strokes or heart attacks (Burgard, Brand, and
House 2007). These problems can lead to a large spike in mortality
right after job loss. For example, mature men who lost their stable jobs
in Pennsylvania during the early 1980s experienced an increase in the
mortality rate right after job loss of up to 100 percent. This initial rise in
mortality declines over time, but mortality remains significantly higher
for job losers than for comparable workers who did not lose their jobs.
If sustained until the end of their lives, such increases lead to reductions
in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009).
Several studies also point to short- and long-term effects of layoffs
on the children and families of job losers and unemployed workers. For
example, in the short run, parental job loss reduces schooling achievement of children (Stevens and Schaller 2009). In the long run, it appears
that a lasting reduction in the earnings of fathers also reduces the earnings prospects of their sons (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008).
There is also evidence that layoff heightens the incidence of divorce,
reduces home ownership, and increases the rate of application to and
the receipt of disability insurance programs (Charles and Stephens
2004; Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2009; Rupp and Stapleton 1995; von
Wachter and Handwerker 2009).
All of these costs are likely to be larger for workers who are unemployed for longer periods of time. It is well documented that earnings
losses for unemployed workers increase significantly with time spent
outside employment (Congressional Budget Office 2007; Machin and
Manning 1999). It is difficult to establish whether this is because the
duration itself worsens labor market prospects, or because those workers
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facing the strongest challenges in the labor market take longer to find a
new job. In one of a few studies establishing causality, Schmieder, von
Wachter, and Bender (2012b) show that nonemployment indeed leads
to lower reemployment wages, at least in Germany. Independently of
the source, longer unemployment spells are likely to put a significant
additional strain on workers’ financial situations and the overall wellbeing of both themselves and their families. These workers are also
particularly dependent on benefits from UI. The poverty rate among the
long-term unemployed is high, especially for those exhausting unemployment benefits (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Tables 6 and 9).
Finally, even though they were not laid off or are not officially
counted as unemployed, the long-term earnings and career prospects of
young workers entering the labor market during a recession also suffer.
For example, individuals graduating from college during a large recession are likely to see reduced earnings for 10–15 years compared to
more fortunate graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and
Heisz 2012; Oyer 2008). As is the case for job losers, those labor market entrants in the middle of the education distribution do worse, while
those with lower or higher education tend to do better (Kondo 2008;
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). The pattern of recovery of
unlucky college graduates is telling: a recession reduces the quality
of the first employer. After about five years, workers find an employer
of better quality, but their earnings still have to recover within the firm
relative to more fortunate graduates who obtained their jobs in better
economic times. Thus, the initial setback in the career can take 10–15
years to dissipate, even for this very mobile demographic group.

THE REASONS FOR LONG-TERM EARNINGS LOSSES
AFTER LAyOFF AND UNEMPLOyMENT
There are several potential sources of lasting reductions in earnings
after a layoff. An often cited explanation attributes the losses in earnings
to a loss in the use of certain skills, as some industries or occupations
shift their operations elsewhere or permanently reduce their employment levels. If some of workers’ earnings derived from payment for services and skills only needed in specific industries or occupations, upon
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job loss workers lose wages associated with these skills (Neal 1995;
Parent 2000; Poletaev and Robinson 2008). Such a loss can lead to
long-term earnings declines if workers do not reinvest in a new equivalent set of skills. Particularly for middle-aged or older workers, it might
not be worth spending their time and money in costly retraining as they
face uncertain reemployment over a shorter remaining working life.
Another explanation is that workers in stable jobs, especially workers aged 30 or older, are likely to have found an occupation and an
employer suitable for their interests and qualifications. The process of
searching for such a job can take time, involving both changes of occupations and employers in the beginning of their careers, as well as job
search and promotions within a firm (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
1994; Neal 1999; Topel and Ward 1992). On average, this phase of
workers’ careers can last 10 years. Part of the gain from this prolonged
search and matching process is lost at job loss. By its nature, finding
such a suitable job again is likely to take a long time. If job offers start
arriving only as the economy picks up, the adjustment process can last
well beyond recovery in the aggregate labor market.
Increasing evidence also suggests that the first wage on a worker’s
new job is likely to influence her pay for a long time (Beaudry and
DiNardo 1991; Schmieder and von Wachter 2010). This persistence
can arise from (explicit or implicit) wage contracts between workers
and firms. Since many unemployed workers end up finding the first job
when wages are still depressed due to the recession, persistence implies
that they may live with lower earnings for quite some time. As a result,
workers laid off in recessions suffer substantially larger earnings losses
than workers laid off in booms (Davis and von Wachter 2012). Although
workers can improve their pay by obtaining outside job offers, changing jobs, or relocating, many face obstacles to such adjustment, often
due to family commitments. However, the rate of mobility is likely to
be too low even given those factors, possibly because individuals do not
realize the need to keep improving their economic situations 5–10 years
after a job loss or an unemployment spell.
Some workers may also experience reductions in earnings because
they held jobs in industries or at firms that paid exceptionally high
wages. Yet, it does not appear that workers in such jobs are more likely
to be laid off. In fact, during large recessions job losers are less likely to
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be selected from high-wage jobs, partly because economic difficulties
are widespread and do not just affect single firms or sectors. Similarly,
it is unlikely that job losses arise because firms systematically let go
those workers who are overpaid or who are least productive.2

POLICy OPTIONS TO EASE THE BURDEN OF ADJUSTMENT
OF LAID-OFF AND UNEMPLOyED WORkERS
Policies Aimed at Reducing the Burden of Short-Term
Earnings Losses
Government programs can help to ease the burden of the short-term
cost of job loss and unemployment. The most common approach to do
so has been to increase the duration over which eligible workers can
receive unemployment benefits. In the 2008 recession, the maximum
duration of UI benefits was 99 weeks, about four times the regular duration of 26 weeks. Significant extensions in the duration of UI also took
place in the 1982 and 1990 recessions (Congressional Budget Office
2004).
Extensions of UI benefits have several beneficial aspects for recipients and for the economy as a whole. Extended benefits allow workers
to buffer the effect of the earnings loss on consumption, albeit consumption still falls for the average UI recipient (Browning and Crossley 2001; Congressional Budget Office 2007; Gruber 1997). In addition, extended benefits allow workers to search longer for a suitable
job, and provide insurance against the stress of not being able to find
a job because of continued slack in the labor market. Extensions in UI
benefits also prevent some workers from applying to other government
programs not intended to smooth short-term economic shocks, such as
Social Security Disability Insurance or Old Age and Survivors Insurance. In particular, benefits provided under disability insurance can be
very costly, especially if provided to younger or middle-aged workers
with low-mortality impairment (Autor and Duggan 2006; von Wachter,
Song, and Manchester 2011b). While increases in unemployment rates
typically lead to a significant rise in application and award rates, extensions in UI have the potential to dampen this effect. Finally, extended
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UI benefits can provide a degree of demand stabilization through the
multiplier effect (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Table 1).
On the downside, several studies have suggested that UI may impose
a cost by reducing recipients’ willingness to work (Congressional Budget Office 2008).3 In addition, prolonged spells of unemployment may
lead workers’ skills to atrophy or otherwise reduce their employability. Yet, it is likely that in severe recessions the benefit of extended UI
outweighs the costs. First, the value of income replacement to workers
should be particularly high. Second, longer UI durations are unlikely to
have a strong effect on employment, since strategic considerations are
likely to be weaker when the number of jobs is scarce (see, for example,
Congressional Budget Office [2008]). Moreover, recent research suggests that a sizable part of the decline in employment may not be due to
the reduction in the willingness of UI recipients to work, but rather to
the fact that some individuals have limited access to credit. If this is the
case, not all of the employment effects of UI represent a distortion, but
it may be a sign that UI helps to alleviate credit constraints that prevent
individuals from self-insuring against unemployment shocks.4
In the only study of its kind, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender
(2012a) analyze large extensions in the durations of UI in Germany and
show that these led to only moderate reductions in employment, without
a noticeable difference in this effect in large recessions. Based on a very
large sample of unemployed workers spanning over 25 years and utilizing a very credible research design, these findings lie at the lower range
of typical U.S. estimates (Meyer 2002, Table 5). For a large increase in
UI duration from 26 to 99 weeks, the estimates from Germany suggest
that extended UI would lead to a moderate increase in the rate of unemployment. Yet, for several reasons the current effect in the United States
would likely be smaller. The increases in UI durations were stepwise,
and extension was not always certain. Only 50 percent of all eligible
unemployed workers have taken up UI benefits in this recession, further
reducing the potential impact of UI extensions on employment.5 Finally,
the effects on aggregate employment are based on the assumption of full
employment; under a slack labor market, the effect of individual search
decisions on aggregate employment is likely to be smaller.6
This research also suggests that contrary to what is often believed,
extensions in UI benefits appear to neither help nor strongly hurt the
longer-term job prospects of recipients. Increases in UI durations have
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small negative effects on the wage at the first job after unemployment.
Yet, neither the wage nor the employment rate five years after entry
into unemployment is affected by longer UI durations (Schmieder, von
Wachter, and Bender 2012b). Thus, it appears that extended UI benefits
have an effect on workers’ disposable income, consumption, and shortterm employment choice, but they may have neither strong adverse nor
beneficial effects on long-term employment prospects.
Several other measures to ease the short-term burden of adjustment
have been tried in the current and in past downturns, and have been
featured in policy proposals in the 2008 recession. These include wage
subsidies paid to employers and tax breaks for firms to raise job creation, temporary assistance to obtain further training, and some form
of public employment. The best available evidence suggests that these
measures are somewhat successful in reducing unemployment and
alleviating earnings losses of job losers.7 These measures do not share
the advantage of extended UI, which builds on an existing infrastructure of a successfully functioning program and immediately affects UI
recipients and the economy (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Table
1). However, with the exception of training, the measures share with
extended UI the mainly short-term focus, with less known long-term
benefits for laid-off and unemployed workers.
Policies Aimed at Reducing Long-Term Unemployment and
Lasting Earnings Losses
The reach of the large losses in earnings, increases in job instability, and reductions in health goes beyond the duration of extended UI
benefits. In fact, since the losses persist well beyond 5 or 10 years, the
majority of the lifetime loss in earnings occurs after eligibility for UI
benefits has expired. Yet, few policy options are available to alleviate
the long-run costs of job loss and unemployment.
For example, there is no current evidence that the longer duration
of UI benefits improves the long-term earnings or employment trajectories of the unemployed (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2012b).
Similarly, the evidence of efforts to successfully train laid-off workers in new skills is mixed, and there is little evidence available on the
long-term effects of other programs.8 By the nature of the mechanisms
behind long-term earnings losses as explained above, it is unlikely that

26 von Wachter

any policy will completely close or significantly reduce the long-term
earnings gap—short of altering the market’s mechanisms of wage setting, the trade-offs governing workers’ investment in their skills, or the
multiple factors affecting the decision to relocate. Yet, there are some
options available to help those with long unemployment spells find jobs
and try to improve the long-term earnings prospects of job losers.
In particular, it is likely that a lack in mobility between jobs, occupations, or regions will contribute to the persistence of reductions in
earnings at job loss, perhaps because workers are not aware of the time
it would take to dissipate their earnings losses. As explained above, the
individual’s recovery process is likely to last well beyond the recovery of the aggregate labor market. Job losers might not be aware of
the long-term efforts required to rebuild a career, and active counseling
may help in bringing expectations in line with the reality workers will
be facing in the labor market. Evaluations of job search assistance have
found that counseling reduces UI rolls and is cost-effective.9
Another reason why workers do not move or change occupations
might be because they are not aware that the job prospects in their lines
of work and in their local labor markets may have declined permanently. This may lead individuals to wrongly assess the prospects of
finding a job in their old industries or occupations in their local labor
markets, and wait too long to switch careers, change employers, or
move to another region. Information on how job prospects in the workers’ professions and related occupations are evolving both locally and
nationally might be a useful tool to help unemployed workers and their
families make better choices. Such information is routinely available
from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and could,
for example, be included with workers’ UI benefit checks.
Part of the effort to rebuild a career might involve retraining or relocating. One way to raise mobility is to offer workers support in covering expenses related to retraining or moving. Evaluations of subsidies
to attend community college have found that they, on average, raise
earnings of displaced workers, particularly if covered subjects are of a
more technical nature. However, such programs seem to be beneficial
and cost-effective for selected populations but may not be a solution for
the broader population of participants (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan
2005). Less is known about the potential benefits of relocating unemployed workers. On the one hand, reallocation of labor across regions
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plays an important role in equilibrating local labor markets (Blanchard
and Katz 1992). On the other hand, regional mobility does not appear
to significantly lower earnings losses of displaced workers, perhaps
because most large recessions afflict most regions of the country (von
Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Yet, over the longer run, government programs helping unemployed workers to relocate, for example, by reducing their mortgage debt, are likely to help workers recover
some of their lost earnings.
An alternative set of policies includes efforts to directly stimulate employment growth at the local level. These could be targeted at
improving the economic situation in regions particularly hard hit by
the recent downturn. Yet, in general, an upturn in the labor market
improves the lot of some workers, but does not raise the earnings trajectory of job losers or those formerly unemployed (Jacobson, Lalonde,
and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). There
is no reason per se why localized policies should have a different effect
on the employment of the long-term unemployed or the earnings of
reemployed laid-off workers than a regular upturn in the labor market.
One reason why workers experiencing long-term unemployment
spells are not affected by an improvement in labor market conditions
is that they have become detached from the labor market. In this case,
low-cost policies, such as informing workers about job opportunities
or the employment outlook in their occupation, may not deliver the
desired effect of increasing workers’ mobility and raising their chances
of finding a job. In this case, a more active approach may be needed
to reintegrate long-term unemployed workers into the labor market.
For example, it may be cost-efficient to temporarily subsidize workers’
wages upon reemployment for a certain period if this leads to a permanent increase in labor force participation and reduces applications to
programs geared for the disabled or the poor.10
Finally, given increasing evidence that children’s long-term economic success might be influenced by the layoff of a parent, it is worth
considering ways to directly assist families with children. One possibility that builds on existing programs is to provide additional financial aid
to cover college tuition and living expenses. While work on the crossgenerational effects of displacement is still developing, many families
that experienced a layoff with children in college or nearing college
age today are likely to feel the pinch in their financial resources. Thus,
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it may be worth exploring measures to help cover part of the costs of
higher education or training for the children of job losers.
Policy Initiatives to Avoid Mass Layoffs in Future Recessions
It is likely that cost-effective government policies can help the longterm unemployed find renewed employment. Yet, few measures promise to substantially reduce the long-term earnings losses that can afflict
laid-off or unemployed workers. While Congress considers financial
reform to safeguard against another financial crisis, it may be worth
considering reforms that help prevent costly earnings losses during a
future recession, such as work sharing. For jobs lost in declining firms
or industries, this may mean that inevitable job destruction would be
spread over time. Thus, layoffs would likely occur in a better economic
environment and therefore lead to significantly smaller losses in earnings. For jobs lost in economically viable sectors or at viable firms,
work sharing could avoid costly breakup of productive employment
relationships that would have likely continued in the absence of an economic crisis.
Two mechanisms to achieve such a temporary buffering of employment at firms in economic difficulties could be work-sharing arrangements supported by the government, or private arrangements such as
work-time accounts. Work sharing has effects that are similar to those
of current measures to increase job creation through tax breaks or wage
subsidies, except that incentives to generate employment are given
prior to job displacement. In particular, instead of firing, say, 30 percent of its workers, an employer would reduce hours worked by all
of its workers by 30 percent. Government subsidies comprise part of
workers’ reduced earnings. They could be financed partially by the UI
system, in which case workers essentially draw part of the benefits they
would have received if they had become unemployed.
Work-sharing policies have been currently adopted by 21 U.S.
states. Yet, these have a limited public commitment to replace earnings,
so the take-up is relatively low. Even though a large amount of layoffs
have already taken place, if expanded, such programs could increase
aggregate employment by reducing continuing layoffs at those firms
that keep shedding workers.11 Work sharing was also available to firms
in Germany during the current recession, and has been credited to have
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helped avert a significant number of layoffs, despite a drop in GDP
growth that was larger than the decline in the United States.12 Clearly, it
is important to pay attention to the details of such an arrangement. From
the point of view of UI, being unemployed is a clearly defined state. For
administering work sharing, it may be difficult to screen eligible firms.
Yet, the successful implementation by many states suggests that these
difficulties can be surmounted on a practical level.
The evaluation of work sharing is still at an early stage. However, it
comes with lower financial involvement and less direct steering of economic activities than more targeted interventions, and is likely to extend
the benefits of government support to a much broader group of workers.
A related strategy to help avert layoffs of productive workers would
be to create programs geared to maintain access to short-term credit to
firms in financial distress that are otherwise economically viable. This
approach would be most sensible in times of a sudden reduction in private credit, such as what occurred after the financial crisis in 2008.
A second approach would be to encourage workers and firms to
find private solutions to reduce the risk of layoffs, such as work-time
accounts based on an agreement between workers and firms to smooth
hours over the business cycle. Thus, effectively the firm saves part of
the overtime pay on behalf of workers during good economic times,
and draws down balances when economic conditions worsen instead of
firing the worker. In addition to work sharing, such work-time accounts
were a major factor in keeping layoffs to a minimum in Germany during the current recession. The use of these accounts was particularly
prevalent in sectors that exhibited stable growth prior to the crisis and
were experiencing shortages in skilled labor (Möller 2010). Such an
arrangement is based on long-term relationships between workers and
firms that involve some degree of firm- or sector-specific skills. While
the paradigm in the United States is one of high labor turnover, many
employment relationships are long-lasting, and employers invest in
searching for and training workers. Thus, in light of the large costs of
job displacement, such arrangements may be beneficial to both workers
and firms.13
Clearly, layoffs cannot be prevented altogether and are to some
extent a natural feature of a market economy. However, in special circumstances, such as the financial crisis of 2008 or high interest rates
in 1982, some layoffs might occur at otherwise healthy firms, leading
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to costly layoffs as productive employment relationships are severed.
Similarly, layoffs in declining industries might be accelerated, leading
to large-scale layoffs that exceed the capacity of the labor market to
reallocate these workers. For such cases, mechanisms that allow firms
to avoid large-scale layoffs could prevent large and lasting consequences affecting a high number of workers. The potential benefit of
such safeguards is underscored by the difficulty of alleviating the longterm consequences of workers affected by layoffs and unemployment.

CONCLUSION
An increasing number of studies indicate that job loss and unemployment during recessions can impose large and lasting costs on
affected workers and their families. The short-term burden of these
costs can be alleviated relatively cost-effectively, such as by extending
UI. Less is known about how to help workers adjust to the significant
long-term costs. While cost-effective policies exist to reintegrate the
long-term unemployed into the labor market, the potential for policy
interventions to reduce long-term earnings losses appears less promising. Given the large long-term costs of layoffs and unemployment, preventive measures to avoid large-scale layoffs in future recessions are
worth exploring further.

Notes
This chapter is based on a testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of U.S.
Congress on April 29, 2010, on “Long-Term Unemployment: Causes, Consequences
and Solutions,” as well as a presentation at the Reconnecting to Work conference at the
University of California–Los Angeles.
1. Davis and von Wachter (2012) contrast the effects of job loss in booms and recessions. Farber (2005) provides estimates of the short-term costs of job loss for the
United States over the past two decades. Couch and Placzek (2010), Kodrzycki
(2007), Schoeni and Dardia (2003), and von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth
(2008) show medium-run estimates for California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts in the early 1990s.
2. Estimates of the cost of job loss are robust to extensive controls for worker and
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3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

firm characteristics; the effect of layoffs is not larger when firms displace fewer
workers, such as during smaller layoffs or good economic times.
For a more technical overview, see Meyer (2002).
This point is made by Chetty (2008), who estimates that over half of employment
effects of UI may be due to such an income effect.
The take-up rate of UI fluctuates between 40 and 50 percent for all unemployed
and between 70 and 80 percent among job losers (Congressional Budget Office
2004). A similar back of the envelope calculation and caveat is made by Elsby,
Hobijn, and Şahin (2010, Section 3.2).
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) discuss the role of aggregate factors in determining the employment effects of UI extensions; Rothstein (2011) provides estimates suggesting small to moderate employment effects of UI extensions in the
United States during the Great Recession of 2008.
For example, for an assessment of the effect of wage subsidies, see Perloff and
Wachter (1979) and Congressional Budget Office (2010). For an assessment of the
effect of training programs for displaced workers see U.S. Department of Labor
(1995, Section 5). For a meta-analysis of the effect of various labor market policies, see Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010).
While the average returns from training are positive, relatively few displaced
workers take up training (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 2005).
U.S. Department of Labor (1995, Section 5). For a survey of recent evidence see
Jacobson (2009).
This has been recently advocated under the name of wage insurance, for example,
by Kling (2006); Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993); and Litan and Kletzer
(2001). Evidence on related reemployment bonus experiments suggests that shortterm subsidies raise employment, but may only be cost-effective if targeted to
workers most likely to exhaust their benefits (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner
2005; U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
This argument is spelled out in Hassett’s (2010) testimony to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Burda and Hunt (2011) and Möller (2010) assess the role of work sharing and
work-time accounts in averting layoffs in Germany.
A small theoretical literature discusses why such contracts are not prevalent in the
United States (Grossman and Hart 1983; Ramey and Watson 1997).
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Labor Market Policy
in the Great Recession
Lessons from Denmark and Germany
John Schmitt
Center for Economic and Policy Research

The Great Recession started in the United States, but it quickly
spread to the rest of the world. Although some countries fared even
worse than the United States, many have weathered the crisis better.
This chapter reviews the experience of 21 rich countries that are all
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—a group of economies that offer a standard of living
roughly comparable to that of the United States—in search of possible
lessons for the United States.
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage point change between 2007 and
2009 in the unemployment rate across these 21 rich countries. Since
national definitions of the unemployment rate vary somewhat, the figure uses “harmonized” unemployment rates prepared by the OECD. It
covers a period that starts in 2007—the year just before the downturn
hit most economies—and ends in 2009—the year that the economy
reached its trough in most countries.1 The United States had the thirdhighest increase in unemployment (4.7 percentage points), after Spain
(9.7 percentage points) and Ireland (7.2 percentage points). In the other
OECD economies, the increase in unemployment was less than 2.5 percentage points. Strikingly, the unemployment rate actually fell in Germany (−1.2 percentage points).
Economic theory suggests three possible reasons for the different unemployment experience. The first is that the size of the negative
demand shock might have varied across these economies. It could be,
for example, that Spain suffered a larger negative demand shock than
the United States, which in turn experienced a worse demand shock than
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Figure 3.1 Change in Harmonized Unemployment Rate, 2007–2009
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most of the rest of the OECD. Since we can’t directly observe demand
shocks, we can never be completely sure. But all of the evidence—primarily the change in GDP—suggests that the demand shocks were large
and negative across all of these economies. The shock to Germany,
for example, was likely larger than the one that hit the United States:
between 2007 and 2009, German GDP fell 3.8 percent, compared to a
2.6 percent decline in the United States.2
A second possible explanation for the different unemployment
experiences is different macroeconomic policy responses. Even if
all countries experienced exactly the same negative demand shock,
countercyclical macroeconomic policy—expansionary monetary and
fiscal policy—could have reduced the observed decline in GDP more
in some countries than in others. Macroeconomic policy responses
did vary widely across the OECD, but most analyses suggest that the
United States did better than average.3 The Federal Reserve Board
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lowered interest rates farther and faster in the United States than, for
example, the European Central Bank did in Europe.4 The United States
also implemented the largest explicit fiscal stimulus package (as a share
of GDP) among the major OECD countries. Other countries passed
smaller stimulus packages, and automatic stabilizers were more important parts of the fiscal response elsewhere, but, even taking all these
measures into account, the fiscal response was likely faster and larger
in the United States.
A final possible explanation for the different international unemployment experience in the downturn is the structure of labor markets.
National labor market institutions likely vary in the way that they translate a given decline in GDP into unemployment. The preceding discussion suggests that the United States experienced a negative demand
shock somewhere in the middle of the OECD experience and responded
in a way that partly mitigated the negative impact of that shock. If so,
the large rise in U.S. unemployment suggests that U.S. labor market
institutions offered a particularly harsh trade-off between falling GDP
and unemployment. By contrast, Germany appears to have experienced
a larger negative demand shock and responded to that shock with less
aggressive monetary and fiscal policy than the United States, yet unemployment declined in Germany between 2007 and 2009. The German
labor market institutions appear to have handled the demand shock
extremely well.
This chapter will focus on this third possible reason for international differences in the labor market response to the Great Recession:
national labor market institutions. The following section presents a brief
framework for thinking about how labor market institutions and policies mediate the relationship between GDP and employment. The next
section reviews the experience of two national economies: Denmark,
which operated what was arguably the most successful labor market of
the 2000s, and Germany, which has had remarkable success in resisting
the international rise in unemployment since 2007. The final section
concludes with some possible lessons for the United States.
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LABOR MARkETS AND MACROECONOMIC SHOCkS
Once a negative demand shock has hit and macroeconomic policy
has been deployed in response, the path of employment and unemployment depends largely on the labor market. For the 21 rich OECD countries, Figure 3.2 graphs the change between 2007 and 2009 in the unemployment rate against the corresponding change in real GDP. Over this
two-year period, real GDP fell in every country except Austria.
Figure 3.2 includes a regression line that traces the average relationship between unemployment and GDP across the countries. Most of the
countries in the sample (including Denmark) are clustered close to the
average experience. These data suggest that the national labor market
institutions in place in these countries converted a 1 percentage point
decline in GDP into about a 0.4 percentage point increase in unemployment. Several of the countries, however, lie well off the line, indicating that they differ substantially from the OECD average. Germany,
for example, falls well below the regression line. Any given decline in
German GDP had far less impact on the unemployment rate than at the
OECD average. The United States, Spain, and Ireland, meanwhile, all
lie well above the regression line, suggesting that GDP declines in these
countries are much more costly in terms of unemployment than was the
case for the OECD in general.
In broad terms, labor markets can adjust to macroeconomic demand
shocks in some combination of two ways (with an important caveat,
which will follow). Either employment can fall—fewer workers working the same number of hours as before (at the same hourly wage) meet
the new lower output demanded—or average hours per worker can
fall—the same number of workers spend fewer hours per week to produce the new output level.5
Imagine that a particular decline in aggregate demand requires that
employers reduce their total wage bill by 10 percent. The wage bill (B)
is equal to the total number of employees (E), times the average number
of hours they work (H/E), times the average hourly wage (W):
B = E × (H/E) × W .
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Figure 3.2 Unemployment and GDP, 2007–2009
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Employers could cut the wage bill by reducing employment by 10
percent (E), or by reducing the average hours per worker (H/E) by 10
percent (or, of course, by some combination of the two). As the discussion below suggests, labor market institutions play a crucial role in
determining exactly where the adjustment falls. In Denmark, the United
States, and most other countries in the OECD, much of the adjustment
has fallen on employment (E), resulting in substantial increases in
unemployment. In Germany, essentially all of adjustment has occurred
through changes in average hours (H/E), resulting in a counterintuitive
decline in unemployment there.
One caveat applies, however. These adjustment mechanisms are
incomplete on their own. One of the central insights of Keynes’s General Theory (1936) was that cuts in workers’ incomes, whatever form
they take, cannot restore full employment in the face of a shortfall in
aggregate demand. The very action of individual employers cutting
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workers’ take-home pay in order to bring their individual wage bills into
line with the lower level of aggregate demand has the effect of further
lowering aggregate demand. Labor market adjustments take place, but
in the middle of an aggregate demand slump, they cannot restore full
employment without offsetting expansionary macroeconomic policy or
some new, positive aggregate demand shock. This new, positive demand
shock could take many forms, some of which are more desirable than
others. The short U.S. recession of 2001, for example, ended primarily because of demand fueled by the housing bubble. Economists have
long argued, however, that wage-led growth offers a more sustainable
avenue for reviving and maintaining aggregate demand (see Berg and
Ostry [2011], Coats [2011], Kalecki [1991], and Palley [2011]).

THE GREAT RECESSION IN DENMARk AND GERMANy
Labor market institutions have been at the center of the discussion of
labor market performance since at least the 1980s, when unemployment
rose sharply and remained stubbornly high in most of the major OECD
economies. A standard view, encapsulated in the OECD’s 1994 Jobs
Study, maintains that labor market institutions are the primary determinant of labor market performance. In this framework, labor market
institutions should first and foremost seek to maximize “flexibility”;
other economic and social goals of labor market institutions—including economic security and equity—are distinctly secondary. This view
generally leaves aside the role that macroeconomic policy plays in the
smooth functioning of the labor market. To the extent that this approach
does acknowledge the importance of macroeconomics, it is usually to
argue that institutions such as unions, UI, and employment protection
legislation restrict the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy by introducing “rigidities” that channel expansionary policies toward inflation,
not job creation.6
In the mid-2000s, this standard view was updated and amended in
the face of substantial evidence that countries with what qualified as
“rigid” labor markets by many of the usual indicators (high union coverage rates, generous unemployment benefits, and strong employment
protection legislation) were performing quite well.7 This new thinking
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brought explicit recognition to two key ideas. The first was that the
previous understanding of flexibility was too narrow. Unemployment
insurance, for example, might reduce incentives for the unemployed to
accept jobs, but these same benefits might improve the quality of eventual job matches by giving workers more time to search. A second key
idea was that the interaction of labor market institutions matters more
than the specific institutions separately. In some contexts, high unemployment benefits might raise the unemployment rate. In others, the
existence of generous unemployment benefits might persuade workers and unions to accept lower levels of legal employment protection,
resulting in a more, not less, dynamic labor market.
The rest of this section reviews the recent experience of two countries with very different experiences before and after the Great Recession. Denmark had what was arguably the OECD’s best performing
labor markets before the Great Recession, but has suffered since 2008.
German labor markets, meanwhile, were generally struggling shortly
after unification until the end of 2007, when suddenly Germany began
to outperform every major economy in the OECD.

DENMARk
The experience of the Danish economy from the mid-1990s through
the Great Recession did a great deal to change the consensus view on
the need for labor market “flexibility” at all costs (see, for example,
OECD [2004, 2006] and European Commission [2006]). In 2007, just
before the downturn, the Danish unemployment rate was 4.0 percent
(compared to 4.6 percent in the United States), and the employmentto-population rate was 77.1 percent (compared to 71.8 percent in the
United States).8 Low-wage work was rare, and income inequality was
near the lowest levels in the OECD (see Mason and Salverda [2010];
OECD [2011, Figure 1]; and Westergaard-Nielsen [2008]). Yet, by
OECD standards, Denmark had high taxes, high unionization rates,
generous unemployment benefits, and a costly system of education,
training, assistance, and incentives for unemployed workers.
The Danish model—often described as being built around flexicurity—worked, it seems, because it combined a high level of flexibil-
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ity for employers with equally high levels of security for workers. The
flexibility came primarily in the form of low levels of legal employment
protections combined with a willingness of Danish unions to accept layoffs. The security came in the form of high wages, strong unions, and
generous UI and other benefits.9 A defining Danish labor market institution has been its collection of active labor market policies (ALMPs).
These policies, targeted at unemployed workers, include education
and training, extensive assistance in job search, financial incentives,
subsidized employment, and, in some cases, even direct public-sector
employment. Active labor market policies increase flexibility by moving the unemployed through the generous unemployment benefits system and enhance security by improving skills and providing temporary,
subsidized employment opportunities for workers who otherwise might
spend long periods unemployed.
From about the middle of the 1990s through the onset of the Great
Recession, the system produced enviable results. The unemployment
rate fell rapidly, from over 10 percent in 1993 to less than 5 percent
by 2000, a range where it remained until 2008. Most accounts explain
these results by emphasizing the way that the flexicurity institutions
supported a dynamic labor market that was capable of rapidly reallocating workers from firms and sectors in the economy where demand was
falling to firms and sectors where demand was on the rise (see OECD
[2004, 2006] and European Commission [2006]). Politically, the system worked because workers and their unions felt secure enough about
their incomes to agree to only limited legal and negotiated job security.
Employers accepted the higher taxes and an important economic role
for unions because these were the political conditions that made the
greater numerical flexibility possible.
Figures 3.3–3.7 put the salient features of the Danish system into
international perspective. As Figure 3.3 shows, Denmark has an exceptionally large commitment to ALMPs. The share of national GDP spent
on ALMPs (per percentage point of unemployment) was the highest in
the OECD.10 Using this standard measure, in 2007, before unemployment in Denmark increased, the country spent 0.26 percent of GDP
per percentage point of unemployment—about 12 times more than the
United States (0.02 percent of GDP per point of unemployment) and
about 5 times more than Germany (0.05).
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Figure 3.3 Expenditure on Active Labor Market Policies, 2007
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One of the standard justifications for the large scale of Danish
ALMPs is that they are necessary to ensure that the unemployed don’t
get stuck in the country’s generous, union-administered, unemployment
benefit system. The OECD data in Figure 3.4 support the view that
unemployment benefits in Denmark are fairly generous by international
standards. An average worker receives about 70 percent of the average
wage during their initial period of unemployment, slightly less generous than Germany (74 percent), but more generous than the United
States (58 percent).11
Denmark is also heavily unionized. As Figure 3.5 shows, over 80
percent of Danish workers are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, more than in Germany (63 percent), and far above the level in the
United States (13 percent).
At the same time, Denmark provides a relatively low level of legal
employment protection. Figure 3.6 presents an index of the strength of

46 Schmitt
Figure 3.4 Generosity of Unemployment Insurance
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employment protection legislation (EPL) based on the OECD’s assessment of legal and bargained conditions on severance pay, advance notification of dismissal, legal procedures related to unfair dismissal, and
related issues. The index runs from zero (essentially no legal employment protections) to six (a very high level of legal employment protection). On this scale, Denmark (1.6) lies closer to the English-speaking
economies (Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) than it does to Germany (3.0), Sweden
(2.9), and France (2.5), where employment protections are stronger.
This combination of institutions performed well between the middle of the 1990s and the onset of the Great Recession. These same institutions, however, have not fared so well in the current downturn. Figure
3.7 compares the increase between 2007 and 2010 in the unemployment
rate in Denmark, Germany, the United States, and Spain (the OECD
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Figure 3.5 Collective Bargaining Coverage, 2007
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country with the largest increase in unemployment over the period).
Between 2007 and 2010, the Danish unemployment rate almost doubled from 4.0 to 7.8 percent, more closely tracking the experience of
Spain and the United States than of Germany.
Figure 3.8 sketches the labor market adjustment path in Denmark
between 2007 and 2009. Total employment and total hours worked
increased about 2 percent between 2007 and 2008—the crisis hit Denmark later than most of the rest of the OECD. Between 2008 and 2009,
however, total employment and total hours both fell sharply. Total hours
fell to about 2 percent below their 2007 level, with almost all of this
reduction in total hours stemming from a decline in the total number of
workers. The Danish economy did not adjust to the labor-demand shock
by lowering the average number of hours worked by the existing workforce, but rather primarily by reducing the number of workers, with
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Figure 3.6 Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Employment,
2008
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relatively small cuts in the average hours worked. In the framework
discussed earlier, almost all of the adjustment fell on employment cuts
and very little on average hours reductions.
Why did the Danish system suddenly lose its luster? One explanation is that the same institutions that created a dynamic labor market
in good macroeconomic times acted to accelerate job loss during the
downturn. Low dismissal costs produced dynamism when there was
sufficient macroeconomic demand to produce full employment. However, low dismissal costs encouraged employers to reduce employment
(rather than hours) when aggregate demand fell. Meanwhile, the country’s superb system of ALMPs was poorly equipped to deal with aggregate demand slumps. The majority of ALMPs seek to “activate” unemployed workers through training or by connecting them with available
jobs. Even the best ALMPs, however, cannot connect workers to jobs
if there are no jobs.
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Figure 3.7 Change in Unemployment Rate, 2007–2010
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The Danish model worked well when aggregate demand was high
enough to ensure full employment. When the economy was operating
near full employment, the main economic bottlenecks were on the supply side of the labor market (labor quality, the distribution of skills, and
location of workers relative to jobs). When the bottlenecks were on the
demand side, however, greater numerical flexibility did little to generate employment and helped to drive unemployment up. A real danger
for Denmark going forward is that the cyclical flaws in the model will
be used to dismantle rather than reform these institutions. The German
case suggests that a combination of numerical flexibility—in hours—
combined with moderate legal and bargained dismissal costs can produce far better outcomes in downturns. This experience should inform
efforts to improve the ability of Danish institutions to respond to future
periods of slack demand.
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Figure 3.8 Change in Hours and Employment, Denmark, 2007–2009
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GERMANy
Before the Great Recession, Germany was not the ideal model of
labor market performance. Unemployment was high, job creation was
weak, and wage inequality was on the rise, primarily because of the
sharp rise in low-wage and precarious employment that began in the
mid to late 1990s.12 German companies were profitable and the country
was a successful exporter, but the labor market was generally not delivering. The German labor market’s performance since the Great Recession, however, has been remarkable. In 2007, before the downturn, the
German unemployment rate was 8.7 percent (using the OECD’s internationally comparable measure, which differs slightly from the official
German rate); by 2009, when the rest of the world was feeling the worst
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of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate in Germany had fallen
to 7.5 percent.
The German unemployment rate dropped because labor market
adjustment fell entirely on hours, not employment (or wages). Figure
3.9 shows the change in hours and employment between 2007 and 2009.
The contrast with Denmark is striking. The Great Recession affected
both countries later than in the United States, but once the downturn hit,
total hours fell in Germany—to about 98 percent of 2007 levels—even
as total employment remained constant. Effectively, reductions in the
average hours worked absorbed all of the decline in labor demand in
Germany. By contrast, in Denmark the reduction in labor demand fell
strongly on total employment, with only small reductions in average
hours worked per employee.
How did Germany manage this? A key element was the German
system of short-time work (STW) programs, which provide part-time
Figure 3.9 Change in Hours and Employment, Germany, 2007–2009
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unemployment benefits to workers who have had their hours reduced in
response to declines in demand for their employers’ products and services.13 In a traditional UI program, if an employer needs to cut employment by 20 percent in the wake of a demand shock, the employer will
lay off 20 percent of workers who, assuming that they individually meet
eligibility requirements, will receive UI benefits. In a STW system, the
same employer could instead cut average hours for all employees by
20 percent, and each employee (again, assuming individual eligibility requirements are met) would receive 20 percent of the full-time UI
benefit. Germany had a long-standing STW system in place before the
downturn, and participation increased rapidly by the end of 2008 (International Labor Organization [ILO] 2011, Figure 3.5). By 2009, Germany had one of the highest shares of its workforce enrolled in STW
programs (see Figure 3.10).
Short-time work, however, was only part of the hours adjustment in
Germany. According to an analysis by Fuchs et al. (2010) of the change
Figure 3.10 Short-Time Work, 2009
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in the average hours worked between 2008 and 2009, STW accounted
for about 25 percent of the decline in average hours (see Table 3.1).14
Employer-initiated reductions in working time—usually implemented
through collective-bargaining agreements—were even more important
than STW, accounting for about 40 percent of the decrease in hours.
Another 20 percent of the decline in hours was due to the debiting of
workers’ working-time accounts. About two-thirds of German companies have working-time accounts in place, where employees who work
more than the normally scheduled number of hours (or work weekends,
evenings, and holidays, or under other circumstances) can “bank” these
hours against future hours of work.15 In the recession, many employers—with the agreement of workers and their unions—cut hours worked
and paid workers out of the hours accumulated in these working-time
accounts, rather than laying them off. Reductions in overtime accounted
for an additional 20 percent of the decline in average hours worked.
A review of the German experience suggests that several institutional features pushed employers to reduce hours rather than workers. Relatively high levels of legal employment protection (see Figure 3.6) made it more expensive for firms to lay workers off than to
reduce hours. Relatively high levels of collective-bargaining coverage
(see Figure 3.5), combined with a union focus on job security, further
raised the relative cost of layoffs. The widespread presence of collective bargaining facilitated hours flexibility by implementing negotiated
working-time banks and allowing for negotiated reductions in overtime
and the usual workweek. Together, this institutional structure gave substantial incentives to firms to prefer hours reductions to employment
cuts, and gave workers incentives to do the same.
Germany faces its own set of institutional challenges. Critics of the
German response to the Great Recession have argued that the strong
Table 3.1 Average Hours Reductions in Germany, 2008–2009 (%)
Proportion of average hours reduction due to:
Increased short-time work
25
Employer-initiated reductions in working time
40
Debiting working-time accounts
20
Reduced overtime
20
NOTE: Factors are approximate and therefore do not sum to 100.
SOURCE: OECD (2010) analysis of Fuchs et al. (2010).
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emphasis on “labor hoarding” at the firm level may mean that the economy is not efficiently reallocating labor from firms and sectors that are
lagging to those that are growing. This argument, however, assumes
that the problem facing German firms in the downturn is their individual or industry performance, rather than an across-the-board collapse in demand. In some respects, though, this concern presents the
mirror image of the problem facing Denmark. The German system, as
implemented since 2008, has done an excellent job coping with a deep
recession, but a reliance on hours adjustments alone could conceivably
create efficiency problems when the economy is operating closer to
full employment. If an individual firm is facing a long-term decline in
demand for its output, for example, it is not likely to be socially efficient
—beyond a transition period—to adjust to that firm-specific decline in
demand by keeping workers tied to the declining firm. But, this kind
of reasoning suggests modifying the functioning of the STW system
in good times, so as to ensure that STW does not impede the efficient
reallocation of workers across firms and sectors when the economy is
operating near full capacity. In fact, the German STW system already
appears to incorporate this kind of flexibility across the business cycle.
Before the downturn, participation in STW was limited to six months,
but as the economy deteriorated, the maximum duration of STW was
expanded successively to 12, 18, and then 24 months (ILO 2011).

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The recent experiences of Denmark and Germany provide important insight into the interplay between labor market institutions and
business cycles. Danish institutions—built around numerically flexible
employment levels and strong income security for workers—appear to
perform well when the economy is at or near full employment. In good
times, the country’s expensive ALMPs work to connect unemployed
workers to available jobs. In a severe downturn in which the overwhelming cause of unemployment is a lack of aggregate demand, however, institutions that encourage adjustment through employment are a
liability, and policies that seek to “activate” workers are not particularly
effective. Meanwhile, German institutions, which act to keep work-
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ers connected to their current employers, may have drawbacks when
the economy is operating near full employment because they may discourage the efficient reallocation of workers from firms and industries
where demand is falling to firms and industries where demand is on the
rise. These same institutions, however, appear to have been well-suited
for coping with the Great Recession because they encouraged firms to
cut hours rather than workers, sharing the burden of the downturn more
widely and helping firms keep their workforces in place and ready for
the subsequent upturn.
In the United States, the hours and employment response to the
Great Recession looked more like it did in Denmark than Germany.
The recession hit U.S. labor markets slowly at first, but between 2008
and 2009, employment and hours both fell sharply (see Figure 3.11). By
2009, employment was about 4 percent lower than it had been in 2007,
and total hours were down almost 6 percent. The larger drop in hours
Figure 3.11 Change in Hours and Employment, United States,
2007–2009
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than in employment implies that some of the labor market adjustment in
the United States fell on the average number of hours worked. Employment losses, however, still accounted for the large majority of the
adjustment. A simple decomposition suggests that the mix of declines
in employment and in average hours worked was similar in the United
States and Denmark. In both countries, about 30 percent of the decline
in total hours was the result of a decline in average hours per employee,
and about 70 percent was the result of lower levels of employment.16
The hours decline in the United States largely reflected a rise in
part-time work for economic reasons, reductions in overtime, and
reductions in the average hours of full-time employees. Overall, U.S.
labor market institutions did little to encourage firms to reduce average
hours rather than employment levels. On the one hand, firing costs are
low: the United States has the lowest level of employment protection
(see Figure 3.6) and the lowest level of collective bargaining coverage (see Figure 3.5) in the OECD. On the other hand, the structure of
employer-provided benefits, particularly health insurance, make hours
cuts a less cost-effective tool for lowering total compensation. While 17
states operated short-time unemployment compensation programs during the Great Recession, take-up rates were too low to have a measureable impact on national average hours worked. At their peak, participation rates in STW programs, for example, never exceed a few tenths of
a percent of the total U.S. workforce (see Figure 3.10).17
Are there any direct lessons that the United States can learn from
the experience of Denmark and Germany? The political debate around
“structural unemployment”—the idea that unemployment has remained
high because workers lack the skills in demand in the postrecession
economy—has rekindled an interest in education and training as a
means to rescue the labor market in the short term.18 Yet, on a perunemployed-worker basis, Denmark spends more than 12 times what
the United States does to train and “activate” unemployed workers, with
only moderately better outcomes since the beginning of the downturn.
In general, supply-side ALMP strategies seem poorly suited to recessions caused by deficient demand. At least with respect to performance
in an aggregate demand slump, the Danish system appears to emulate a
lot of the least desirable features of the U.S. system, including low firing costs that encourage firms to adjust to downturns by cutting workers
rather than hours.
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The German response to the downturn, in contrast, suggests that
labor market institutions that encourage hours reductions rather than
layoffs can spread the pain of adjustment more equitably, as well as act
to preserve good matches between workers and firms. German institutions raise the cost of firing workers—through employment protection legislation and collective bargaining agreements—and encourage
reductions in average hours—through STW arrangements, withdrawals
from collectively bargained working-time accounts, and collectively
bargained reductions in the usual workweek and overtime.
Translating these lessons to the U.S. context, however, is a challenge. Firing costs are low in the United States, and the two main avenues for raising firing costs—employment protection legislation or a
rapid expansion in collective bargaining—appear unlikely in the foreseeable future. Individual states could expand the use of STW programs
within their UI systems, but the scale of expansion necessary would be
substantial and would require addressing a host of concrete barriers that
keep take-up rates low (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009).
A federal program to subsidize temporary reductions in work
hours—by giving tax credits to employers who implement or expand
paid sick days, paid family leave, paid vacations, four-day workweeks,
or other practices that reduce hours—instead of, or in addition to,
expanding state-level UI programs might also help.19 One advantage
of a temporary federal tax break for these practices is that such a system directly targets the high cost of cutting hours relative to cutting
workers, which has limited the take-up rate for STW programs in the
United States. Even in Germany, which has higher firing costs and a
long-standing STW system, STW accounted for only about one-fourth
of the decline in average hours.
In labor markets, at least, the Great Recession continues. Given
the political discussion around debt and deficits, any further macroeconomic policy response to the ongoing problems in the labor market
seems unlikely. That leaves the United States little choice but to learn
what it can from the labor market experiences of other countries that
are also facing the worst downturn since the Great Depression. Unfortunately, U.S. labor market institutions have fared much worse than the
OECD average since 2007, turning any given decline in GDP into far
more unemployment than almost every major economy in the OECD.
To the extent that U.S. policymakers have decided on any course of
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action, it appears to be, in President Obama’s words, to “win the future”
by investing in education and training. The experience of Denmark,
which won the future in the 1990s and 2000s, however, gives cause for
caution. Education, training, and other measures to connect workers to
jobs only work when there are jobs to be had. For the immediate future,
the experience of Germany looks to offer a better way forward. German
labor market institutions gave employers incentives to spread the pain
across the full workforce, with the remarkable result that the unemployment rate there actually fell over the course of the Great Recession.

Notes
The author thanks Eileen Appelbaum, Lauren Appelbaum, Dean Baker, Nicole Woo,
and participants at the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment conference on
Reconnecting to Work at the University of California–Los Angeles, especially Wayne
Vroman and Jeffrey Wenger, for many helpful comments. Thanks also to Sairah Husain
for research assistance, and the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute for
financial support for this research.
1. The National Bureau of Economic Research marks the beginning of the recession
in the United States at December 2007, with the trough in June 2009. The downturn generally hit the rest of the world later, in 2008. For a summary of the timing
of the recession in European economies, see Cameron (2010, Table 2).
2. The German economy was particularly vulnerable to the Great Recession because
world trade collapsed in the downturn and exports are such an important part of
the German economy. The main source of the shock in the United States was the
collapse in the residential housing market. Construction and real-estate-related
employment plummeted, but the main blow came through the (still not quite complete) deflation of the housing bubble, which greatly reduced household net worth
and induced a severe contraction in spending. See, for example, Baker (2009a)
and Bivens (2011).
3. See, for example, OECD (2009) and ILO (2009). For a dissenting view on comparative fiscal policy, see Aizenman and Pasricha (2011), but note that their definition of fiscal stimulus is narrow, excluding tax cuts and increases in unemployment benefits, for example.
4. For an illustration of key interest rates across a sample of the major OECD economies, see ILO (2011, Figure 2.2).
5. A third possibility is that total employment and average hours remain constant,
but the hourly wage falls. Assuming that average productivity remains constant,
however, the wage cut alone doesn’t lower output to match the new lower level of
demand facing the firm.
6. For a summary of the debate and a critique of the orthodox view, see, among
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7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

many others, Howell (2005), Schmitt and Wadsworth (2005), and Baccaro and Rei
(2007).
For a succinct summary of the amended thinking, see OECD (2006, Chapter 3).
Rate is for population ages 15–64; see OECD (2010, Table B).
The Danish UI system is administered by the country’s unions, not the government.
Expenditures (as a share of GDP) per percentage point of unemployment is a standard measure of the generosity of national ALMP programs. Using only expenditures (as a share of GDP) would exaggerate the generosity of ALMP programs in
the case of countries with high levels of unemployment. In the case of Denmark,
dividing the total expenditures (as a share of GDP) by the unemployment rate
emphasizes that the Danish system is exceptionally generous—per unemployed
worker.
The figure shows the OECD’s estimate of the (unweighted) average net replacement rate during the “initial phase of unemployment” for a worker at average
earnings across six family types. These results are conditional on receipt of benefits, that is, the generosity estimate does not factor in the share of the unemployed
who are eligible for and take up unemployment benefits. In the current downturn,
take-up rates in the United States have been as high as three-fourths; in normal
times, including earlier recessions, the take-up rate in the United States is typically
between one-third and one-half.
For a discussion of German and related European economic policy and performance since reunification, see Bosch and Weinkopf (2008), Carlin and Soskice
(2009), Leschke and Watt (2010), Möller (2010), and Schettkat and Sun (2009).
For discussions of STW in Germany and elsewhere in the OECD, see Cahuc and
Carcillo (2011), Hijzen and Venn (2011), ILO (2011), and Vroman and Brusentsev
(2009).
The original analysis is in Fuchs et al. (2010). I rely here on the ILO’s (2011)
presentation of its findings.
For a helpful discussion in English of the German system, see Fagan, Hegewisch,
and Pillinger (2006).
Between 2007 and 2009, total hours fell 5.8 percent and total employment fell 4.2
percent. The 4.2 percent decline in employment represents about 72 percent of the
5.8 percent decline in total hours, with about 28 percent accounted for by a decline
in the average hours worked by the remaining workers. In Denmark, total hours
fell 1.9 percent and total employment fell 1.3 percent, implying that employment
declines accounted for about 68 percent and average-hours declines about 32 percent of the decline in total hours.
See Hijzen and Venn (2011, Figure 4). For a discussion of the limitations of existing U.S. short-time compensation programs, see Vroman and Brusentsev (2009)
and Hijzen and Venn (2011).
For evidence against a large, permanent rise in the “natural” unemployment rate,
see Daly, Hobijn, and Valletta (2011); Mishel (2011); Mishel, Shierholz, and
Edwards (2010); Schmitt and Warner (2011); and Weidner and Williams (2011).
Baker (2009b,c) offers a proposal along these lines.
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Unemployment is costly to society and individuals. Fifty years ago
economist Arthur Okun (1962) demonstrated that for the United States
in the postwar period, a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate
is associated with a 3 percent decline in gross national product. Subsequent work (Moosa 1997) revealed that this rule of thumb, known
as Okun’s Law, closely characterizes most developed economies. At
the individual level, unemployed persons who are laid off experience
financial losses in the form of a drop in income, even if they are covered
by UI. Moreover, when reemployed, their wages typically fall short of
their previous level for a number of reasons, one of which is that workers’ skills are not fully portable across firms, occupations, and industries (Goldsmith and Veum 2002).
Social scientists also assert that unemployment lasting more than
a few weeks is damaging to mental health. For instance, two metaanalytic studies (McKee-Ryan et al. 2005; Paul and Moser 2009) report
that unemployed persons have substantially poorer psychological well-
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being after controlling for a wide range of factors expected to influence
emotional health. However, a largely unresolved issue is whether the
poor mental health status associated with the unemployed is caused by
their involuntary joblessness. The purpose of this chapter is to move
toward resolution of that question. First, we offer a new method for
identifying whether there is a causal link between exposure to unemployment and emotional well-being. Second, by using this identification strategy, and by drawing upon data from two large nationally
representative data sources—the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) and the National Latino and Asian American Study
(NLAAS)—we estimate the impact of both short-term and long-term
unemployment on a broad measure of emotional health.

UNEMPLOyMENT, PSyCHOLOGICAL HEALTH,
AND CAUSALITy
Social psychologists have proposed a number of pathways whereby
involuntary joblessness potentially diminishes emotional well-being.
Jahoda (1982) contends that unemployment is psychologically destructive primarily because it deprives an individual of the latent byproducts of work, including a structured day, shared experiences, status, and opportunities for creativity and mastery.1 Erikson (1959), in
his life-span development theory, asserts that healthy emotional wellbeing as an adult is contingent upon the realization of occupational success for those intent on being breadwinners; therefore, unemployment
is harmful to mental health. Attribution theory (Heider 1958; Weiner
1974) suggests that individuals seek an explanation for developments
in their lives. Those who blame themselves for undesirable happenings such as involuntary joblessness are likely to experience feelings of
“helplessness” (Seligman 1975), which damages mood (i.e., depression,
anxiety) and self-perception.2 Thus, for these persons, unemployment is
expected to foster psychological distress. A number of psychologists and
epidemiologists have asserted that the deleterious effects of unemployment increase as unemployment duration advances (Jackson and Warr
1984). They support the idea that stress accumulates, so there is reason
to believe that each additional week of joblessness is even more emo-
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tionally damaging than prior weeks (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld 1938;
Harrison 1976). This suggests that long-term unemployment is more
harmful to psychological well-being than short-term unemployment.
There is an extensive empirical literature dating to the Great
Depression that documents a negative association between unemployment and psychological health.3 Ethnographic studies conducted by
Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel (1933) and Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld
(1938) found that the unemployed exhibited both poor emotional wellbeing and an inferior view of themselves. Subsequently psychologists
have developed inventories of questions designed to measure various
dimensions of psychological health, including depression (Beck et
al. 1961); anxiety (Spielberger et al. 1983); mastery or self-efficacy
(Pearlin et al. 1981; Rotter 1966); self-esteem (Rosenberg 1965); and
general psychiatric status (Goldberg and Blackwell 1970). Using these
measures, numerous researchers conducting quantitative studies using
cross-sectional survey data report that unemployed groups have lower
levels of psychological well-being than employed groups. Unemployed
persons have been found to exhibit higher levels of depression (Fryer
and Payne 1986) and anxiety (Kessler, Turner, and House 1989), as
well as lower levels of self-esteem (Feather 1982; Goldsmith, Veum,
and Darity 1997) and self-efficacy (Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity 1995)
compared to the employed.4 However, because unemployment can be
the consequence of poor mental health, it is not appropriate to interpret
these results as conclusive evidence that unemployment causes deterioration in emotional well-being.
A common strategy to address the issue of reverse causality is to
use longitudinal or panel data and examine whether changes in mental health coincide with changes in workforce status. The fundamental
idea is that if involuntary joblessness leads to psychological distress,
then persons moving from an employed to an unemployed state will
exhibit a decline in mental health, and those switching over time from
an unemployed to a working state will experience an improvement in
psychological well-being. Numerous researchers report evidence consistent with this perspective. Their findings, although compelling, are
not definitive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that unemployment
causes deterioration in mental health.5 The problem is that it is still
possible that an individual’s emotional well-being changed, for some
reason, prior to the alteration in workforce status. We attempt to shed

66 Diette et al.

further light on the question of causality by examining whether psychologically resilient persons (i.e., individuals who have always exhibited
sound emotional well-being) exposed to unemployment in the past year
are more likely to experience their first spell of poor emotional wellbeing than persons employed throughout the past year.

DATA AND A STRATEGy FOR DETERMINING IF
UNEMPLOyMENT CAUSES POOR MENTAL HEALTH
Data and Methodology
The NCS-R and the NLAAS were designed to collect information on potential determinants of mental disorders in the United States
through face-to-face interviews with respondents conducted in the privacy of their homes. The NCS-R was carried out on a nationally representative group of 9,282 racially and ethnically diverse respondents
between February 2001 and April 2003. The NLAAS contains information on a nationally representative group of 4,649 Latino or Asian
respondents collected between May 2002 and November 2003. These
data sets, which we merge together, are ideal to use in our investigation
of whether a causal link exists between unemployment and emotional
health because of the way that the survey collects respondent information on emotional well-being.
The NCS-R and the NLAAS respondents provided retrospective
information on whether they were sad, empty, discouraged, depressed,
or disinterested most of the day nearly every day for at least two weeks
or every month in the past year, which we use to construct a broad
measure of psychological distress.6 An unusual and desirable feature of
the survey is that respondents who had suffered psychological distress
were asked to provide the year during which they first suffered a bout
of poor emotional health. We take advantage of this unique aspect of
the NCS-R and the NLAAS to develop a new strategy for assessing the
link between unemployment and psychological health. Using information on the year of first onset of poor psychological health, we stratify
our data into two separate subsamples or data sets. We construct a data
set composed of psychologically resilient persons (resilient)—those
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who have either never experienced a significant bout of poor emotional
well-being or had their first spell in the past year—and a second data set
of psychologically vulnerable persons (vulnerable)—those who have
experienced psychological distress in prior years.
The resilient subsample allows us to focus on those individuals
without previous bouts of poor mental health. We suspect that persons
who report never experiencing sustained psychological distress over
the course of their life cycle and who are in the workforce will continue to be emotionally healthy. The resilient subsample allows us to
analyze those least likely to have a bout of poor mental health leading
to unemployment. Therefore, the findings of this subsample represent a
significant step forward in resolving the problem of identifying a causal
relationship between unemployment and poor mental health. However,
there are conditions where the resilient subsample could still suffer
from reverse causality.
For example, it is possible that some individuals in the resilient
subsample are misclassified and should rightfully be in the vulnerable
subsample. These individuals would need to represent a substantial portion of the resilient subsample to undermine the identification strategy.
This would occur if there are many individuals who fail to report their
prior poor mental health status because of poor recall, fail to recognize that they have mental health problems but their employers observe
the problems, or the survey questions fail to identify those with mental
health problems that employers observe. These individuals would be
more likely to have a bout of poor mental health in the current year
that causes unemployment. People may struggle to remember highly
specific events, but the questionnaire is designed to identify general
features of distress, such as being sad or feeling empty or discouraged.
Therefore, we suspect that misclassification bias from failure to recall,
poor recognition of their mental state, or inadequate questions is limited. A separate challenge to our identification strategy arises if a substantial group of individuals have mental health issues that are latent or
dormant, these issues manifest themselves in the current year, or these
individuals experience unemployment in the past 12 months as well.
These individuals would be misclassified in our resilient subsample,
belonging instead in the vulnerable subsample.
The data also contain information on the number of weeks during
the past year that the respondent spent employed; unemployed; legiti-
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mately out of the labor force (i.e., disabled, retired, in school, or taking
care of a family member); and discouraged or out of the labor force
but not for justifiable reasons. We treat the latter category as time spent
unemployed. Following the literature we classify those who spent 26 or
more weeks unemployed during the past year as having suffered from
long-term unemployment, while those who spent less time unemployed
are designated as having experienced short-term unemployment.
Our primary interest is in examining the effect of involuntary unemployment on mental health. Therefore, persons who are out of the labor
force for acceptable or genuine reasons are excluded from the data.7
Thus, we focus our investigation on whether those who experience
either short- or long-term unemployment in the past year had a higher
probability of experiencing their first lifetime bout of emotional distress
than those who spent the past year fully employed while holding constant other economic and social determinants of mental health.
Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is conducted separately on the subsample of resilient
persons, those who have either never experienced a spell of prolonged
psychological distress or have in the past year had their first bout of
poor emotional health, and on the subsample of vulnerable individuals
who have experienced sustained psychological distress prior to the past
12 months. Table 4.1 reveals that there are 5,485 persons in the resilient
subsample, 5,421 of whom have never been “sad” or experienced a
substantial period of poor mental health, while 64 individuals (slightly
more than 1 percent of the subsample) were sad this past year for the
first time. There are 2,109 respondents who have proven to be vulnerable to bouts of poor emotional well-being prior to the current year.
Forty percent (845) of these persons also were saddled with psychological distress this past year, while 1,264 avoided poor mental health over
the course of the previous 12 months.
Table 4.1 also presents information on labor force status for those
who experienced psychological distress in the past year and for those
who were emotionally healthy throughout the past 12 months, for both
the resilient and vulnerable subsamples. Of interest is whether a disproportionate share of the individuals who are in distress this year experienced unemployment—especially long-term unemployment—over the
past year.
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Table 4.1 History of Psychological Distress and Workforce Status
Summary Statistics for Resilient and Vulnerable Subsamples
Panel A: Workforce status—resilient subsample (n = 5,485)
Psychological distress No psychological distress
this past year
this past year
(n = 64 = 1%)
(n = 5,421 = 99%)
Employed
45
4,425
(70%)
(82%)
Short-term unemployment
5
383
(8%)
(7%)
Long-term unemployment
14
613
(22%)
(11%)
Panel B: Workforce status—vulnerable subsample (n = 2,109)
Psychological distress No psychological distress
this past year
this past year
(n = 845 = 40%)
(n = 1,264 = 60%)
Employed
619
1,051
(73%)
(83%)
Short-term unemployment
96
86
(12%)
(7%)
Long-term unemployment
130
127
(15%)
(10%)
NOTE: Resilient persons have either never experienced psychological distress—a
sustained period over at least one month in the past year of sadness/discouragement/
disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the past year. Vulnerable persons have
experienced psychological distress prior to the past 12 months and may also have
experienced a spell of distress in the past year. People who were unemployed in the
past year and spent, in total, less than 26 weeks unemployed are identified as having
experienced a bout of short-term unemployment. The long-term unemployed spent 26
or more weeks in the past year unemployed.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.

A large share (30 percent) of the persons in the resilient subsample who express being sad or distressed this year—for the first time in
their lives—were exposed to unemployment during the past 12 months.
Among those who experienced no psychological distress in the past
year, only 18 percent spent some weeks unemployed. The same pattern exists for the vulnerable subsample. There is a higher proportion
unemployed among those suffering poor emotional well-being in the
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past year (27 percent) relative to those with good emotional health in
the most recent year (17 percent). Thus, it appears that involuntary joblessness is associated with psychological distress, although caution is in
order since we are not controlling for other determinants of emotional
health that could be correlated with unemployment.
Psychologists expect a variety of social and economic factors to
cushion the impact of unemployment on emotional health.8 A valuable
aspect of the NCS-R and the NLAAS data is the provision of information on a myriad of factors, both economic and social, that are believed
to buffer the impact of unemployment on psychological health. This
makes it possible to account for these features of a person’s environment when examining the influence of unemployment on psychological health. The potential buffers that we are able to control for in our
analysis include the number of siblings, the number of adult children,
the extent of their wealth, and if the respondent has a parent who is still
living, is currently married, has friends he speaks to often, and is part of
a close-knit religious community. Table 4A.1 in Appendix 4A provides
detailed definitions for all of the variables used in our formal analyses
of psychological health.
The NCS-R and the NLAAS also provide extensive information
on demographic factors that may contribute to psychological health,
including a respondent’s gender, educational attainment, age, and racial/
ethnic heritage. Moreover, information is available on respondents’
family characteristics when they were youths, allowing us to control
for whether they were raised by both of their parents, whether the family received public assistance, and parents’ education.
Appendix Table 4A.2 presents summary statistics on all of these
variables used in our empirical analysis for both the resilient and vulnerable subsamples. We describe these characteristics below beginning
with the resilient subsample. About half of the subsample is female (49
percent), 67 percent are married, 55 percent completed more than high
school or are highly educated, 72 percent are more than 30 years old, 34
percent have young children in their homes, 44 percent are foreign born
(unsurprising, since much of the data come from the NLAAS), and the
average individual has accumulated $65,000 of net worth. The resilient
subsample we analyze is very diverse with respect to race/ethnicity:
7 percent are African American, 34 percent are of Hispanic origin, 27
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percent are Asian, and 32 percent are white. Most people were raised
by both parents (79 percent), around half have highly educated mothers (49 percent) and fathers (47 percent), and only 4 percent grew up in
poor families.
A third of the respondents in the resilient subsample had a mother
who was still alive, and a quarter reported that their dad was still living.
The typical person has 1.5 siblings and 1.3 adult children. Moreover,
45 percent say they speak to friends regularly and are frequent participants in a religious community. The characteristics of the vulnerable
subsample are similar to those of the resilient subsample on a number
of dimensions. However, the vulnerable group, relative to the resilient
group, are only half as likely to be born outside the United States, more
likely to be female (63 percent), more likely to have young children,
less likely to be Asian, twice as likely to have grown up in a family on
welfare, and have amassed substantially less wealth.
Empirical Procedures
In order to investigate the impact on emotional well-being of exposure to short- or long-term unemployment during the past year relative
to employment throughout the past 12 months, we use Equation (4.1) to
estimate the following model of psychological distress:
(4.1) PsyDistress = α + β(ShortTermUnem) + ψ(LongTermUnem)
+ δ(Buffer) + λ(X) + ε .
PsyDistress takes on a value of 1 if the respondent reports being sad,
empty, discouraged, depressed, or disinterested most of the day nearly
every day for either at least two weeks or every month in the past year,
otherwise it is 0. Two bivariate indicators are used to capture the extent
of a person’s unemployment experience over the past year. Those individuals who experienced some unemployment in the past year and the
total number of weeks, whether or not they were concurrent, fall short
of 26 weeks and are identified as having experienced short-term unemployment, in which case ShortTermUnem = 1. The variable LongTermUnem = 1 if an individual spent more than 25 weeks unemployed in the
past year. Buffer is a vector containing social and economic support
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variables expected to mitigate or exacerbate the impact of involuntary
joblessness on emotional health. X is a vector of demographic and family control variables.
We estimate Equation (4.1) using a logistic regression to estimate
the impact of unemployment and other factors on the odds that a person
has suffered psychological distress in the past year. We report the odds
ratios from the logistic regression. The odds ratios represent the effect
of a unit increase in a continuous independent variable or a value of 1
for a bivariate variable on the odds of experiencing psychological distress in the past 12 months, relative to the odds when that same variable
takes on a value of 0. A coefficient greater than 1 indicates an increase
in the odds of suffering psychological distress (i.e., a coefficient estimate of 1.2 means a 20 percent increase in odds relative to when the
bivariate variable is 0). A coefficient estimate of 1 suggests no change
in the odds of poor emotional health occurring and a value less than 1
means the probability of poor emotional well-being in the past year is
reduced (i.e., an estimate of 0.8 means the odds are 20 percent smaller
relative to when the bivariate variable is zero).
For individuals in the resilient data set, the estimation of Equation
(4.1) tests whether unemployment in the past year enhances the odds that
a person will experience their first ever bout of sustained psychological
distress in the past year. It is a commonly held belief that unemployment causes a decline in emotional well-being. The advantage of estimating Equation (4.1) with these data is that if unemployment is found
to be associated with a greater likelihood of poor emotional health, the
impact can be interpreted as causal with a high degree of confidence.
Since these are resilient individuals who have only experienced their
first bout of poor emotional health in the past year, it seems questionable that this bout of poor emotional health led to their current stretch of
involuntary joblessness. A more likely story is that unemployment over
the past year led to a deterioration of psychological well-being among
persons with a history of sound psychological health.
In addition, to explore whether social and economic support mediates the impact of unemployment on contemporaneous emotional
health, we stratify our subsamples by the presence (or not) of each buffer and reestimate the model.
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RESULTS
Unemployment and Psychological Distress
Table 4.2 is a summary table that presents our estimates of the
impact of both short- and long-term unemployment on the chances of
experiencing psychological distress in the past year for the resilient
subsample (Panel A) and the vulnerable subsample (Panel B). However, in our view reverse causality may mar the accuracy of the findings
using the vulnerable population, while estimation of Equation (4.1) on
a subsample of resilient persons may well purge the estimates of the
endogeneity generated by reverse causality. Thus, the use of the resilient subsample can produce estimates that are capable of illuminating
whether unemployment causes deterioration in emotional well-being.
Model 1 is a sparse specification of Equation (4.1), where psychological distress is stipulated to depend solely on workforce status. Model
2 adds controls for a host of social and economic buffers. Model 3,
the most complete specification, further augments the model to account
for individual characteristics and family features when growing up.
Full results for the resilient subsample are presented in Table 4A.3 in
Appendix 4A, and Table 4A.4 reports our complete set of findings for
the vulnerable subsample.
Panel A in Table 4.2 reveals that in all three models exposure to
long-term unemployment in the past year significantly increases the
odds that a resilient person will experience their first ever bout of poor
emotional well-being in the current year relative to resilient individuals who were employed throughout the past year. The estimates range
from a 125 percent increase in likelihood in Model 1 to a 218 percent
increase in Model 2. However, those resilient persons who are subject
to short-term unemployment during the past year have the same likelihood of experiencing their first bout of poor mental health as persons
who were employed throughout the past year. Thus, our findings suggest that long-term unemployment has a larger detrimental impact on
emotional health than bouts of short-term unemployment.
Recall that we classify people who have experienced poor mental
health prior to the current year, regardless of the source of their poor
emotional states, as vulnerable. Among these persons, exposure to
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Table 4.2 Logit Estimates of the Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term
Unemployment on the Odds of Currently Experiencing
Psychological Distress for Resilient and Vulnerable
Subsamples—Summary Table
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variables
Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio
Panel A: Resilient subsample

Workforce status
Short-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment
Observations

1.28
(0.61)
2.25***
(0.69)
5,485

1.10
(0.53)
3.18***
(0.99)
5,485

1.04
(0.52)
2.85***
(0.96)
5,485

Panel B: Vulnerable subsample

Workforce status
Short-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment

Observations
Controls
Buffers
Demographics & family factors

1.90***
(0.30)
1.74***
(0.23)
2,109
No
No

1.85***
(0.29)
1.69***
(0.24)
2,109
Yes
No

1.80***
(0.29)
1.58***
(0.22)
2,109
Yes
Yes

NOTE: *** p < 0.01. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the
previous year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged
workers are counted as unemployed. The set of buffer variables includes measures
of assets, marital status, parents living, number of living siblings, number of adult
children, having close friends, being part of a religious community, and the lack of
young children in the home (see Table 4A.1 for detailed definitions of all variables
included in the estimated models). Demographic controls include indicators for foreign born, gender, education level, age cohort, and racial and ethnic heritage. Family
characteristics as a youth contain indicators that reveal who raised the respondent,
their parents’ education level, and the financial status of the family when the respondent was a youth. In addition, Models 2 and 3 include indicators for missing data on
assets, number of siblings, talking on the phone with friends, and regular attendance
at religious services.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.
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either short- or long-term unemployment over the past year leads to a
significant increase in their reporting to have experienced poor emotional health in the past year relative to similar persons who worked
throughout the past year. For instance, vulnerable individuals who
were subject to long-term unemployment were 58 percent more likely
(Model 3) to experience psychological distress compared to those vulnerable persons in the labor force who worked the entire past year.
Consistent with our theory, we find that a number of buffers—being
married, having adult children, having friends with whom you are in
regular contact, and being part of a religious community—significantly
reduce the odds of experiencing psychological distress over the past
year, regardless of exposure to unemployment, for vulnerable persons
(see Appendix Table 4A.4). However, emotional health does not appear
to be directly related to such buffers for resilient persons.
Do Buffers Mediate the Link between Unemployment and
Psychological Distress?
An interesting question is whether social characteristics or features
of a person’s life act to insulate them from the adverse impact of unemployment on their psychological health. We explore this question by
evaluating the link between unemployment and emotional well-being
when a potential social buffer is present and when it is absent across
both of our subsamples. Our findings for seven social buffers (i.e.,
being married or having a mother who is alive) are presented in Table
4.3. Table 4A.4 presents evidence on the prevalence of the various buffers in our data sets and on the size of the subsamples used to estimate
the impact of unemployment on psychological health when a potential
buffer is present and when it is absent.
Among resilient persons (the left side of Table 4.3), long-term
unemployment is positively associated with the odds of experiencing
psychological distress (i.e., an estimated coefficient > 1) in all seven
cases when the buffer is not present (on 4 occasions the estimate is
statistically significant), but also for 6 of the seven scenarios when
the buffer is present (again, 4 of the estimated impacts are statistically
significant). Moreover, the odds of poor emotional health due to longterm unemployment exposure are elevated to a greater extent when the
buffer is not present relative to when it is present on three occasions
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Table 4.3 The Impact of Social and Economic Buffers on the Effect of
Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment on the Odds of
Currently Experiencing Psychological Distress
Resilient subsample
Vulnerable subsample
Panel A: Marriage stratifications
Not married
Married
Not married
Married
(n = 1,732)
(n = 3,649)
(n = 939)
(n = 1,170)
Short-term
1.63
0.45
2.61***
1.30
unemployment
(1.03)
(0.48)
(0.63)
(0.30)
Long-term
4.03***
1.92
1.84***
1.41*
unemployment
(2.00)
(0.93)
(0.39)
(0.28)
Panel B: Mother stratifications
Mom not alive Mom alive
Mom not alive Mom alive
(n = 3,531)
(n = 1,731)
(n = 975)
(n = 1,134)
Short-term
3.10*
0.49
1.47
1.99***
unemployment
(1.92)
(0.36)
(0.41)
(0.40)
Long-term
4.366***
2.03
1.45**
1.83**
unemployment
(2.21)
(1.01)
(0.26)
(0.44)
Panel C: Father stratifications
Dad not alive Dad alive
Dad not alive
(n = 763)
(n = 1,376)
(n = 607)
1.75
1.24
1.79**
Short-term
(2.52)
(0.72)
(0.53)
unemployment
Long-term
11.14***
0.57
1.98**
unemployment
(8.10)
(0.60)
(0.54)

Dad alive
(n = 851)
1.51*
(0.37)
1.12
(0.34)

Panel D: Adult children stratifications
No adult
No adult
children Adult children
children Adult children
(n = 2,256)
(n = 2,845)
(n = 1,042)
(n = 1,067)
0.84
1.730
1.59**
2.29***
Short-term
(0.52)
(1.38)
(0.32)
(0.62)
unemployment
Long-term
2.34*
3.69**
1.19
1.80***
unemployment
(1.17)
(1.92)
(0.28)
(0.33)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
Resilient subsample
Vulnerable subsample
Panel E: Talk to friends stratifications
Talk rarely
Talk often
Talk rarely
Talk often
(n = 2,824)
(n = 2,473)
(n = 1,022)
(n = 1,027)
1.12
1.30
1.56*
1.77**
Short-term
(0.90)
(0.81)
(0.38)
(0.39)
unemployment
Long-term
1.88
4.26***
1.72***
1.40
unemployment
(1.06)
(1.87)
(0.35)
(0.29)
Panel F: Attend religious services stratifications
Attend
Attend
Attend rarely
regularly
Attend rarely
regularly
(n = 2,472)
(n = 2,292)
(n = 1,011)
(n = 864)
1.27
0.71
2.31***
1.26
Short-term
(0.75)
(0.75)
(0.54)
(0.38)
unemployment
Long-term
1.52
4.44***
1.91***
1.30
unemployment
(0.88)
(2.34)
(0.38)
(0.31)
Panel G: Young children in the home stratifications
Children
No children
Children
No children
(n = 1,054)
(426)
(n = 626)
(1,483)
1.02
0.99
1.82*
1.79***
Short-term
(0.81)
(0.65)
(0.56)
(0.36)
unemployment
Long-term
1.27
3.53***
1.03
1.73***
unemployment
(1.05)
(1.43)
(0.36)
(0.28)
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.

(marriage, mother alive, father alive), but for the other four social buffers the deleterious impact of long-term unemployment on emotional
well-being is larger when the buffer is present. Thus, the evidence is
mixed on whether social factors considered buffers reduce the impact
of long-term unemployment on mental health for resilient persons. Furthermore, the results exhibit the same mixed pattern for the vulnerable
population.
Short-term unemployment is essentially unrelated to psychological
health regardless of whether social buffers are present or not for resilient
individuals. Experiencing short-term unemployment only significantly
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damages emotional well-being for those without a mother who is alive
in our resilient subsample. However, the situation is very different for
the vulnerable who, prior to the current year, reported having suffered
through bouts of poor emotional health. For them, whenever social buffers are not present, short-term unemployment leads to elevated odds of
psychological distress, and in 6 out of 7 cases, the impact is statistically
significant. The same pattern holds when the social barrier is present,
which suggests that for vulnerable people the presence of what could
well be a buffer does not mitigate the deleterious impact of short-term
unemployment on mental health status. Thus, for persons with a prior
history of poor emotional well-being, short-term unemployment exhibits the same negative pattern of effects on psychological health as longterm unemployment.
Do Demographic Factors and Education Mediate the Link
between Unemployment and Psychological Distress?
It is possible that the connection between psychological well-being
and unemployment is influenced by demographic factors such as age
and gender, as well as skill level or educational investment. To explore
this possibility we stratified our data sets by gender, education level
(more than high school, high school or less), and age (30 years of age
or older, less than 30 years old). The results, reported in Table 4.4,
offer three key insights. First, for the resilient individuals, short-term
unemployment is unrelated to emotional well-being, regardless of gender, education level, or age cohort. Second, the results for the vulnerable individuals are consistent with the findings in Table 4.2, Panel B:
both short- and long-term unemployment significantly damage mental health, regardless of gender, educational attainment, or age cohort.
Finally, among the resilient population, those most negatively affected
by long-term unemployment are males, highly educated, and older individuals—groups typically associated with being primary breadwinners.

CONCLUSION
A longstanding belief among social scientists is that unemployment, especially long bouts, has deleterious effects on emotional health.
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Table 4.4 The Impact of Select Demographic Factors on the Effect of
Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment on the Odds of
Currently Experiencing Psychological Distress
Panel A: Gender stratifications
Resilient subsample
Vulnerable subsample
Male
Female
Male
Female
(n = 790)
(n = 1,319)
(n = 2,683)
(n = 2,349)
1.94***
1.78***
0.59
1.33
Short-term
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.64)
(0.82)
unemployment
1.93**
1.43**
5.62***
2.15*
Long-term
(2.93)
(0.98)
(0.53)
(0.24)
unemployment
Panel B: Education level stratifications
High school
More than
High school
More than
or less
high school
high school
or less
(n = 875)
(n = 1,234)
(n = 2,933)
(n = 2,468)
1.82**
0.75
1.85***
1.32
Short-term
unemployment
(0.93)
(0.61)
(0.39)
(0.47)
Long-term
5.74***
1.53
1.42*
1.80***
unemployment
(2.55)
(0.73)
(0.29)
(0.36)
Panel C: Age stratifications
More than 29 Less than 30 More than 29 Less than 30
(n = 3,934)
(n = 1,443)
(n = 1,565)
(n = 544)
Short-term
2.39
0.26
1.87***
1.87**
unemployment
(1.33)
(0.27)
(0.38)
(0.52)
Long-term
4.03***
1.96
1.63***
1.21
unemployment
(1.81)
(1.09)
(0.26)
(0.38)
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.

There is extensive evidence of a direct link between mental health and
involuntary joblessness; however, the possibility that poor emotional
well-being leads to long periods of unemployment has left the question
of causality unresolved. This chapter introduces a new approach to the
assembly of data that allows estimation of the link between emotional
health and unemployment that may address concerns about the direction of causality. Our estimates are conducted using a subsample of
resilient persons—those who until the current year have never experi-
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enced poor mental health. If resilient individuals are exposed to unemployment and exhibit poor mental health, it seems most likely that the
joblessness harmed their psychological health. We find that long-term
unemployment—but not short-term unemployment—promotes psychological distress among resilient persons. Moreover, the negative
psychological consequences of long-term unemployment are present
even when buffers exist, suggesting that policymakers consider both the
monetary and nonpecuniary costs of unemployment when formulating
policy to address economic downturns. Our findings suggest that the
Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery have likely generated
extraordinary negative psychological consequences: at the peak of this
recession, about 45 percent of the unemployed had been out of work six
months or longer, and one-third of the unemployed were jobless for at
least a year.

Notes
1. Warr’s (1987) vitamin model is similar to Jahoda’s (1982) functionality framework, in that desired features of work—like vitamins—contribute to psychological health, and when they are withheld or withdrawn through unemployment,
emotional well-being is impaired.
2. Similarly, the Life Event model advanced by Brenner (1976) and Catalano and
Dooley (1977) argues that any alterations in life circumstances, especially those
deemed important to personal identity and status such as joblessness, are stressful
and thus may hamper psychological health.
3. Poorer mental health status for the unemployed relative to the employed has been
found for both men (Ensminger and Celentano 1990; Rowley and Feather 1987),
and women (Dew, Bromet, and Penkower 1992), and long-term unemployment is
especially damaging (Warr and Jackson 1985).
4. For a meta-analysis review of cross-sectional studies of the link between various
forms of emotional health and unemployment, see Paul and Moser (2009).
5. For a meta-analytic review of longitudinal studies finding improvements in emotional health for unemployed who find work, see McKee-Ryan et al. (2005).
6. Kessler et al. (2003) combined respondents’ self-reports on a similar set of feelings and emotions to construct a nonspecific psychological distress score to assess
mental health.
7. Examples of acceptable reasons included those who are retired, homemakers, in
school, and physically or mentally unable to work.
8. Numerous studies report that social support buffers the psychological distress associated with unemployment. See, for instance, Atkinson, Liem, and Liem (1986).
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Table 4A.1 Definition of Variables Used in Logit Estimation of the
Influence of Unemployment on Psychological Distress
Variable name
Variable definition
Data sets
Resilient
1 if respondent has never experienced psychological
distress (see outcome definition below) or had their first
bout in the past year, 0 otherwise
Vulnerable
1 if respondent has experienced psychological distress
prior to the current year, 0 otherwise
Outcome
PsyDistress
1 if respondent reports being sad, empty, discouraged,
depressed, or disinterested most of the day nearly every
day in the past year for either at least two weeks or
every month, 0 otherwise
Work force status
Short-term
1 if experienced unemployment during the past year
unemployment and the total weeks summed to 25 or fewer weeks, 0
otherwise
Long-term
1 if experienced unemployment during the past year
unemployment and the total weeks summed to 26 or more weeks, 0
otherwise
Employed
1 if employed throughout the past year at least 40
weeks and experienced no unemployment in past 12
months
Economic &
social buffers
Assets
Respondent’s estimated value of assets less debts in
thousands
Married
1 if respondent is currently married or cohabitating, 0
otherwise
Mother living
1 if respondent’s biological mother is still alive, 0
otherwise
Father living
1 if respondent’s biological father is still alive, 0
otherwise
Siblings
Number of siblings respondent had while growing up,
top coded at 8
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Table 4A.1 (continued)
Variable name
Variable definition
Economic &
social buffers
Adult children
Total number of adult children respondent has that are
living—both biological and nonbiological, 0 otherwise.
Friends
1 if respondent often talks on phone or gets together
with friends most every day or a few times a week, 0 if
less often.
Religious
1 if respondent attends religious services at least 3
community
times per month, 0 otherwise.
Young children
Total number of living biological and nonbiological
children under 17 years of age living in respondent’s
home.
Demographics
Foreign born
1 if respondent reports being born outside the United
States, 0 otherwise.
Female
1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise.
Highly educated
1 if respondent reports having completed more than 12
years of formal education, 0 otherwise.
Young
1 if respondent is less than 31 years of age, 0 otherwise.
African American 1 if respondent reports being African Caribbean or
African American, 0 otherwise.
Hispanic
1 if respondent reports being Hispanic, 0 otherwise.
Asian
1 if respondent reports being Asian, 0 otherwise.
Family characteristics
Both parents
1 if respondent reports being raised by both their
biological father and biological mother, 0 otherwise.
Mother highly
1 if respondent reports their mother completed 12 or
educated
more years of formal education, 0 otherwise.
Father highly
1 if respondent reports their father completed 12 or
educated
more years of formal education, 0 otherwise.
Welfare
1 if respondent reports their family was on welfare at
some time during their youth, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4A.2 Summary Statistics for All Variables Used in Logit Estimates for Resilient and Vulnerable Samples
Resilient
Vulnerable
Resilient
Vulnerable
Variable
(n = 5,485) (n = 2,109) Variable
(n = 5,485) (n = 2,109)
0.50
0.34
Young children
0.40
0.01
PsyDistress
(0.95)
(0.81)
(0.49)
(0.11)
0.21
0.44
Foreign born
0.09
0.07
Short-term unemployment
(0.41)
(0.50)
(0.28)
(0.26)
0.63
0.49
Female
0.12
0.11
Long-term unemployment
(0.48)
(0.50)
(0.33)
(0.32)
0.59
0.55
Highly educated
75.25
65.05
Assets
(0.49)
(0.50)
(179.56)
(163.43)
0.26
0.28
Young
0.31
0.38
Assets—missing
(0.44)
(0.45)
(0.46)
(0.49)
0.07
0.07
African American
0.56
0.67
Married
(0.26)
(0.25)
(0.50)
(0.47)
0.26
0.34
Hispanic
0.54
0.35
Mother living
(0.44)
(0.48)
(0.50)
(0.48)
0.11
0.27
Asian
0.40
0.26
Father living
(0.31)
(0.45)
(0.49)
(0.44)
0.76
0.79
Both parents
0.31
0.57
Father living—missing
(0.43)
(0.41)
(0.46)
(0.51)
0.59
0.49
Mother highly educated
2.37
1.51
Siblings
(0.49)
(0.50)
(2.44)
(2.29)
0.09
0.11
Mother highly educated—missing
0.30
0.57
Siblings—missing
(0.29)
(0.31)
(0.46)
(0.50)

Adult children
Friends
Friends—missing
Religious community
Religious community—missing

1.31
(1.48)
0.45
(0.50)
0.03
(0.18)
0.45
(0.50)
0.10
(0.30)

1.04
(1.37)
0.49
(0.50)
0.03
(0.17)
0.41
(0.49)
0.11
(0.31)

Father highly educated
Father highly educated—missing
Welfare
Welfare-missing

0.47
(0.50)
0.20
(0.40)
0.04
(0.20)
0.57
(0.50)

0.52
(0.50)
0.19
(0.39)
0.08
(0.28)
0.31
(0.46)

SOURCE: Data drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. Means are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Indicator variables are
constructed that take on a value of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing value and a value of zero
for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the
observation to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable.
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Table 4A.3 The Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment
on the Odds of Currently Experiencing Psychological
Distress for Resilient Individuals—Full Results
Variables
Workforce status
Short-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment
Buffers
Assets
Assets—missing
Married
Mother living
Father living
Father living—missing
Siblings
Siblings—missing
Adult children
Friends
Friends—missing
Religious community
Religious community—missing
Young children
Born in foreign country

Model 1
Odds ratio

Model 2
Odds ratio

Model 3
Odds ratio

1.28
(0.61)
2.25***
(0.70)

1.10
(0.53)
3.18***
(0.99)

1.04
(0.52)
2.85***
(0.96)

1.00
(0.00)
1.07
(0.32)
0.71
(0.193)
1.20
(0.47)
1.30
(0.46)
0.10**
(0.10)
1.03
(0.07)
4.19
(43.00)
0.98
(0.09)
1.01
(0.26)
0.50
(0.38)
0.69
(0.19)
0.77
(0.34
1.15
(0.11)
0.93
(0.40)

1.00
(0.00)
1.04
(0.30)
0.80
(0.22)
1.12
(0.47)
1.12
(0.42)
0.03**
(0.04)
1.02
(0.07)
5.02
(5.07)
1.02
(0.10)
0.99
(0.26)
0.46
(0.36)
0.64
(0.18)
0.82
(0.37)
1.16
(0.13)
0.86
(0.37)

The Relationship between Mental Health and Unemployment 87
Table 4A.3 (continued)
Demographics
Female

1.96**
(0.55)
0.87
(0.24)
1.42
(0.43)
1.45
(0.64)
1.91*
(0.76)
1.64
(0.91)

Highly educated
Young
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Family characteristics
Both parents
Mother highly educated
Mother highly educated—missing
Father highly educated
Father highly educated—missing
Welfare
Welfare—missing
Constant
Observations

0.01***
(0.01)
5,485

0.02***
(0.01)
5,485

1.08
(0.34)
1.07
(0.39)
0.92
(0.46)
1.34
(0.47)
0.95
(0.37)
0.69
(0.38)
1.91
(2.00)
0.01***
(0.01)
5,485

NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Resilient persons have either never experienced psychological distress—a sustained period over at least one month in the past
year of sadness/discouragement/disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the
past year. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the previous
year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged workers
are counted as unemployed. Indicator variables are constructed that take on a value
of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing value
and a value of zero for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable
name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the observation
to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.
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Table 4A.4 The Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment
on the Odds of Currently Experiencing Psychological
Distress for Vulnerable Individuals—Full Results
Variables
Workforce status
Short-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment
Buffers
Assets
Assets—missing
Married
Mother living
Father living
Father living—missing
Siblings
Siblings—missing
Adult children
Friends
Friends—missing
Religious community
Religious community—missing
Young children
Born in foreign country

Model 1
Odds ratio

Model 2
Odds ratio

Model 3
Odds ratio

1.90***
(0.30)
1.74***
(0.23)

1.85***
(0.30)
1.69***
(0.24)

1.80***
(0.29)
1.58***
(0.22)

1.00***
(0.00)
0.89
(0.09)
0.61***
(0.06)
0.99
(0.13)
0.97
(0.12)
1.86*
(0.61)
1.01
(0.03)
0.66
(0.22)
0.93**
(0.03)
0.77***
(0.07)
0.73
(0.21)
0.82**
(0.08)
0.87
(0.13)
1.03
(0.05)
0.99
(0.14)

1.00***
(0.00)
0.89
(0.10)
0.63***
(0.06)
0.97
(0.13)
0.99
(0.13)
1.71
(0.59)
0.99
(0.03)
0.79
(0.31)
0.93**
(0.03)
0.77***
(0.07)
0.69
(0.20)
0.84*
(0.08)
0.87
(0.13)
1.01
(0.05)
1.05
(0.15)
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Table 4A.4 (continued)
Demographics
Female

1.06
(0.10)
0.88
(0.09)
1.21
(0.15)
1.11
(0.22)
0.80
(0.15)
0.71
(0.17)

Highly educated
Young
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Family characteristics
Both parents
Mother highly educated
Mother highly educated—missing
Father highly educated
Father highly educated—missing
Welfare
Welfare—missing
Constant
Observations

0.59***
(0.03)
2,109

1.11
(0.22)
2,109

0.92
(0.11)
0.93
(0.11)
1.06
(0.20)
0.95
(0.12)
1.06
(0.17)
1.46**
(0.26)
1.02
(0.33)
1.31
(0.35)
2,109

NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Vulnerable persons have experienced
psychological distress—a sustained period over at least one month in the past year
of sadness/discouragment/disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the past
year, prior to the past 12 months and may also have experienced a spell of distress in
the past year. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the previous year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged
workers are counted as unemployed. Indicator variables are constructed that take on
a value of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing
value and a value of zero for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable
name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the observation
to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable.
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS.

NOTE: Sample size prior to stratification may be smaller than the full subsamples used in the estimates presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In
the full subsamples, some observations contain missing values for specific buffers or demographics. Estimates with the full subsample
include separate indicator variables for missing values for each variable. The stratification analysis eliminates observations with a missing value for the buffer or demographic variable that is the basis for stratifying the resilient or vulnerable subsamples.
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Table 4A.5 Sample Size for Buffers and Demographics Used to Stratify the Data to Evaluate If the Impact of
Unemployment on the Odds of Psychological Distress Depends on These Elements
Resilient subsample
Vulnerable subsample
Variable status
Variable status
Yes
No
Yes
No
Variable (n prior to stratification)
Variable (n prior to stratification)
Buffers
Buffers
66.5
33.5
55.5
44.5
Married (n = 5,485)
Married (n = 2,109)
34.6
65.4
53.8
46.2
Mother living (n = 5,485)
Mother living (n = 2,109)
59.4
40.6
58.4
41.6
Father living (n = 2,356)
Father living (n = 1,458)
58.9
41.1
50.6
49.4
Adult children (n = 5,485)
Adult children (n = 2,109)
46.7
53.3
50.1
49.9
Friends (n = 5,297)
Friends (n = 2,049)
49.8
50.2
46.1
53.9
Religious community (n = 4,921)
Religious community (n = 1,875)
20.5
79.5
29.7
70.3
Young children (n = 5,485)
Young children (n = 2,109)
Demographics
Demographics
48.9
51.1
62.5
37.5
Female (n = 5,485)
Female (n = 2,109)
55.0
45.0
58.5
41.5
Highly educated (n = 5,485)
Highly educated (n = 2,109)
28.3
71.7
25.8
74.2
Young (n = 5,485)
Young (n = 2,109)

The Relationship between Mental Health and Unemployment 91

References
Atkinson, Thomas, Ramsay Liem, and Joan H. Liem. 1986. “The Social Costs
of Unemployment: Implications for Social Support.” Journal of Health and
Social Behavior 27(4): 317–331.
Beck, Aaron T., Calvin H. Ward, M. Mendelson, J. Mock, and J. Erbaugh.
1961. “An Inventory for Measuring Depression.” Archives of General Psychiatry 4(6): 561–571.
Brenner, M. Harvey. 1976. Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic
Policy: Implications for Mental and Physical Health and Clinical Aggression. Report to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Catalano, Ralph, and C. David Dooley. 1977. “Economic Predictors of
Depressed Mood and Stressful Life Events.” Journal of Health and Social
Behavior 18(3): 292–307.
Dew, Mary A., Evelyn J. Bromet, and Lili Penkower. 1992. “Mental Health
Effects of Job Loss in Women.” Psychological Medicine 22(3): 751–764.
Eisenberg, Philip, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1938. “The Psychological Effects of
Unemployment.” Psychological Bulletin 35(6): 358–390.
Ensminger, Margaret E., and David D. Celentano. 1990. “Gender Differences
in the Effect of Unemployment on Psychological Distress.” Social Science
and Medicine 30(4): 469–477.
Erikson, Erik H. 1959. “Identity and the Life Cycle.” Psychological Issues
1(1): 50–100.
Feather, Norman T. 1982. “Unemployment and Its Psychological Correlates:
A Study of Depressive Symptoms, Self-Esteem, Protestant Ethic Values,
Attributional Style and Apathy.” Australian Journal of Psychology 34(3):
309–323.
Fryer, David M., and Roy L. Payne. 1986. “Being Unemployed: A Review
of the Literature on the Psychological Experience of Unemployment.” In
International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Cary L.
Cooper and Ivan T. Robertson, eds. Chichester, England: Wiley, pp. 235–
278.
Goldberg, David P., and B. Blackwell. 1970. “Psychiatric Illness in General
Practice: A Detailed Study Using a New Method of Case Identification.”
British Medical Journal 1: 439–443.
Goldsmith, Arthur H., and Jonathan R. Veum. 2002. “Wages and the Composition of Experience.” Southern Economics Journal 69(2): 429–443.
Goldsmith, Arthur H., Jonathan R. Veum, and William Darity Jr. 1995. “Are
Being Unemployed and Being Out of the Labor Force Distinct States? A

92 Diette et al.
Psychological Approach.” Journal of Economic Psychology 16(2): 275–
295.
———. 1997. “Unemployment, Joblessness, Psychological Well-Being and
Self-Esteem: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Socio-Economics 26(2):
133–158.
Harrison, Richard. 1976. “The Demoralising Experience of Prolonged Unemployment.” Department of Employment Gazette 84(4): 339–348.
Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York:
Wiley.
Jackson, Paul R., and Peter B. Warr. 1984. “Unemployment and Ill-Health:
The Moderating Role of Duration and Age.” Psychological Medicine 14:
605–614.
Jahoda, Marie. 1982. Employment and Unemployment: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jahoda, Marie, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel. 1933. Marienthal: The
Sociography of an Unemployed Community (English translation, 1971).
Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Kessler, Ronald C., Peggy R. Barker, Lisa J. Colpe, Joan F. Epstein, Joseph C.
Gfroerer, Eva Hiripi, Mary J. Howes, Sharon-Lise T. Normand, Ronald W.
Manderscheid, Ellen E. Walters, and Alan M. Zaslavsky. 2003. “Screening
for Serious Mental Illness in the General Population.” Archives of General
Psychiatry 60(2): 184–189.
Kessler, Ronald C., J. Blake Turner, and James S. House. 1989. “Unemployment, Reemployment, and Emotional Functioning in a Community Sample.” American Sociological Review 54(4): 648–657.
McKee-Ryan, Frances M., Zhaoli Song, Connie R. Wanberg, and Angelo J.
Kinicki. 2005. “Psychological and Physical Well-Being during Unemployment: A Meta-Analytic Study.” Journal of Applied Psychology 90(1):
53–76.
Moosa, Imad A. 1997. “A Cross-Country Comparison of Okun’s Coefficient.”
Journal of Comparative Economics 24(3): 335–356.
Okun, Arthur M. 1962. “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance.”
Cowles Foundation Paper No. 190. New Haven, CT: Yale University,
Cowles Foundation.
Paul, Karsten I., and Klaus Moser. 2009. “Unemployment Impairs Mental
Health: Meta-Analyses.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 74(3): 264–282.
Pearlin, Leonard, Elizabeth G. Meneghan, Morton A. Lieberman, and Joseph
Mullan. 1981. “The Stress Process.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior
22(4): 337–356.
Rosenberg, Morris. 1965. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.

The Relationship between Mental Health and Unemployment 93
Rotter, Julian B. 1966. “Generalized Expectancies for Internal versus External
Control of Reinforcement.” Psychological Monographs 80(1): 1–28.
Rowley, K. M., and Norman T. Feather. 1987. “The Impact of Unemployment
in Relation to Age and Length of Unemployment.” Journal of Occupational
Psychology 60(4): 323–332.
Seligman, Martin, E. P. 1975. Helplessness: On Depression, Development and
Death. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
Spielberger, Charles D., Richard L. Gorsuch, Robert E. Lushene, Peter R.
Vagg, and Gerard A. Jacobs. 1983. “Manual for the State–Trait Anxiety
Inventory.” Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Warr, Peter B. 1987. Work, Unemployment and Mental Health. Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Warr, Peter B., and Paul R. Jackson. 1985. “Factors Influencing the Psychological Impact of Prolonged Unemployment and Re-employment.” Psychological Medicine 15(4): 795–807.
Weiner, Bernard. 1974. Achievement Motivation and Attribution Theory. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

5
Work Together to Let
Everyone Work
A Study of the Cooperative JobPlacement Effort in the Netherlands
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Centre of Applied Labour Market Research and Innovation,
Hanze University of Applied Sciences

“We work together to let everyone work.” That was the message in
November 2010 when a number of employers and governmental organizations in the Netherlands publicly announced that they would cooperate with each other in order to let as many people participate in paid
jobs as possible. From both an economic and a social perspective, it is
clearly highly important to maximize the number of people that have
paid jobs. At the end of 2008, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands
was a historically low 2.7 percent. Dutch employers were having difficulties finding workers. As a result, companies were forced to cooperate
with the Dutch government to fill their vacancies. However, for most
employers in times of economic recession (the Dutch unemployment
rate almost doubled between 2009 and 2010), decreasing the number of
unemployed people will not be their highest priority.
Although on a national scale employers intend to cooperate with
the government to reduce unemployment, it is not always the case for
local governments. The local social services, which are responsible
for local labor market policy, need information that would allow them
to work more collaboratively with employers. More specifically, they
wish to answer the question: Why would employers cooperate with
social services by providing jobs to unemployed people via a social
service agency? Two main reasons make this question a really important one to answer. First, social service agencies can use the answer in
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the short run to convince as many employers as possible to cooperate
with them, resulting in an immediate decline in the unemployment rate.
Additionally, in the long run, social services agencies that have a clear
insight into employers’ needs and wishes will be better able to fill the
gap between supply and demand in the Dutch labor market. That is,
although the unemployment rate in the Netherlands is relatively high
right now and the number of vacancies is relatively low, it is expected
that, due to the aging of the Dutch population (the percentage of people
over 65 years of age is predicted to be 25 percent in 2030 compared
with 14 percent right now), there will be an increased need for highqualified personnel in the near future. In general, being unemployed
does not make people highly qualified, but having a job does. Hence, it
is important for the Dutch labor market to have as many people as possible participate in paid employment in order to avoid a large number
of underqualified, long-term unemployed people while there is simultaneously a high number of unfilled vacancies. Such a situation would
have devastating consequences for the whole Dutch economy. Hence,
social service agencies and employers need to work together in order to
let everyone work.
In this chapter, we will argue that, based on a survey we conducted
with employers, the willingness of Dutch employers to cooperate with
social services is highly dependent on company size. Whereas all
employers underline the importance of financial considerations when it
comes to their intention to cooperate with social services, employers at
small companies (less than 11 employees) are especially sensitive to a
more idealistic approach (“making a difference”) compared to employers at middle-sized (11–100 employees) and large companies (over 100
employees).

THEORy OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR
When it comes to determining which factors influence behavior such
as cooperating with a social service, an important social psychological theory that comes to mind is the theory of planned behavior (TPB)
(Ajzen 1985, 1991). In short, the theory states that the most important
predictor of human (planned) behavior is the intention to behave in such
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a way. Applied to our subject, the TPB means that cooperating with a
social service agency is primarily predicted by the intention to do so.
Furthermore, this intention is predicted by three determinants. The first
is the individual’s attitude, that is, the global evaluation of the behavior.
The second determinant, subjective norms, refers to perceived social
pressure to engage in the behavior. The third determinant is perceived
behavioral control: the degree to which an individual expects that he or
she is capable of performing the given behavior. Especially in health
psychology, the TPB has been applied to the prediction of various
health-related behaviors (see Conner and Sparks [2005] for a review).
But also when it comes to, for example, the prediction of traffic behavior, such as speeding (Forward 1997), dangerous passing (Parker et al.
1992), and pedestrian violations of regulations (Moyano Díaz 2002),
the TPB proved to be a relatively successful framework for predicting behavior. In a meta-analytical review, Armitage and Conner (2001)
report that the TPB explained an average of 39 percent of the variance
in intention and 27 percent of the variance in behavior. Therefore, the
TPB should be a useful theoretical framework for answering the question of which factors determine employers’ willingness to cooperate
with social services.
Behavioral Beliefs
Concerning attitudes, Ajzen (1991) states that so-called behavioral
beliefs determine how positive or how negative an attitude about the
given behavior will be: “Each belief links the behavior to a certain outcome, or to some other attribute such as the cost incurred by performing
the behavior. Since the attributes that come to be linked to the behavior are already valued positively or negatively, we automatically and
simultaneously acquire an attitude toward the behavior” (p. 191). Several beliefs concerning the outcomes of cooperating with a social service agency multiplied by their respective subjective values therefore
determine how positively or how negatively an employer in general
thinks about cooperating with a social service agency. Thus, we set out
to determine which are the salient behavioral beliefs for employers that
predict their willingness to do so.
In the preparation phase of this study, we conducted several interviews with employers, most of whom underlined the importance of
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financial factors. In the end, a company must stay in business, so cooperation should not cost a lot of money and time. Related to that, some
employers reported that cooperation could be a convenient way to
reduce a shortage of staff without having to expend too many resources.
In addition, some employers mentioned the word proud as part of their
belief system. That is, they showed a desire to make a difference. As a
result, they expected to feel proud when cooperating with a social service agency to help an unemployed person to find a (new) job. Indeed,
in a case study, Humphreys and Brown (2008) find that an important
motive for altruistic behavior of employees of a bank is the desire to
make a difference and as a result to feel proud. This is illustrated by the
following quote: “You need to be proud of what you’re doing, you need
to be able to put your head on the pillow at night you know, thinking
‘I’ve made a difference today,’ and you need to be able to tell your Mum
what you’ve done” (p. 408). Related to feeling proud, some employers
reported that cooperation with a social service would be in line with
their personal values, in terms of giving each individual a chance to
climb up the societal ladder. Therefore, in our study we investigate the
relative importance of each of these behavioral beliefs (money, time,
reducing shortage of staff in a convenient way, pride, and the degree
to which cooperation is congruent with personal values) in relation to
cooperation with a social service agency.
Subjective Norms
Usually, subjective norms are posited as perceptions of social pressure to behave in a particular way that derive from judgments of this
behavior from salient others, weighted by the motivation to comply
with this pressure. For example, if an employer’s friends find it really
important to be socially responsible, yet the employer is not motivated to comply with the view of their friends, subjective norms will
not strongly increase the intention to cooperate with social services.
A few employers who were interviewed did mention important others
who expressed norms compatible with cooperating with social services
and indicated an associated increase in their likelihood to act similarly.
Therefore, we decided to include a measure of subjective norms in our
study.
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Perceived Behavioral Control
In many studies, perceived behavioral control proved to be an
important predictor of intentions and resulting behavior (e.g., Norman
2011; Askelson et al. 2010; White, Terry, and Hogg 1994). However,
based on our interviews, we omitted this factor from our study. Among
the employers we interviewed, we did not find any concerns that related
to whether or not they believed that they would be able to perform the
given behavior. That is, no employer perceived any external or internal
barriers that would stand in the way of cooperating with a social service. Most of the research on perceived behavioral control deals with
behavior that seems harder to perform than cooperating with a social
service agency, such as exercise behavior (White, Terry, and Hogg
1994), attempts to reduce binge drinking behavior (Norman 2011), or
vaccinating girls against human papillomavirus (Askelson et al. 2010).
Cooperating with a social service agency is, in the eyes of the interviewed employers, under complete volitional control, whereas, in general, the aforementioned behaviors are under less volitional control.
When a given behavior is perceived to be under complete volitional
control, the actor believes that he or she is able to engage in the given
behavior (high perceived behavioral control). For behaviors that are
under less volitional control, the extent to which individuals believe
they can perform the behavior will be especially important as a predictor of the intention to act. Still, it is necessary for employers to expect
that they will be able to cooperate with social services before actually
intending to cooperate. However, based on our interviews, we expected
that feelings of perceived behavioral control would be relatively high
for all employers. Thus, unlike behavioral beliefs and subjective norms,
we did not expect that perceived behavioral control would significantly
contribute to the prediction of (differences in) intention to cooperate
with social services. We did not want to ask our respondents relatively
superfluous questions, and therefore we did not consider perceived
behavioral control. However, based on the TPB, we did consider behavioral beliefs and the subjective norms concerning cooperating with a
social service.
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Belief in a Just World
Another theoretical notion that could be useful in predicting
employers’ willingness to cooperate with social services is the “justworld hypothesis” (Lerner and Miller 1978). People with a strong belief
in a just world hold a belief system that people deserve what they get
and get what they deserve. It could be argued that people who strongly
believe in a just world are not highly motivated to help unfortunate people (such as unemployed people) because they are likely to believe that
those people themselves are to be blamed for their unfortunate position
(see, for example, Hafer [2000]). On the other hand, employers with
a weak belief in a just world could be more willing to help the unemployed. Thus, in our interviews, one employer mentioned his conviction
that he himself could end up being unemployed just as easily as the
“real” unemployed people (for example, by getting in an accident), and
that this conviction was a strong motivation for him to cooperate with
a social service agency. Therefore, we decided to investigate the role
of this factor as it relates to predicting the intention to cooperate with
social services.
Company’s Goals
The last factor we considered important deals with the concept of
corporate social responsibility, which is a major issue in the world of
industry and business. Many companies state their commitment to social
responsibility in their official communications and have the explicit
goal of being socially responsible. Hence, we investigated whether the
degree to which an employer states that his or her company expresses an
explicit goal related to corporate social responsibility would affect the
intention to provide an unemployed person with a job via a social service
agency. Specifically, we examined the role of several behavioral beliefs
(those that deal with money, time, reducing shortage of staff, pride, and
the expectation that it would be in line with personal values); subjective
norms; the degree to which an employer believes that being unemployed
only happens to people who deserve it (belief in a just world); and the
company’s goals in relation to corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, on an exploratory basis we investigated whether there would
be differences between companies as a function of their size. It seems
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plausible that employers or HR-managers of large companies will have
a solely “bureaucratic” viewpoint when it comes to cooperating with
a social service agency. As a result, it could be that among managers
or employers at large companies, there is less room to act on idealistically motivated reasons to cooperate with a social service compared to
employers at smaller companies.

METHOD
Respondents
We sent a digital questionnaire to a total of 7,870 companies in the
city of Groningen (the Netherlands) and asked that the respondents be
those who were responsible for recruiting and hiring. We received 697
responses from employers (response rate = 8.8 percent). Among those,
283 were self-employed earners, and analyses showed that these employers on average do not have a high intention to cooperate with social
services (1.93 on a 5-point scale) and thus we excluded them from our
study. We based our results on the remaining 414 respondents. Among
them there were 197 employers at small companies (2–10 employees),
156 employers at middle-sized companies (11–100 employees), and 61
employers at large companies (over 100 employees).
Measures
The questionnaire consisted of several parts constructed to measure
intention to cooperate, behavioral beliefs regarding cooperation with a
social service agency, subjective norms, belief in a just world, and the
company’s important goals, respectively.
Intention
The main dependent variable, intention to cooperate, was measured
by a single item: “To what extent do you intend to cooperate with a
social service agency within the next two years?” Respondents could
answer on a 5-point scale (1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely; M = 2.89,
SD = 1.26).
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Behavioral beliefs
Respondents evaluated the importance and likelihood of the following aspects of cooperating with social services: pride, congruent with
personal values, financially desirable outcomes, saving time, and useful for reducing shortage of staff. First, respondents rated the importance of these aspects when it comes to deciding whether or not to cooperate with a social service agency, on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
(extremely unimportant) to 5 (extremely important). Next, respondents
indicated the likelihood that cooperation with a social service agency
would result in these outcomes. Scores were rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 5 (extremely likely). Scores for
each behavioral belief were computed by constructing the product of
the importance and likelihood of each aspect (see Table 5.1 for an overview of the means and standard deviations for each behavioral belief).
Subjective norms
Subjective norms were measured by computing the product of two
items. On the first item the respondents were asked to rate their estimation of the opinion of important others in their social environment
about cooperation with a social service agency in order to help unemployed people to reintegrate to work. Their answer could vary from 1
(extremely negative) to 5 (extremely positive). On the second item the
respondents were asked to rate their motivation to comply with these
others’ opinions on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much; M of
the product of these two items = 6.06, SD = 4.97).
Belief in a just world
To measure to what extent the respondents think that people get
what they deserve when it comes to being unemployed, we constructed
two items: 1) “It is not possible for someone who really wants to work to
be unemployed for a long period,” and 2) “Unemployed people should
primarily blame themselves for their unemployment.” The respondents
could answer these two items by stating their level of agreement, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). They were combined
into a single score by computing the average response on both items
(r = 0.65, M = 2.81, SD = 0.85).
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Table 5.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Behavioral Beliefs
Mean
Standard deviation
Pride
9.10
4.87
Consistent with personal values
11.72
6.00
Saving money
10.35
6.07
Saving time
7.42
5.24
Reducing shortage of staff
9.40
6.34
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

Company’s goals
Two items were constructed to measure the extent to which the company had an explicit goal of engaging in corporate social responsibility:
1) “Making money is an important goal of my company” (M = 3.13,
SD = 1.23), and 2) “Expressing a social image is an important goal of
my company” (M = 2.96, SD = 1.09). Respondents could answer by
stating their level of agreement, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5
(totally agree). These two items were unrelated, r = −0.07, df = 412,
p = 0.14. Therefore, these two items were treated as separate variables.
The questionnaire ended with several questions regarding company
size and respondents’ gender and age. The latter two did not yield any
significant effects concerning the intention to cooperate with a social
service agency; therefore, we omit these variables from our description
of the results.

RESULTS
We divided the total number of 414 respondents into three groups
based on company size. In general, the large (N = 61) and middle-sized
companies (N = 156) showed the highest intention to cooperate with
social services (M = 3.28, SD = 1.31 and M = 3.06, SD = 1.23 respectively). The difference between large and middle-sized companies did
not reach significance. Compared to the large and middle-sized companies a post hoc test showed that small companies (N = 197) expressed a
significantly lower intention to cooperate with social services than large
and middle-sized companies: M = 2.64, SD = 1.22; highest p < 0.01.
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We conducted three separate regression analyses (for small companies, middle-sized companies, and large companies) to detect which
factors contribute to the prediction of the intention to cooperate with
social services. This criterion variable was regressed on each behavioral
belief separately, subjective norms, the measure concerning belief in a
just world, and the company’s goal (each predictor was standardized).
It is possible to summarize all these behavioral beliefs into one single
“global attitude” measure (see, for example, De Groot and Steg [2007]).
However, in our opinion it is more interesting to explore the role of
each behavioral belief separately. In so doing, we can make more clearcut practical recommendations than if we combined these behavioral
beliefs into one, more abstract global attitude measure.
Table 5.2 summarizes the regression coefficients for the small
companies, middle-sized companies, and large companies. For small
companies the following factors reached significance: pride, financially
desirable outcomes, saving time, and subjective norms. For middlesized companies, the only factors that reached significance were financially desirable outcomes and saving time, and for large companies it
was only saving time.
To conclude, for small companies, economically driven motives
such as time and money, along with more idealistically and personally
driven motives such as expecting to feel proud and to be respected, contribute significantly to the prediction of the intention to cooperate with
social services. For middle-sized and large companies no such factors
are important. For these companies, primarily economic considerations
(time and money) determine whether they are willing to cooperate with
social services. Finally, no other factors, such as the belief in a just
world or the degree to which it is important for a company to express
a social image, reached significance for small, middle-sized, or large
companies.

DISCUSSION
Why would employers cooperate with social services by providing
unemployed people with a job? The (beginning of the) answer is, “Well,
that depends.” It depends on the size of the company. While employ-

Table 5.2 Regression of Intention to Cooperate with Social Services on Behavioral Beliefs, Subjective Norms, Belief
in a Just World, and Company’s Goals
β

Small companies
t
R2
F
df
0.25*** 6.77 9,187
2.72**
1.74

Pride
0.26
Consistent with
0.14
personal values
Saving money
0.22 2.58
Saving time
0.25 2.91**
Reducing shortage −0.11 −1.32
of staff
Subjective norms
0.22 2.87**
Belief in a just world −0.02 −0.24
Goal: social
0.06 0.80
responsibility
Goal: making money −0.13 −1.53

Middle-sized companies
t
R2
F
df
0.25*** 5.43 9,146
0.10 0.90
0.13 1.14
β

0.32
0.23
0.07

3.10**
2.51*
0.82

0.12 1.38
−0.12 −1.36
0.12 1.36
0.03

0.39

β
0.09
0.19

Large companies
t
R2
F
df
0.38** 3.36 9,500
0.44
1.11

−0.16 −1.20
0.49 3.28**
0.10 0.77
−0.05 −0.27
−0.14 −1.12
−0.15 −1.14
0.03

0.25

NOTE: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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ers of middle-sized and large companies primarily base their intentions
on economic considerations, employers of small companies base their
intentions on more idealistically and personally driven motivations.
Why did we find these results? Although our study was not set up to
answer this question, and more research is needed to fully explore it, we
do have a suggestion: It is very conceivable that for employers of small
companies there is a strong connection between their personal self and
their company. If this is the case, it is not surprising that in addition to
more economic considerations concerning time and money, subjective
norms and expecting to feel proud are also important factors for determining the intent to cooperate with social services.
In our study, for small companies, the questionnaire was probably
filled out by the owner of the company (since the owner is responsible
for recruiting and hiring new staff), while for the larger companies, the
questionnaire was probably filled out by a human resources manager. In
the latter case, the connection between the respondent and the company
is in general less strong, resulting in a less important role for idealism
and personality. In addition, this line of reasoning may also account
for the less important role of the behavioral belief concerning money
among large companies. Since the respondents in this group are, in general, not the owners themselves, it is not their money that they spend
or save by cooperating with a social service agency—more likely, it
is primarily their own time that they will win or save. Hence, time for
them is a more important consideration than money.
Based on the results of our study, we would advise social services
in the Netherlands to take company size into account when they try to
find cooperation partners. Smaller companies seem to be more sensitive
to idealism and an approach based on subjective norms (“Think of how
others will appreciate you!”) than middle-sized and large companies.
However, based on our above reasoning, it might be especially important for social services, over and above company size, to determine how
strong the connection is between the person with whom they are dealing and the given company. An approach that is based more on idealism (“making a difference”) is probably more effective in the case of a
strong connection than when this connection is less strong. Importantly,
whether the connection between the person and the company is stronger
or weaker, the economic picture, especially in terms of time, should
always be appealing, since for all companies economic considerations
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are important factors to act on when it comes to cooperating with a
social service agency.
Another remarkable finding is the lack of an effect of the company’s
goals in our study. Whether the company has an explicit goal concerning making money and/or an explicit goal concerning being socially
responsible, it does not affect the employers’ intention to cooperate with
a social service agency. On the one hand, it is reassuring for the social
services that apparently employers perceive no discrepancy between
making money and cooperating with a social service (otherwise there
should have been a negative correlation between the degree to which
the respondents stated that making money is an important goal of their
company and the intention to cooperate). On the other hand, it is somewhat disappointing for social services that stating that your company
has an explicit goal to be socially responsible does not result in a higher
intention to cooperate with social services. It is possible that employers
in general just do not know whether cooperating with a social service
agency makes sense when they have explicit corporate social responsibility goals. However, it is also conceivable that expressing such goals
primarily serves a marketing function—it gives companies the opportunity to express a positive image. More research is needed to explore
whether employers in general express their company’s goals in terms
of corporate social responsibility primarily for marketing reasons, and
to explore under what circumstances employers will and will not act on
their corporate social responsibility goals by cooperating with social
services.
Theoretical Implications
During the formulation of our study, we were guided by several
theoretical perspectives, the first of which was the theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1991). Besides an attitudinal influence (based on
the separate behavioral beliefs) on intention, we only found evidence for
a significant influence of subjective norms among employers at small
companies. We used a rather general measure of subjective norms (only
based on the perceived norm of “important others”) instead of measuring the norms of several reference groups. According to Armitage and
Conner (2001), measuring subjective norms by means of a single item
measure (which closely resembles our measure) can account for a low
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correlation between subjective norms and intention. However, in their
meta-analysis the subjective norm-intention correlation is significantly
weaker than, for example, the attitude-intention correlation. In line with
Armitage and Conner, we could conclude that while “this does not present sufficient evidence to warrant discarding the construct, it does perhaps indicate that it is the part of the theory of planned behavior that
most requires further study” (p. 482). To fully identify the normative
component of human behavior and to increase the predictive power of
the theory of planned behavior, one should probably take into account
that there are many types of norms, besides subjective norms (see, for
example, Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno [1991]), which could all have
profound influences on intention and behavior. In addition to that, our
results show that a subjective norm is only an important factor, when
the consequences of the given behavior solely shine on the actor, as was
the case for the employers of the small companies in our study.
The second theoretical viewpoint we used was the notion of the
“just-world hypothesis” (Lerner and Miller 1978). Believing that being
unemployed is something that people deserve should lower the intention to cooperate with a social service agency. However, we did not
find any evidence for this line of reasoning. Contrary to other studies, such as Fox et al. (2010) and Van den Bos and Maas (2009), we
used a situation-specific measure of belief in a just world. That is, we
asked respondents whether they viewed unemployment as something
that unemployed people simply deserve. We did so because there is no
theoretical reason to expect that a strong general belief in a just world
(i.e., the belief that the world is just for people generally) should be
closely related to a more situation-specific measure of belief in a just
world. That is, if individuals believe that people in general get what
they deserve, then it is plausible that they also believe that unemployed
people get what they deserve, namely, unemployment. Yet, such a blunt
measure might have led to more socially desirable answers and, as such,
a less expressed belief in a just world concerning unemployed people
among respondents with a strong belief in a just world.
In line with our reasoning concerning the strength of the connectedness between the respondent and the company, however, it is not
inconceivable that at least for the middle-sized and the large companies, the connection between the respondent and the company was too
weak to let such a personal factor affect the intention to cooperate. That
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does not account, however, for the absence of significant results among
employers of small companies. The role of the “belief in a just world”
concept therefore remains unclear when it comes to employers’ intention to cooperate with social services.

CONCLUSION
Why would employers cooperate with social service agencies by
providing unemployed people with a job? The answer to this question
should have far-reaching implications for the policies that social service agencies undertake to find employers that are willing to cooperate
with them. When employers have difficulties finding sufficient numbers
of new employees, as is the case during periods of economic boom,
social service agencies do not really need to put themselves into the
employer’s psychological frame of reference. However, when unemployment rates are high, as is the case now, it becomes clear that these
agencies need to know what is considered important by employers, who
have to decide whether or not they will cooperate with them. Social
service agencies that are apt to take an employer’s perspective will be
better able to decrease immediately the number of unemployed people.
Moreover, getting to know employers’ needs and wishes is especially
important for Dutch social service agencies in order to be better able
to reduce the expected mismatch of the Dutch labor market in the long
run. Due to the aging of the population, Dutch society simply cannot
afford to exclude people for a long period from the labor market.
Our results suggest that social service agencies should take company
size into account. We found that employers of small companies (2–10
employees) are much more willing to cooperate with social service
agencies due to idealistic motives than are employers of middle-sized
(11–100 employees) and large companies (more than 100 employees).
In contrast, for middle-sized and large companies, more rational factors
such as (the lack of) time and money determine whether or not they
are willing to cooperate with social service agencies. Hence, although
most companies do officially state their social responsibility, our results
show that only for small companies is cooperating with social service
agencies not solely a matter of economics (although they do empha-
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size the importance of economic factors). In trying to persuade employers to cooperate with them, social service agencies should differentiate the rationale for their policies as a function of company size. That
is, when contacting small companies, they should base their approach
on economic motives such as time and money, as well as on an idealistic desire to “do the right thing” and on subjective norms, whereas
with middle-sized and large companies, they should primarily adopt an
approach that is based on motives such as time and money.
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One response to the Great Recession of 2008–2009 in several economies of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) was increased reliance on short-time compensation (STC) and
other work-sharing arrangements that temporarily reduce weekly hours
to ease labor market dislocations and to avoid the personal and economic costs of elevated levels of long-term unemployment. Short-time
compensation has been credited with helping to stabilize employment in
the face of sharp reductions in real gross domestic product (GDP). The
research conducted by Burda and Hunt (2011) and Boeri and Bruecker
(2011) concludes that the STC program in Germany (Kurzarbeit) was a
major contributor in stabilizing German employment in 2009 and 2010.
As labor markets in the United States recover from the Great Recession, it is appropriate to assess the performance of the economy during
this period and consider ways of structuring labor market institutions
to lessen the economic hardships of future recessions. Not only did
U.S. product markets deteriorate, but labor markets also experienced
sharp decreases in employment, steep increases in unemployment, and
record high levels of long-term unemployment. Given the severity of
labor market conditions since 2007, this chapter examines the recent
performance of STC in states with such programs and assesses their
impact on employment. The chapter begins with an introduction to STC
and a description of some of the important features of the program,
and then reviews the performance of STC in the United States for the
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17 states that have operated programs for several years. The next section reviews foreign experience with STC, with particular attention to
the performance of STC programs in Canada, Germany, and Belgium.
The following section discusses ways to increase STC usage in the
United States. While some suggestions are obvious, others would make
changes in the way STC plans currently function within state unemployment insurance (UI) programs.
The chapter reaches three main conclusions. First, STC has the
potential to prevent layoffs and stabilize employment in short-run cyclical fluctuations. While program usage increases sharply at the start of
a recession, the increased utilization lasts for a comparatively short
period. Second, the programs in the United States are small in scale and
do not meaningfully affect labor market adjustments at the macro level.
Third, if STC were to play a larger role during the economic recovery as
well as a larger role in future recessions, the programs would need to be
enlarged and the pace of adoptions expanded. In addition to presenting
suggestions for increasing STC usage, the chapter assesses the February 2012 legislation: the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act
of 2012 (PL12-96).

AN OVERVIEW OF WORk SHARING
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs, now present in
many economies, are intended to reduce the volume of layoffs during
periods of slack labor demand.1 Rather than reducing hours by laying
off (nonprejudicial separations) some workers, a wider pool of workers
at the workplace is retained but at reduced weekly hours of work. For
example, to reduce hours by 20 percent in a work unit that employs
100 persons working 40-hour weeks, there would need to be 20 layoffs. Alternatively, all 100 in the work unit could be placed on 32-hour
schedules. Both measures would reduce hours by 20 percent.
These employment retention programs provide partial unemployment compensation (UC) benefits to workers placed on shorter schedules. For example, if UC benefits replace half of previous weekly wages,
then someone on a 32-hour schedule would receive 80 percent of their
full weekly wages and partial UC benefits equal to 10 percent of weekly
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wages. Thus, part of the reduction in income caused by the reduction in
hours is offset by partial UC benefits. In this simple example, participants in STC would receive take-home pay equal to 90 percent of their
full weekly wages.2
In the United States in 2011, 21 states had STC programs that were
generally small in scale. While 4 states introduced STC programs during 2010 and 2011, the other 17 states have operated these programs for
20 years or longer. A program for STC is established through legislation
as part of a state’s UI law. Short-time compensation plans, administered
as part of UI, are initiated when an employer files an application with
the UI agency. To be eligible to participate in STC, the employer must
be experience rated, not delinquent in paying UI taxes, and explain the
reason(s) for needing to adjust work hours. Plans submitted to the UI
agency are often approved within one or two weeks.
Short-time compensation plans need to conform to state requirements regarding a minimum percentage reduction in hours at the
affected work unit, plan duration, the minimum and maximum reduction in hours for affected workers, and the maximum number of weeks
STC benefits will be paid. Table 6A.1 in Appendix 6A displays important state-level requirements for 17 states with long-standing STC
programs. Plans generally last 25 or 52 weeks and maximum payable
weeks are usually 26 or 52. For affected workers, the reduction in hours
is bounded between a minimum (10–20 percent in all states) and a maximum (40–50 percent in nearly all states). Plans also must specify the
treatment of fringe benefits (usually either full maintenance or reduced
by the proportionate reduction in hours worked). When workers are
unionized, the plan must be approved by the collective bargaining unit.
Certain features of STC are linked to standard UI provisions. One is
that the benefits paid to participants count against the experience-rated
UI taxes paid by the employer. Since the employer initiates this reduction in hours, STC payments are experience rated in the same way as a
layoff. When claimants start to collect STC, the payments count against
their maximum potential payment for the benefit year (the 12-month
period for which current UI eligibility applies). For example, someone
otherwise eligible for 26 weeks of benefits under full unemployment
would only be eligible for 24 weeks if they collected STC one day per
week for 10 weeks earlier in the same benefit year. Most states make
regular recipients serve a waiting week before collecting benefits. For
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STC recipients, this requirement means they can start collecting in the
second week of the STC claim. While regular UI recipients are required
to search for work, this requirement is waived for STC recipients since
they remain employed.

EMPIRICAL ANALySIS OF STC IN THE UNITED STATES
The STC reporting system generates monthly data that can be compared with regular state UI data. Initial claims, first payments, weeks
claimed, weeks compensated, exhaustions and total benefit payments
are routinely reported, along with equivalent initial claims and equivalent weeks claimed. In the latter two series, claims are converted to
equivalent full weeks; that is, a week claimed by five persons working
under a 20 percent reduction in weekly hours represents one equivalent week claimed. Under certain assumptions, the equivalent weeks
claimed show the number of layoffs and weeks of full unemployment
avoided by the use of STC.
The empirical analysis focuses on STC equivalent weeks claimed
measured as a percentage of regular UI weeks claimed in annual data
for the past three business cycles. For 13 of 17 states, the data extend
from 1989 to 2010; there are fewer years in four states.3 All regression
equations use the same specification: the equivalent-weeks-claimed
percentage is explained by the total unemployment rate (TUR) in the
state and a linear trend. The TUR is entered for both the current year
and the previous year. Both the current TUR and the lagged TUR coefficients show how equivalent weeks claimed behave relative to regular
weeks claimed. A positive coefficient for the TUR indicates that STC
equivalent weeks increase more rapidly than regular weeks in a recession when the TUR increases.
Table 6.1 summarizes the 17 regression equations by showing the
distribution of the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients.
Table 6B.1 in Appendix 6B displays the full regression results. All 17
coefficients for the current TUR are positive and statistically significant. A remarkably consistent pattern is present in all 17 states: when
unemployment increases, STC equivalent weeks increase more rapidly
than regular UI weeks claimed.
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Table 6.1 Coefficients from STC Regressions, 1989–2010
Positive, Negative,
Positive,
not
not
Negative,
significant significant significant significant
Constant
1
4
4
8
State unemp.
17
0
0
0
rate—TUR%
State TUR%
0
0
4
13
lagged
Linear trend
9
5
1
2

Total
17
17
17
17

SOURCE: Regression equations displayed in Table 6B.1 of Appendix 6B.

The effect of the lagged TUR is also consistent. All 17 slope coefficients are negative and 13 are statistically significant: equivalent weeks
of STC decline relative to regular weeks in the second year of a recessionary period. As the economy travels further through a recession,
the volume of STC claims decreases even though unemployment may
remain high or even increase. Comparing the absolute size of the two
sets of coefficients, those for the lagged TUR are generally from half to
fully equal to the current TUR coefficients. Not only is there a falloff,
but the falloff is also large relative to the increase in the first year of the
recession.
The linear trend coefficients in Table 6.1 present a more mixed picture.4 For 14 of the 17 states there is an upward (positive) trend in STC
usage with nine trends statistically significant. Three states exhibit a
negative trend, and in two of them the trend is statistically significant
(Florida and Maryland). Despite the predominance of positive trends,
STC programs are, and remain, small in all states. Note in Table 6B.1
of Appendix 6B that the STC equivalent-weeks percentage exceeds 1.0
percent in just one state (Rhode Island) for the full data period; the percentage exceeds 0.4 in just four other states for the same period (California, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont).
The underlying data illustrate not only the unusual severity of the
Great Recession but also its effect on the scale of STC usage. Over
the 22 years from 1989 to 2010, the highest equivalent-weeks-claimed
percentage occurred in 2009 for 16 of the 17 states (all but Kansas).
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Even though the TUR was higher in 2010 than in 2009 in most of the
17 states, the equivalent-weeks-claimed percentage in 2010 fell below
the 2009 percentage in all but one state (Washington).
The regression results shown in Table 6B.1 and summarized in
Table 6.1 portray a remarkably consistent pattern. When the economy
enters a recession, STC usage increases sharply and much more rapidly than regular UI claims. Usage then falls, however, even in the face
of continued high unemployment. The interpretation of the regression
results seems obvious. Going into a recession, employers establish STC
plans and place workers on reduced weekly schedules. These workers,
however, do not remain on short schedules for very long. As the recession lengthens they exit through two outflows. While some workers
return to full weekly work schedules, others experience full layoffs. For
the latter group, STC delays the onset of full unemployment. For participating employers, STC provides more time to observe the depth and
duration of the downturn and yields improved information upon which
to make better informed adjustments in staffing.
For firms that retain long-run viability, there are two important
advantages in utilizing STC programs: 1) the increased level of worker
retention, and 2) reduced training costs since fewer new hires are needed
in the ensuing upturn. For workers, there are fewer layoffs early in the
recession and a different pattern of burden sharing (wider but smaller
per-person losses for affected workers) due to reduced layoffs. One disadvantage for workers who eventually do lose their jobs is that STC
only delays the layoffs—it is not avoided. For them STC has simply
delayed the timing of the job loss.5
Some other aspects of worker experiences with STC can be inferred
from state reports. Because the states report both weeks claimed and
equivalent weeks claimed, the size of the reductions in weekly schedules can be ascertained. The higher the ratio of equivalent weeks to
total weeks, the larger the reduction in work schedules; for example,
a ratio of 0.20 suggests a reduction of one day from a five-day week.
Overall, the reductions in work schedules have generally been modest.
For 14 states, the equivalent weeks to weeks ratio between 2000 and
2010 averaged between 0.176 and 0.265. Ratios in this range suggest
that reductions for STC participants usually averaged one to one-andone-half days per week. These ratios also indicate that the number of
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individuals participating in STC is 3–5 times larger than suggested by
the equivalent weeks ratios examined in the regressions.
As with temporary layoff unemployment, participation in STC is
generally short term. Between 2000 and 2010, the mean duration of
STC was shorter than for regular UI benefits in 13 of the 14 states with
reliable STC duration data.6 The ratio of the two averages was below
0.80 in 10 states, and only in Rhode Island and Vermont were they
similar in size. Moreover, exhaustion of benefits while on STC is rare
because duration is short and a compensated week usually involves
only one or two days in benefit status. Exhaustion rates between 2000
and 2010 were significantly lower for persons receiving first payments
under STC compared to the regular UI program in 15 of the 17 states
with STC programs. The average exhaustion rate for these 11 years was
almost always less than 5 percent for STC recipients compared to 30
percent or higher for regular UI program recipients.
One would expect STC recipients to have higher wages and, hence,
higher weekly benefits than those on layoff and other job losers because
a layoff typically affects less senior workers. The STC data support this
expectation. In the 13 states where full weekly benefits for STC recipients can be calculated, their average STC benefits consistently exceeded
average weekly benefits in the regular UI program. The ratio of the STC
average to the regular program average during the 2000–2010 period
ranged between 1.00 and 1.15 for 10 of the 13 states. Since the reported
data do not identify the occupations of STC participants, we cannot
compare the skill levels of participants to regular UI recipients.
Three concluding comments are appropriate as a summary of the
empirical work in this section of the chapter. First, utilization of STC
was very sensitive to the business cycle over the last three recessions
for which reported data are available. Second, the utilization of STC
was highest during the early stages of the Great Recession. Third, the
scale of STC utilization has been consistently small in all 17 states.
This last comment provides a logical connection to the next section
of the chapter, which examines international experience with STC and
provides a brief description of STC programs in three other advanced
countries.
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COMPARISONS OF STC IN FOUR COUNTRIES
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs are present in the
majority of advanced economies with new adoptions occurring in several after the onset of the Great Recession. Hijzen and Venn (2011) note
that 22 OECD economies reported either introducing new measures
or making adjustments to existing programs in response to the most
recent downturn. Program details vary widely across countries. Here
we briefly examine three foreign programs: 1) Canada, 2) Germany,
and 3) Belgium. The choice of these countries is based on past experiences of the authors and knowledge of their differing scales. While all
three foreign programs are larger than STC in the United States, the
Canadian program can be described as similar in size. The programs in
Germany and Belgium have a much larger presence in their respective
labor markets. We recently reviewed the Canadian program, while the
German and Belgian programs were the subject of comparative analysis
in the early 1990s (Vroman 1992).
Cyclical adjustments in hours worked occur at two margins, the
extensive and intensive margins, or as changes in employment and
changes in hours per employed person. Germany and Belgium have
extensive safety nets for employed workers that include other measures
besides STC, which also facilitate adjustments in hours per employee.
Prominent among these other features are working-time accounts (present in both Germany and Belgium), working-time corridors (Germany),
and career interruption benefits (Belgium). Burda and Hunt (2011) and
Boeri and Bruecker (2011) conclude that working-time accounts, along
with STC, have played an important part in stabilizing German employment in 2009–2010. While we focus on STC, readers are reminded that
other factors can influence adjustments on the intensive margin. These
other factors are part of a broad framework of labor market “flexicurity” present in many OECD economies (see Chapter 2 in this volume).
Because flexicurity provisions are generally not present in the United
States, we merely note their relevance to the analysis of STC in other
countries.
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Canada
Canada has supported an STC program since the early 1980s. While
it has been comparatively small in scale, it operates in all provinces of
the country and exhibits strong cyclical sensitivity. Interested employers file STC plans with the Employment Insurance (EI) agency, and
claimants receive partial EI benefits under approved plans.7 Claimants
must be monetarily eligible under the same requirements as regular EI
claimants. Unlike claimants for regular EI benefits, who are subject
to a two-week waiting period, STC recipients are paid during the first
week of eligibility. The STC payments received do not reduce future
EI entitlement if the claimant subsequently becomes fully unemployed
through a layoff.
With the onset of the Great Recession, Canada modified STC to
broaden the scope of the program. Potential benefit duration was
increased in early 2009 from 38 to 52 weeks and then to 78 weeks.
Employer participation was encouraged through advertisements in the
media and revised program requirements that broadened coverage and
eased the application process. One change was the temporary waiver of
a detailed plan to return to full work schedules. During 2009 participation in STC was the highest in the history of the Canadian program.
Germany
Short-time compensation has been present in Germany since the
end of the nineteenth century and widely used since the late 1920s.
During the Great Recession the STC program, termed Kurzarbeit,
expanded dramatically from 50,000 participants in September 2008 to
1.46 million in May 2009. Over the same period the number of participating employers increased from 1,491 to 14,936. The large increase
in participation reflects the increased usage of the program by large
establishments.
The STC program in Germany has a number of key features. Plans
can be established if there is a “significant loss of work,” the definition
of which was eased in February 2009 to broaden the scope of potential
STC use. The initiative to establish an STC plan can originate from the
employer or from worker representatives, and both must agree on the
details of the plan if workers are unionized. In nonrecessionary periods,
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STC plans usually last six months, but extensions to 12 months are
common. During the Great Recession, the maximum duration increased
to 18 months in January 2009 and to 24 months in June. Maximum
duration throughout 2010 was 18 months.
After the establishment of an STC plan, payments are administered
by the employer through the company’s payroll system with reimbursement to the employer from the German administrative agency, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BA). Employers are required to maintain fringe
benefit contributions (for health insurance and retirement) so that
employer fringe benefit costs increase for their STC workers.
Utilization of STC during the Great Recession was high, and several researchers have credited STC with the maintenance of employment during 2009 and 2010 (Boeri and Bruecker 2011; Burda and Hunt
2011; Crimmann, Wießner, and Bellmann 2010). The authors conclude
that absent STC, the level of unemployment in 2009 would have been
250,000–400,000 higher in Germany.
Other factors have also contributed to the so-called German employment miracle of 2009–2010. Working-time accounts were widely used.
These accounts accumulate balances when workers log overtime and,
rather than receiving take-home pay immediately, the overtime pay is
deposited into the accounts. Workers can then withdraw from these
accounts at a later time when weekly hours are reduced. While these
accounts have existed for more than 20 years and accumulated substantial balances, they were reduced by large withdrawals during 2009
and 2010. Both Boeri and Bruecker (2011) and Burda and Hunt (2011)
attribute the large employment-stabilizing effects in Germany during
the Great Recession to the utilization of these accounts.
The list of other factors operative in Germany also includes deliberate employer decisions to forgo overtime hours in favor of employmentstabilizing adjustments to total hours. Of some importance are workingtime “corridors,” which employers can use to shorten the weekly hours
of less senior workers. In sum, several factors contributed to the stabilization of employment and unemployment in the face of large reductions
in real output in Germany. While STC was important, other factors also
played a major role in stabilizing employment and unemployment (see
Chapter 2 in this volume).
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Belgium
Belgium operates an STC program of substantial size. Between
2007 and 2009 the number of beneficiaries of chomeurs temporaires
(temporary unemployment schemes) doubled, restraining the increase
in open unemployment. The program was expanded during 2009 and
2010 by increasing potential benefit duration and expanding the occupational coverage to white-collar workers.
Two other programs in Belgium pay benefits to part-time workers. Career interruption benefits are paid to those who reduce hours to
pursue non–labor market activities, such as child rearing. Interruptions
are temporary and may be either total or partial. Credit time accounts,
first initiated in 2002, is a much smaller program than the working-time
accounts in Germany, and participation did not expand much in 2009–
2010. Thus in Belgium, the stabilization of employment and unemployment was attributable mainly to the program of chomeurs temporaires.
Table 6.2 displays comparative data on STC for the United States,
Canada, Germany, and Belgium. The table has annual data for the four
years from 2007 to 2010. For the United States, the data pertain to the
17 states with STC at the end of 2009. This total includes the four largest states, and the 17 states combined represent about half of the labor
force and unemployment.8 Note that for Canada and Germany certain
data have been inferred. Total unemployment for all four countries is
based on own-country labor force surveys.
Four aspects of Table 6.2 warrant comments. First, the table reinforces the point made in the previous section that the scale of STC in
the United States is small. Even restricting the data to the 17 states with
long-standing STC programs, the size in 2009, the year of highest utilization, is only 1.1 percent of regular UI recipients. Second, the strong
cyclicality of STC utilization in all four economies is evident. The falloff in utilization during 2010 relative to 2009 is obvious, with the German STC percentage (column [6]) falling to half of the 2009 percentage. As stated previously, STC is utilized most intensively in the early
stages of a recession. If the program is to perform a useful stabilization
function, it has to be established prior to the recession, not after it has
begun. Furthermore, in this slow recovery from the recession, reducing layoffs can make an important contribution to improving the labor
market. Data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through its Job
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Table 6.2 Comparisons of STC Programs in Four Countries, 2007–2010
Regular
Total
UC
unemployrecipients
ment
(2)
(1)
United Statesa
2007
3,495
1,060
2008
4,531
1,396
2009
7,123
2,454
2010
7,608
1,954
Canada
2007
1,079
479
2008
1,117
486
2009
1,516
734
2010
1,484
683
Germany
2007
3,601
1,080
2008
3,141
917
2009
3,227
1,141
2010
2,936
1,027
Belgium
2007
353
429
2008
334
404
2009
380
434
2010
408
438

STC
beneficiaries
(3)

Equiv. ben./
STC
equivalent Equiv. ben./ regular
STC ben. ben. (%)
bene(4)/(2)
(4)/(3)
ficiaries
(6)
(5)
(4)

12.0
22.6
104.0
67.7

3.2
6.2
27.7
16.8

0.267
0.275
0.266
0.249

0.303
0.445
1.127
0.862

2.6
4.8
48.3
30.9

0.7
1.4
13.8
8.9

0.286b
0.286b
0.286b
0.286b

0.152
0.280
1.884
1.296

68.0
102.0
1,139.0
535.0c

36.0
46.0
372.0
174.0c

0.528
0.451
0.326
0.326c

3.337
4.994
32.603
16.999

115.0
134.7
210.9
173.3

30.1
32.4
60.6
49.8

0.261
0.240
0.287
0.287

6.983
8.018
13.951
11.353

17 states with STC in 2009.
Ratio assumed by the authors based on fiscal year data from 1991–2009.
c
Based on part-year data.
SOURCE: Data developed by the authors from national sources. Data in columns (1)–
(4) are in thousands.
a

b

Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicate that even now,
22 months into the recovery, 1.8 million jobs are lost each month due to
involuntary separations. Greater use of STC could further reduce these
involuntary separations—resulting in a net increase of jobs—or apparent job growth.
Third, the most obvious feature of Table 6.2 is the much larger scale
of the STC programs in Germany and Belgium. Column (6) shows
equivalent beneficiaries as a percentage of regular UC beneficiaries: the
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averages during 2009 and 2010 are about 25 percent in Germany and 12
percent in Belgium. The corresponding two-year averages in the United
States and Canada were 1.0 and 1.6 percent. Fourth, note the extent of
the reductions from full schedules suggested by column (5): the ratio
of full equivalent STC beneficiaries to the weekly/monthly numbers
of STC beneficiaries. For the United States and Belgium, the proportions consistently fall between 0.25 and 0.30, whereas for Germany
they show a sharp decrease in 2009–2010. In Germany the reduction in
weekly schedules was about half in 2007–2008 but about one-third in
2009–2010. The average number of recipients in STC grew much more
rapidly than the number of full equivalent STC recipients in 2009–2010.
A final observation about the information in Table 6.2 is the scale
of the increase in unemployment in the United States compared to the
other three countries. Unemployment in 2010 was more than twice its
level of 2007—7.608 million versus 3.495 million.9 The next largest
increase was in Canada, roughly 50 percent. The increase in Belgium
was less than 20 percent, while German unemployment did not increase
in 2009–2010 despite a sharp falloff in real GDP, especially in 2009.
These data merely reinforce the widely understood point that German
workers fared comparatively well during the Great Recession.

OPTIONS FOR INCREASING STC UTILIzATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
We believe STC needs to be more widely utilized in the United
States on both equity and efficiency grounds. Equity is promoted by
sharing the burden of adjustment more equally across the workforce,
and efficiency is advanced by preventing temporary factors from
destroying valuable job matches (OECD 2010).
We find two aspects of STC particularly attractive when compared
to the adjustments in hours worked accomplished through layoffs. First,
we think STC provides a better pattern of burden sharing among workers. A wider pool is affected under STC but the reduction in income
among affected persons is smaller than under layoffs. Not only does
STC reduce the volume of worker dislocation but also the adjustment
problems of dislocated workers, such as long spells of unemployment,
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reduced reemployment wage rates, and loss of health insurance and
other fringe benefits. In the language of labor economics, STC shifts
the locus of changes in hours worked from the extensive margin (layoffs) to the intensive margin (hours per worker). Second, training costs
are reduced because workers remain employed and many return to fulltime schedules at their jobs when sales and production recover to prerecession levels.
Based on this judgment, we suggest four specific actions to increase
STC utilization:
1) Disseminate information about STC and its advantages to
employers and workers. While dissemination of timely information can
be accomplished by various means, the following are obvious: advertise
in the media, especially during the earliest stages of a recession; include
information in UI tax notices to employers; and provide information
to employers and workers in mass-layoff situations. The latter can be
activated by the advance notice requirements of WARN legislation that
requires employers with 50 or more employees to give notice 60 days
prior to a planned mass layoff. State labor departments then send rapid
response teams to the worksite to help plan for the subsequent developments. Rapid response teams include UI specialists who can inform
employers and workers about STC and potentially influence the type of
adjustments to be made.
Rhode Island, the state with the largest STC program (relative to
the state labor market), has experience with avoiding plant closings
when employers and workers have been informed about the STC program. This experience at plant sites has helped save jobs that eventually
returned to full schedules when company sales rebounded.
2) Because of the uncertainty surrounding employer staffing decisions at the early stages of a downturn, STC plans must be comparatively easy to implement. At present, the employer must submit the
STC plan to the UI agency to start the process. An alternative approach
would be to let the employer initiate the STC plan, commence it immediately and administer payments within their existing payroll system,
but inform the UI agency at the same time. Partial UI benefits can be
paid by the employer, who is then reimbursed by the agency.10 Under
this arrangement workers would not need to apply for benefits as they
are automatically enrolled and paid.11 To ensure that plans adhere to
statutory and administrative guidelines, the UI agency can audit some
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plans and respond to complaints. This approach would resemble the one
followed in Germany. The advantage is that it would have a rapid startup and, more than likely, higher worker participation than at present
where take-up is far from universal in STC work units.12
If a state deemed this approach inappropriate, an alternative would
be to ease the application procedure and expedite the approval of STC
applications during a recession. The UI agency would acknowledge the
importance of STC by having internal administrative procedures making it of equal importance to timely payments for fully unemployed
claimants.
3) A salient feature of UI in the United States is experience rating.
Higher payments to laid-off employees cause future employer UI payroll taxes to increase. Experience rating is imperfect, and on average
only about 60 percent of benefit payments are charged to the former
employers. Situations that escape experience rating include payments
that follow quits, benefits to workers when firms cease operations, and
payments by employers taxed at the maximum tax rate. These payments are termed noncharged and ineffectively charged benefits. They
are typically financed by a common tax, where all employers pay the
same tax rate.
The payment of STC benefits could be treated as a category of noncharged benefits. In effect, the cost of STC benefits would be spread
to all covered employers rather than assigned to STC employers. This
procedure would provide an explicit reward for maintaining employment and reducing the volume of layoffs. In other words, STC employers would be rewarded for making adjustments at the intensive margin
rather than the extensive margin. If some STC participants were subsequently severed, the later payments for full unemployment would be
treated the same as other charged benefits.
4) A second aspect of STC benefit payments could also be treated
differentially from regular UI benefits. When a claimant files for regular benefits and is deemed eligible, a benefit year is established. The
benefit year is a 52-week period within which the claimant can collect a
maximum total amount of UI benefits. For most claimants (roughly 80
percent) this amount (the maximum benefit amount [MBA]) is limited
to 26 times their weekly benefit. Any payments within an established
benefit year reduce the available balance from their MBA. When the
remaining balance reaches zero the claimant is said to have exhausted
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their claim for that year. Currently STC payments reduce the MBA
remaining balance in the same way as full weekly benefits, just at a
slower weekly rate that reflects the reduction from the full work schedule. Someone otherwise eligible for 26 weeks who collects STC for 10
days would only be eligible for 24 weeks of full UI benefits in the same
benefit year.
This aspect of eligibility treats STC claimants like fully unemployed claimants even though they have remained employed. To the
extent that STC-eligible persons are concerned about becoming fully
unemployed, this treatment of their remaining MBA would inhibit their
participation in STC. The United States is the only country where drawing STC benefits reduces potential benefits for full unemployment. In
effect, we treat the STC participants as unemployed while other STC
programs treat participants as employed. Worker participation in STC
would be encouraged if STC payments did not reduce the remaining
balance in the MBA.
Administration of this changed treatment would require states to
separately record STC benefits and delay establishing a new benefit
year when STC would otherwise be the first payment of a new benefit
year. A simple way to accomplish this would be to have the federal
partner fully finance STC benefit payments. This financial arrangement
would involve reimbursing state UI agencies directly for STC payments. Employers in states with STC would avoid associated UI taxes
altogether (including some socialized charges if STC benefits were
treated as noncharged items).
Throughout its 30-year history in the United States, STC has been a
small program, even in the states with STC. Implementing the four suggested changes would increase STC utilization, making it available to a
wider set of workers than at present. In unionized situations there would
need to be agreement by the union as to the plan’s details.
Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island has tried to foster increased
use of STC and introduced STC legislation in 2010 and in 2011 with
Senators Richard Durbin and Sherrod Brown (S.386.IS—Unemployment Insurance Solvency Act of 2011). Most provisions of their bill
were included in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act
of 2012 (PL12-96). The legislation includes three categories of provisions: 1) temporary federal financing of STC benefits, 2) grants to states
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for STC-related purposes, and 3) increased federal responsibilities for
promoting STC.
The first provision of the legislation relates to temporary federal
financing of STC programs. This provision not only rewards states
that have existing programs, but also encourages other states to adopt
STC. For states with existing programs, 100 percent of the cost of STC
benefits is paid by the federal partner for three full years. States that
introduce STC programs will have 50 percent of the cost of benefits
subsidized for three years.
The second provision authorizes $100 million in grants to states for
STC-related purposes. Grants will be disbursed for two types of activities: 1) implementing newly enacted STC programs and improving
administration, and 2) promoting and enrolling employers in STC programs. The allocation formula for disbursing these grants to the states is
one-third for the first activity and two-thirds for the second.
The third provision relates to increased federal and state responsibilities for promoting STC. Three new areas of responsibilities are added
to the authority of the U.S. Department of Labor. First, new model language for STC legislation in the states will be prepared, updating legislative language drafted some 25 years ago. Second, technical assistance
and guidance will be provided to the states in establishing and administering STC. The third establishes the requirements for reporting STC
activities, a small extension to the existing reporting requirements.
Compared to the suggestions we have proposed above, the 2012
legislation includes substantial direct financial support both for STC
benefit payments and for STC benefits administration. It also provides
financial rewards for effective outreach to employers, whereas we rely
more on information dissemination through various channels to reach
employers and increase utilization. The legislation does not speak to
the treatment of STC benefit charges in affecting employer UI tax rates
or the treatment of the STC usage in reducing the claimant’s remaining
MBA. To the extent that money talks, the financial carrots of the legislation could encourage adoptions by states. While we have emphasized
the role of STC at the start of a recession, it could also provide a useful
role during the recovery phase of the business cycle. During the recovery phase, however, STC would play a smaller role because the volume
of layoffs is much lower.
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Notes
1. The term work sharing as used here means reducing hours for the purpose of preserving overall employment. It does not refer to, say, two people sharing a single
full-time job with each working part time.
2. Personal taxes are not considered in this example.
3. For Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Rhode Island the first year is either 1991
or 1992.
4. The linear trend variable is equal to 1 in 1989 and increases by increments of 1 in
subsequent years. This variable is needed to control for slowly evolving trends.
An upward trend could reflect slowly increasing awareness of STC by employers
and/or workers.
5. With an STC program in place, one can expect fewer layoffs and a reduction in the
economic costs associated with a job separation. It is also possible that receipt of
STC acts as a signal to modify behavior and adapt to changed economic circumstances; for example, increase the rate of saving.
6. Duration for regular UI benefits and for STC is measured as the ratio of weeks
compensated to first payments.
7. The UI program in Canada is called Employment Insurance. Monetary eligibility
is based on hours of work in the past year. The minimum hours requirement varies
from 420 to 700 depending upon the provincial unemployment rate.
8. The total unemployment of 7.608 million in 2010 was 51 percent of the national
total of 14.825 million.
9. The national numbers for the two periods were 14.815 million versus 7.078 million, an increase of 109 percent.
10. In unionized situations there would have to be agreement by the union as to the
plan’s details.
11. Certain states in the Southeast, for example, the Carolinas and Georgia, already
have employer-filed UI claims.
12. This aspect of STC is one finding of the Berkeley Planning Associates 1997 study
of STC programs.

Appendix 6A
State STC Provisions in 2010
Table 6A.1 displays four key requirements that STC plans must satisfy to
be approved by the UI agency. The table covers the 17 states where STC plans
were operative at the end of 2009. As noted in the text, three more states created STC programs in 2010 and one in 2011.
Table 6A.1 State STC Plan Requirements in 2010
Maximum
Minimum
Plan approval STC weeks
reduction in
period (weeks)
payable
hours (%)
a
Arizona
52
26
10
Arkansas
52
26
10
b
California
26
10
Connecticut
26
26c
20
Florida
52
25
10
Iowa
104
52
20
Kansas
52
26
20
Maryland
26
26
10
Massachusetts
25
26
10
Minnesota
52
52
20
Missouri
52
26
20
New York
20
20
Oregon
52
52
20
Rhode Island
52
52
10
Texas
52
52
10
Vermont
26
26
20
Washington
52
52
10

Maximum
reduction in
hours (%)
40
40
40
40
50
40
50
60
40
40
60
40
50
40
50
50

Longer limit if the state-insured unemployment rate exceeds 4.0 percent of covered
employment.
b
No limit on weeks but payments cannot exceed 26 times the weekly benefit amount
(WBA).
c
26-week extension possible.
SOURCE: USDOL (2010).
a
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Appendix 6B
Regression Analysis of STC
Utilization in 17 States
Table 6B.1 displays results for 17 state-level regression equations typically spanning the years 1989–2010. The dependent variable is annual STC
equivalent weeks claimed measured as a percentage of annual weeks in the
regular UI program of each state. Each regression equation has three explanatory variables: 1) the current year’s state total unemployment rate (TUR), 2)
the TUR lagged one year, and 3) a linear time trend that starts in 1989. Adjacent to each estimated slope coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio. The
summary measures on the right-hand side of Table 6B.1 are the adjusted R2s,
the standard error of estimate, and the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). The final
columns display the mean of the dependent variable and the maximum percentage. The table also identifies four states where STC data were not available
from 1989 due to later start dates for the programs (1991 for Iowa and Rhode
Island; 1992 for Connecticut and Minnesota).
For most states the fits are quite satisfactory, with adjusted R2s of at least
0.50 for 13 states and standard errors below 0.30 for 15 states. The generally
small scale of STC is vividly illustrated by the small means in the right-hand
column of Table 6B.1. Rhode Island is the only state where the mean over the
full period exceeds 1.0 percent of regular UI claims. Only four other states
have means that exceed 0.40 (California, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont).
The small scale of STC is also illustrated by the maximum annual percentages during the estimation period. While most exceed 1.0 percent, only two
maxima exceed 2.0 percent, Kansas and Rhode Island at 3.24 and 4.17 percent,
respectively.
While the summary measures in Table 6B.1 show the small scale of STC,
the regression results point to a pattern of strong cyclical sensitivity. All 17 slope
coefficients on the current year TUR are positive and their t-ratios all exceed
2.0, the threshold for statistical significance. The t-ratios in eight states even
exceed 5.0; the slopes are highly significant. When unemployment increases,
utilization of STC increases relative to utilization of regular UI claims.
The patterns for the lagged TUR coefficients are nearly as consistent. All
17 are negative and 13 have t-ratios of 2.0 or larger. In the year after the TUR
increases there is a sharp falloff in STC usage. Short-time compensation usage
decreases noticeably in the second year of a recessionary period. This falloff
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occurs even if the TUR is higher in the second year of a recession as in 2010
relative to 2009. For 16 of 17 states the percentage was higher in 2009 than in
2010. Finally, the underlying data also illustrate the severe nature of the recent
recession. The highest usage of STC over the full period occurred in 2009 for
14 of 17 states.

Table 6B.1 Regressions Explaining STC Equivalent Weeks as a Percentage of Regular Weeks, 1989–2010
Maximum
(%)

2.62

Mean
(%)
0.297

1.33

0.048

0.407

0.083

1.82

0.414

1.053

0.495

0.258

2.04

0.308

1.622

−0.0027 (2.2)

0.584

0.033

1.50

0.073

0.183

−0.224 (2.1)

0.0023 (0.3)

0.523

0.168

2.15

0.110

1.006

−0.610 (2.7)

0.0459 (2.0)

0.377

0.598

1.86

0.723

3.237

0.063 (7.6)

−0.026 (2.6)

−0.0019 (1.9)

0.783

0.030

1.96

0.048

0.213

−0.209 (2.6)

0.107 (6.0)

−0.076 (4.1)

0.0132 (4.2)

0.714

0.094

1.96

0.132

0.765

−0.216 (2.4)

0.175 (5.3)

−0.120 (3.6)

0.0094 (1.9)

0.770

0.098

1.50

0.166

0.790

Missouri

0.003 (0.0)

0.162 (5.5)

−0.138 (4.0)

0.0275 (6.7)

0.858

0.111

2.01

0.476

1.354

New York

−0.436 (2.6)

0.172 (5.6)

−0.101 (3.1)

0.0201 (4.4)

0.698

0.135

1.84

0.257

1.141

Oregon

−0.524 (4.6)

0.135 (6.5)

−0.050 (2.1)

0.0103 (2.4)

0.803

0.110

1.31

0.163

1.010

Rhode Island 1991 −1.410 (3.0)

0.302 (2.9)

−0.109 (0.9)

0.1021 (5.2)

0.773

0.456

1.67

1.122

4.173

Texas

−0.581 (1.7)

0.178 (3.1)

−0.119 (1.8)

0.0496 (6.4)

0.776

0.192

0.92

0.345

1.501

0.090 (0.4)

0.208 (3.6)

−0.227 (4.0)

0.0462 (6.6)

0.744

0.208

1.75

0.540

1.511

−1.128 (4.9)

0.227 (5.7)

−0.053 (1.1)

0.0259 (3.9)

0.781

0.188

0.64

0.256

1.562

State

Constant

TUR

TUR Lag

Trend

Arizona

0.289 (2.3)

0.064 (2.6)

−0.051 (1.7)

−0.0062 (1.4)

0.161

0.121

Arkansas

−0.149 (1.3)

0.102 (3.6)

−0.072 (2.3)

0.0020 (0.6)

0.441

0.074

California

−0.185 (2.3)

−0.085 (4.8)

0.0021 (0.7)

0.890

Connecticut 1992

−0.172 (0.6)

0.162 (10.8)
0.232 (3.3)

−0.170 (2.1)

0.0106 (0.8)

0.036 (1.1)

0.031 (4.8)

−0.020 (2.5)

−0.397 (1.8)

0.339 (3.5)

0.648 (0.8)

0.501 (2.4)

Maryland

−0.116 (3.2)

Massachusetts
Minnesota 1992

Florida
Iowa 1991
Kansas

Vermont

DW

0.629

SOURCE: Regressions based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and OUI. Absolute values of t-ratios
adjacent to coefficients.
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FRAMING THE ISSUE
Following the GDP decreases resulting from the severe economic
crisis, EU member states experienced, each to a different extent, higher
levels of unemployment. However, the implementation of so-called
anticrisis measures limited such increases in unemployment—in some
cases they were not as high as expected—in the majority of EU member
states. Intending to minimize the impact of the downturn in social terms
and support both companies and employees, the EU took a number of
actions to drive the economic recovery and coordinate EU member
states’ public interventions, with member states either adapting existing labor market policies or introducing new ones (European Commission 2008).1 In this context, the majority of member states launched ad
hoc and comprehensive “anticrisis packages” consisting of a variety
of measures to cope with the recession and resulting in a wide range
of public policy tools aimed at reducing the impact of the crisis on the
labor market.
During the economic downturn, some countries have performed
much better than others. We set out to determine whether this happened by chance or if it was a consequence of the national social model
and the choices governments made in applying specific labor market
measures. In fact, the purpose of our study is to identify whether there
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were particular legal devices and policies that helped some EU member states to face and withstand the crisis better than others. Studying
the different measures implemented by the member states and considering the national legal framework and labor regulations, this chapter
offers some possible interpretations of the different national reactions
to the crisis. These interpretations take into account EU member states’
different labor market policy combinations and their social protection
systems and employment protection legislation, which is also viewed
as a combination of flexibility and security tools. The study has an interdisciplinary approach, though it is not an economic analysis. However,
it aims to give suggestions and make some hypotheses on the effectiveness of labor market policy combinations and social models (including
the relevant legal framework) in tackling the crisis, which economists
may then prove through their analyses.

THE CRISIS IN FIGURES
The starting point of the study is the set of figures describing the
changes in the European labor market from the beginning of the crisis (see Figures 7.1–7.3 and Table 7.1). Between the second quarter of
2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the real GDP in the EU (27 member states) fell by almost 5 percent.
The fall in GDP caused a reduction of labor demand and, accordingly, an increase in unemployment and a decrease in employment. But,
if you compare the two series of data—GDP and employment change
from the previous period (Table 7.1)—the degree of the reduction is
different, and in particular job losses are limited by comparison with
the decrease of real GDP. As is well-known, in fact, GDP growth and
employment generally evolve differently (Bell and Blanchflower 2011),
since employment reacts to economic developments with a certain time
lag (Hijman 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009).
The figures show a considerable difference in the impact of the crisis
on the 27 EU member states, particularly if we compare unemployment
rates in July 2008—that is, before the crisis—and July 2010. Although
Spain and Ireland were regarded as emerging economies before the
downturn, they reported significant increases in unemployment. More
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Figure 7.1 GDP Percentage Change from Previous Period
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SOURCE: Eurostat, seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days.

specifically, the levels of unemployment almost doubled in a two-year
span, an issue that has become a matter of serious concern. The same
happened in the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), which
experienced the highest rates of unemployment in Europe (Figure 7.2).
Looking at the trends in Figure 7.3, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ireland, and Spain also had the highest decrease in employment rates. A
case in point of the negative impact of the economic crisis on employment was Denmark. Before the crisis, Denmark had a low level of unemployment and has experienced a worsening of its labor market situation
during the economic downturn. Despite Danish unemployment levels
(7.3 percent in July 2010) remaining lower than the EU average (9.7
percent), Denmark experienced a critical increase in unemployment,
which doubled over a two-year period. At the same time, the employment rate dropped by 4.2 percent, which was more than the EU average.
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Figure 7.2 Unemployment Rate Change and Unemployment Rate,
2010q2
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SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.

The labor market is less worrisome in countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, where the rise in the unemployment rate was in no case higher than 1.8 percent and the decrease
in the rate of employment was not as significant as in the countries mentioned above. Indeed, Germany represents a unique case: after a very
limited increase in unemployment (0.4 percent in July 2009 compared
to July 2008), an unexpected reduction was reported in 2010, with the
levels of employment experiencing a growth (ILO 2011a). Such vari-

Figure 7.3 Change in Employment Rate 2010q2 − 2008q2
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SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data.
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Table 7.1 GDP and Employment Change between 2008q2 and 2009q2
Member state
GDP
EU27
−5.1
Belgium
−4.1
Bulgaria
−4.6
Czech Republic −4.8
Denmark
−7.3
Germany
−5.5
Estonia
−16.5
Ireland
−7.7
Greece
−2.0
Spain
−4.4
France
−3.1
Italy
−6.4
Cyprus
−1.7
Latvia
−17.3

Employment
−1.9
−0.2
−1.8
−0.9
−2.2
−0.0
−9.9
−8.3
−0.7
−7.0
−1.3
−1.4
−0.4a
−13.2

Member state
GDP
Lithuania
−16.0
Luxembourg
−7.8
Hungary
−7.4
Malta
−4.4
Netherlands
−5.1
Austria
−5.4
Poland
+1.4
Portugal
−3.0
Romania
−8.3
Slovenia
−9.5
Slovakia
−4.9
Finland
−10.2
Sweden
−6.3
United Kingdom −5.9

Employment
−6.0
1.2
−2.3
−0.1a
−1.2
−1.0
+0.8
−2.7
−2.0a
−1.4
−1.5
−2.9
−2.2a
−2.1

a
Not seasonally adjusted data.
SOURCE: Eurostat, National Accounts.

ability among European countries, and the fact that the recession had
little impact on some of them, seems not to be coincidental. There is
some empirical evidence that the different performance levels within
national labor markets could result from the diversified legal framework
of labor regulation and existing labor market policies and institutions,
along with new measures taken by governments to combat the crisis.

ANTICRISIS MEASURES ACROSS EUROPE
The combination of several factors at the national level produced,
in fact, 27 different ways in which the economic downturn hit the EU
member states. In addition, there were 27 different responses to the crisis. Each country has adopted a set of measures—not a single action—
among which it is possible to identify the most frequently implemented
ones (European Commission 2009). Moreover, it is necessary to take
into consideration that labor market policies adopted by national gov-
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ernments vary considerably, especially in terms of issues concerning the
role played by social partners in each country. Each country’s participation in the development and implementation of anticrisis measures
and with the adjustment of existing labor market tools differs across
Europe. Differences are also found when one considers the level and
the extent of the involvement of each EU member state in public policy
design. Policy development and implementation depend on the diversity of functions performed by the social dialogue at the time, and the
power of each government.
In Austria, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands—countries with a well-established social partnership—agreements between
social partners contributed considerably to the creation of stimulus packages. With regard to collective bargaining, opening clauses
allowed company-level agreements to deviate from sectoral collective
agreements in order to cut costs and safeguard employment (i.e., deviation from the general framework). These agreements usually envisage
an extension in working time without full compensation in pay, cuts in
working time, cuts in benefits, or delays in agreed pay increases (ILO
2011b).
In order to assess the effectiveness of the adopted policies, it is necessary to review existing legislation and classify measures implemented
by every European country in accordance with a simple scheme. The
classification of policy measures is a preliminary step for verifying
whether there is a relationship between patterns of labor market policies
adopted by member states and the trends of the national labor market
during the crisis. To date, key reports from the European Commission
(Arpaia et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009), the
OECD (2010), and EU institutions (Employment Committee [EMCO]
and the European Commission [EC] 2010) have analyzed public interventions in the labor market. In particular, the Eurofound has provided
a useful classification of crisis-related measures implemented in the EU
member states (see Table 7.2) (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore
2009). This classification is based on three different types of interventions: 1) measures to create employment or to promote reintegration,
2) measures to maintain employment, and 3) income support measures
for the unemployed.

Incentives for companies to employ
additional workers
• Wage subsidies
• Reduction of/exemption from nonwage labor costs
• Nonfinancial incentives

Other instruments
• early retirement payment
• child benefits
• housing/heating
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Table 7.2 Classification of Labor Market Measures
Measures to create employment
Income support measures
or to promote reintegration
for the unemployed
Job matching, counseling, career
Unemployment benefits
guidance:
• Eligibility criteria
• Improving public employment
• Amount
services
• Duration of support for entitlement
• Support for workers to find a job
groups of workers

Measures to maintain employment
Support of short-time work or temporary
layoff
• Wage subsidies
• Social security contributions
Training support
• Advice/consultancy to enterprises
• Contribution to training costs
• Wage subsidy

(Re-) Training of the unemployed:
• Income support while in training
• Advice/consultancy, skill assessment
tools
• Provision/organization of training
• Contribution to training costs

Reduction/deferral of nonwage labor
costs
• Social security contributions
• Taxes

Mobility grants
• Tax incentives
• Travel/accommodation allowances
• Repatriation allowances

Direct enterprise support
• risk-capital schemes, guarantees,
direct subsidies
• reduction of company taxes

Support of self-employment
• Advice/consultancy, training
• Start-up grants
• Reduction/deferral of social security
payments

Indirect enterprise support
• Public investment
• Incentives for consumers’ purchases
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Measures to Create Employment and to Promote Reintegration
Measures to create employment (Mandl and Salvatore 2009) aim
to promote the hiring of employees by means of economic incentives,
mainly consisting of a reduction of nonwage labor costs and wage subsidies or public sector job creation. In some countries (Germany, France,
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden), the economic incentives for
companies are provided for hiring special target groups. Support measures for self-employment, based on the provision of consultancy and
training (the U.K. and Bulgaria), or the reduction/deferment of social
security payments also falls within this category. Several member states
(Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Portugal, and the U.K.) have introduced or
extended subsidies for business start-ups.
Measures to promote reintegration into employment (Hurley et
al. 2009), put into action by employment services, try to enhance the
transition from unemployment to employment by addressing job mismatch, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guidance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employability through training. Efforts have been made to improve and adapt
public employment services in order to manage the higher number of
“clients” (for example, hiring additional staff, as in Germany, Norway,
Spain, and the U.K.) and to economically support private employment
agencies through economic and/or normative incentives (the Netherlands and Italy). In the same vein, and with the goal of making workers
more willing to accept a new job, mobility grants are envisaged (Slovakia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic). In Belgium, for instance,
employees who agree to relocate in order to accept a job offer obtain
tax benefits.
Income Support for Unemployed People
Income support for unemployed people (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl
and Salvatore 2009) mainly consists of unemployment benefits, provided to reduce the socioeconomic consequences of job loss. Unemployment benefit systems exist in every EU member state, even though
amendments (in some cases temporary) have been made at a national
level to their regulations in order to respond to the increased number
of unemployed people resulting from the crisis. Relevant changes have
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been particularly concerned with the following areas: eligibility criteria, amount, duration of entitlement, and beneficiaries. More specifically, some countries relaxed the rules for entitlement to unemployment
benefits (France, Finland, and Sweden), while others extended the duration: Romania has envisaged an extension of 3 months, Latvia extended
the unemployment benefit receipt period to 9 months, and in Poland it
moved from 12 to 18 months. In the Czech Republic, the government
has opted for an increase in the amount of funds, while Italy introduced
(on a temporary basis) special benefits for quasi-subordinate workers.
Measures to Maintain Employment
Measures to maintain employment are intended to prevent dismissals and preserve existing jobs. Among these instruments, the main ones
are short-time work (STW) arrangements and compensation.
Short-time work schemes
Short-time work may take the form of a temporary reduction in
working time or a temporary layoff. In both cases, the employment
relationship between employer and employee persists and the arrangements have a limited duration (Arpaia et al. 2010). In the case of STW,
compensation for income loss is usually envisaged in the form of social
security payments. This compensation is either publicly funded—by
means of taxes—or based on social security contributions. Nevertheless, STW compensation systems across Europe differ considerably
from each other in terms of procedures, degree of involvement of trade
unions, “back-to-normal” plans, coverage, compensations amount,
and eligibility criteria. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between
well-established systems and new schemes introduced to face the crisis
(Table 7.3).
In the first case (which includes Germany, Austria, Belgium, France,
and Italy, among others), the compensation system is part of the unemployment benefit (insurance) system, in that employers and employees
pay social contributions to a fund or to the UI system so that in the event
of STW or temporary layoff, employees are covered by this fund for the
lost income as a consequence of a working hours reduction. Conversely,
in member states (such as the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia) that introduced, whether temporary or not, STW compensations as
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Table 7.3 Different Systems of Short-Time Work
Group I—Existing and/or adapted
Group II—Systems introduced to
systems (Germany, Austria, Belgium, face the crisis (the Netherlands,
France, Italy, etc.)
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, etc.)
STW arrangements are part of the
unemployment benefit/insurance
system

STW arrangements are not part of
the unemployment benefit/insurance
system

The employer and (in some cases)
the employees pay social
contributions to a fund or to the
UI system

STW arrangements are funded by
taxes

In the event of STW or temporary
layoff, employees are covered for
the lost income

a new measure during the crisis, such new arrangements are not part of
the UI system and therefore they are funded by the state through taxes.
STW compensation systems may also be classified on the basis of
their function (Arpaia et al. 2010). In some national systems, they are
part-time unemployment benefits. This means that employees working
reduced hours or on temporary layoff are regarded as people working
on a part-time basis seeking full-time employment. In some cases, they
may have to be available for a new job despite the fact that the employment contract with their current employer is still in force. Regardless of
function, in the majority of EU member states, this is true even if STW
schemes envisage lost income compensation within the unemployment
insurance system. Indeed, STW schemes represent a form of job protection against dismissal.
With reference to this measure, it is possible to point out that it might
be beneficial to different actors involved in the national economic arena.
Needless to say, employees benefit from STW schemes since measures
of this kind avoid dismissal and help maintain existing jobs, at the same
time ensuring income support by compensating lost income. However,
STW schemes also have many advantages for employers. First, these
arrangements allow companies to preserve human capital and skills that
will be necessary in the recovery phase. Second, they reduce potential
costs related to personnel turnover, dismissal, the recruitment process,
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and training. Governments view STW compensation systems as convenient measures, as they help maintain social peace and cohesion in that
employers and employees share the impact of a downturn. Finally, such
arrangements represent a flexible tool for governments, such that they
are able to control, to some extent, the adjustment of the labor market.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LABOR MARkET MEASURES
This research tries to identify the system and policies that provide
a higher level of effectiveness in tackling the crisis and unemployment,
and to collect information that could be useful on a general basis while
deciding which labor market policies to implement and which legal
framework to apply. It is generally acknowledged that it takes time
to evaluate the effectiveness of labor market measures. However, in a
joint paper, EMCO and the EC provide some evidence for the effectiveness of the main labor market policies adopted and implemented by
EU member states during the crisis, and, more generally, they review
evaluations of the effectiveness of similar measures implemented in the
past (EMCO and EC 2010). The OECD, on the other hand, gives evidence for the effectiveness of STW schemes applied during this recession (OECD 2010).
Considering the three different types of labor market policies examined in this chapter (measures to create employment or to promote reintegration, measures to maintain employment, and income support for
unemployed), measures to maintain employment in the form of STW
arrangements, wage subsidies, or nonwage cost reductions are deemed
to have been most successful in limiting the decrease in employment rates (Governatori et al. 2010) and the rise of unemployment,
by preventing layoffs. Among measures of this kind implemented by
the member states, some of them—particularly STW schemes—have
proved more effective than others in preserving jobs (EMCO and EC
2010; OECD 2010). Nevertheless, researchers point out critical issues
related to STW arrangements, such as the fact that they may artificially
maintain employment in declining industries instead of allowing for an
efficient reallocation of employment. There is general agreement about
the potential negative impact—the deadweight loss—from distortions
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due to this policy (OECD 2010). However, countermeasures can be
taken to address these distortions. In particular, STW schemes can be
provided for a shorter period of time and can be arranged on the basis
of more precise eligibility criteria.
Regarding measures to create employment, job subsidies consisting of hiring incentives or the reduction of nonwage labor costs are
effective in terms of job creation, but they are costly measures that can
lead to negative consequences in terms of the deadweight effect. At the
same time, public sector job creation is less likely than other policies to
provide positive impacts (Kluve 2006, 2008).
With respect to measures that promote reintegration, training has
a modest positive impact on employment. This kind of impact is more
likely to be associated with times of high unemployment. But, in general, positive training effects become evident in the long run, and it is
not clear whether there is a positive or negative relation between the
economic cycle and the effectiveness of this kind of measure. Therefore, it is difficult to state how effective training programs may be during the economic crisis (Kluve 2008). On the other hand, job search
assistance and activation measures have a positive impact on employment and are effective in the short run, but they need an economic context characterized by a growing or stable labor demand. In fact, only if
there is labor demand is it possible to support job search and matching
and help with reintegration into the labor market. For this reason, such
measures are mainly appropriate in the recovery phase.
Generally speaking, income supports for the unemployed may have
a negative effect on unemployment (OECD 2006) since their generosity
(replacement rate and duration) discourage job search and reintegration into the labor market. In order to reduce the negative effects in
terms of efficiency, some adjustments can be and have been made, such
as decreasing the amount of benefits and reducing the period through
which such support is provided. In addition, unemployment benefits
have to be made conditional on availability for suitable work and participation in active labor market policies (ALMPs) and activation policies (OECD 2010). The majority of EU member states have moved in
this direction, since in their systems, as shown in Table 7.4, unemployment benefit recipients are required to actively search for work (in 18
cases out of 27), to be immediately available for suitable work (almost
all member states) and accept suitable job offers, and to be ready to
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Table 7.4 Obligations of Unemployment Benefit Recipients
Participation
Available for
Country
Active job search
in ALMP
suitable work
Belgium
x
x
Bulgaria
x
Czech Republic
Denmark
x
x
x
Germany
x
x
x
Estonia
x
x
Greece
x
x
Spain
x
x
x
France
x
x
Ireland
x
x
Italy
x
x
Cyprus
x
x
Latvia
x
x
Lithuania
x
x
x
Luxembourg
x
x
Hungary
x
x
x
Malta
x
The Netherlands
x
x
Austria
x
x
Poland
x
Portugal
x
x
Romania
x
x
Finland
x
x
x
Slovenia
x
x
Slovakia
x
x
x
Sweden
x
x
x
United Kingdom
x
x
x

participate in the ALMPs (in 17 cases out of 27) commonly agreed on
in an individual action plan or client contract. The plan or contract is
established between the unemployment benefit recipient and the public
employment service and identifies the rights and duties of both parties.
Moreover, in the view of assuring the effectiveness of this conditionality, sanctions are applied to recipients in cases of noncompliance with
the above-mentioned obligations.
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THE ROLE OF EMPLOyMENT SERVICES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALMPs
Public employment services are generally able to implement labor
market measures. Therefore, they play a key role in supporting the
(re)integration of the unemployed into the labor market and, in the end,
employment levels. It is well known that the effective implementation
of labor market policies depends on the efficiency of public employment services (EC 2002). However, they may achieve their goals not
only by acting directly through their organizations, but also through
cooperation with other actors and stakeholders (i.e., other public organizations, social security institutions, social partners, other service
providers, or education and training providers). From this perspective,
European institutions themselves encourage the collaboration of public
employment services with other service providers (Council of the European Union 2001, 2002; EC 1998). This relationship may even take the
form of subcontracting services to private employment agencies, which
generally allows public employment services to better deliver specific
services for particular target groups among the unemployed (Anderson
et al. 2009).
Employment services also play an important role with regard to
the effectiveness of the conditionality of unemployment benefits on
participation in ALMPs and on accepting suitable job offers. Looking
at public employment services, the purpose of a consistent strategy is
to facilitate the return of the unemployed and unemployment benefit
recipients into the labor market. To achieve this, public employment
services and social security institutions must cooperate closely, which
may develop into a merger between the two (Anderson et al. 2009).
Indeed, in a number of EU member states (see Table 7.5) there is a
single institution responsible for the provision of employment services
and unemployment benefits. This trend is confirmed by recent mergers
in France and the Netherlands in 2009.
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Table 7.5 Institutions Responsible for the Provision of Employment
Services and Unemployment Benefits
Austria
Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS)
France
Pôle emploi: (ANPE + Assedic)
Germany
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency)
Estonia
Eesti Töötukassa
Greece
Greek Manpower Employment Organization (OAED)
Luxembourg
Administration de l’emploi (ADEM)
Slovenia
Employment Service of Slovenia
The Netherlands Location for Work and Income: Centre for Work and
Income + Uitvoeringsinstitut werknemersverzekeringen
(Employee Insurance Agency)
United Kingdom Jobcentre Plus (merger of Employment Service and
Benefits Agency, 2002)

PUBLIC ExPENDITURE ON LABOR MARkET POLICIES
The question of effectiveness of labor market policies is fundamental not only with regard to crisis-related measures, but also for EU
member states because of a rise in budgetary constraints. European
institutions have reported that in 2009 EU countries increased their
expenditure on labor market interventions and income supports by 0.7
percent of annual GDP, while before the crisis, public expenditure on
labor market policies had experienced a decline (EMCO and EC 2010).
In fact, in 2008, public expenditure on labor market policies in the EU
amounted to just 1.6 percent of total EU-27 GDP, although there was
considerable variation between member states (see Figure 7.4).2 For
this reason, EU governments need to be aware of the most effective
policy mix in order to direct the public expenditure. It is interesting to
compare data on labor market policy expenditures and trends in unemployment rates among the different EU countries during the crisis. The
data on public expenditures for all countries are available only 18–20
months after the reference period, and as a result, Eurostat provides, at
the moment, only data for 2008.
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Figure 7.4 Total LMP Expenditure and Unemployment Rate Change 2009q2–2008q2
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In any case, considering that the impact of labor market policies
(LMPs) on the labor market requires a period of time to become evident,
it seems reasonable to compare data on public expenditure for 2008 and
unemployment rate growth over the last two years. Member states that
had the lowest increases in unemployment rates in 2009 compared to
2008 were those that spent the most on labor market policies in 2008.
As Figure 7.4 shows, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria
spent more than 1.8 percent of their GDP on LMPs and saw very small
levels of unemployment growth or even declines in unemployment during this period. Figure 7.5 shows that this trend is confirmed even if we
compare the growth in unemployment rate between 2008 and 2010 and
the labor market policies expenditure for 2008.
When the data on public expenditures for 2009 are available for all
countries, it will also be interesting to verify if and to what extent the
increase in unemployment affected public expenditure.

POLICIES ADAPTED OR ADOPTED By THE EU
MEMBER STATES
By analyzing the different measures implemented by the EU member states, it is possible to observe a relationship between different
combinations of labor market measures applied by EU countries and
their social models. From this perspective, it is necessary to consider
in toto the set of labor market policies—both new and amended—that
the EU member states put into action to face the crisis. Table 7.6 represents, without the pretention of being exhaustive, the measures adopted
or adapted (if already existing) by each EU member state against this
background. The EU countries have been identified by their levels of
unemployment rate growth (considering the difference between July
2010 and July 2008), ranked from the best to the worst in terms of performance. It should be pointed out that those countries with the most
significant increases in unemployment rates are those that did not envisage or did not amend existing STW schemes.
On the other hand, EU member states with good labor market performance, such as Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, and, to
some extent, Italy, already had measures of this kind in their labor mar-
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ket systems. Furthermore, these countries made such labor market policies more flexible over the past few years, in consideration of the needs
of the moment, and improved or adapted these policies by combining
them with training and/or activation measures. Other well-performing
countries, such as the Netherlands and Romania, have introduced (even
on a temporary basis) STW schemes to face the recession.
The next step is to contextualize these different combinations of
policies in the wider regulatory framework of national labor markets.
In this view, two main social models are taken into consideration: the
welfare system model and the flexicurity model (Table 7.7).
The first system is characterized by rigid employment protection
legislation (particularly in the event of dismissal), an ungenerous unemployment benefit system, and a minimum level of implementation of
ALMPs and activation of policies through public employment services.
It is noteworthy that the welfare system model developed over the years
an active component, which in the past was very limited or absent. On
the other hand, the flexicurity model is based on a nonrestrictive dismissal protection legislation, a generous unemployment benefit system,
high levels of implementation of ALMPs and activation policies, and
efficient public employment services. Examples of the first model can
be found in countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Italy, while
Denmark has always been the model for flexicurity, together with Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MODELS
By looking at the labor market performance of the EU member
states, and by considering their social models, some interesting remarks
and comments are possible.
Regarding growth in the unemployment rate during the crisis, Germany, Belgium, Austria, and to some extent Italy, are considered to be
the countries with the lowest increases. The social model of all these
EU member states is classified as a welfare system. On the other hand,
Denmark, which, as mentioned, is regarded as a role model of flexicurity, experienced a high increase in unemployment. This country has
been and still is, in fact, an interesting case with reference to the per-
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Table 7.6 Policies Mix
Training
activities
Change in
during the time
unemployment
off/training
rate 2010Q2–
STW
support for
2008Q2
compensations
employees
Luxembourg
−0.5
+
+
Germany
−0.4
+
+
Austria
0.8
+
+
Malta
0.9
+
Belgium
1.2
+
+
Romania
1.5
new
Netherlands
1.6
new
compulsory
Italy
1.8
+
+
Finland
2.0
United Kingdom
2.0
+
France
2.0
+
+
Sweden
2.3
Poland
2.5
new
EU 27
2.7
Slovenia
2.8
new
compulsory
Czech Republic
2.9
new
compulsory
Cyprus
3.0
+
Portugal
3.3
+
+
Hungary
3.4
new
compulsory
Denmark
4.1
Bulgaria
4.5
new
Slovakia
5.1
Greece
5.4
+
Ireland
7.2
+
Spain
8.9
Estonia
9.9
Latvia
10.8
+
Lithuania
11.9
+

Reduction/
deferral of
nonwage
labor costs

Public
expenditure

+

+
+
+

+
+

+
+
+
+
+

+
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Income
tax cut

Direct
enterprise
support
Incentives
to employ
(loan
(Re-)training Improving Unemployment
benefits
additional guarantees, low- Mobility of unemployed employment
workers interest loans) grants
people
services
(amendments)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+

+
+

+
+
+

+

+

+

+

+
+

+

+
+

+
+
+
+
+

+

+
+

+
+

+

+
+

+

+
+

+

+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+

Systems
Welfare systems
(Central and Southern
Europe)
Flexicurity systems
(Northern Europe)

Employment
protection legislation
Stringent dismissal
protection legislation
(individual and
collective)

Unemployment
STW and layoff
benefit system
compensations
Nongenerous:
Yes
Short duration
Low replacement rate

Nonrestrictive
dismissal protection
legislation

Generous:
Long duration
High replacement rate

No or very limited as
partial unemployment
benefit

Active labor market
policies (ALMPs)
public employment
services (PES)
Low level
of activities and
implementation
of few ALMPs
High level
of activities and
implementation
of many ALMPs
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formance of the labor market during the crisis. Before the crisis, this
system ensured a low unemployment rate and a quick reintegration of
jobseekers into the labor market. During the crisis, however, this system proved to have some shortcomings. In fact, by September 2009,
Denmark had doubled its level of unemployment: from 3.2 percent in
July 2008 to 6.5 percent in September 2009 (Denmark reached its highest level of unemployment, 7.4 percent, in April 2010).
The aim of this system is not to prevent dismissal but rather to
support a quick job-to-job transition and reintegration into the labor
market. Nevertheless, if the labor demand is low, then reintegration
is impossible or very difficult. In addition, Denmark does not envisage a “real” STW compensation system even though companies may
use STW arrangements and employees involved are eligible for parttime unemployment benefits. Employees must fulfill the contributory
requirements for eligibility for total unemployment benefits and have to
be available for a new working activity despite the fact that the employment contract with their current employer is still in force. However, in
practice this provision is not strictly applied if the employee has the
possibility of staying with his or her current company.
Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands (plus Norway, which is not
an EU member) also use the flexicurity system. While they had better
labor market performance than Denmark during the recession, these
countries still experienced an increase in their unemployment rates
amounting to more than 2 percent (the Netherlands was the only exception, with an increase of 1.6 percent). There is an important difference
between Denmark and the other flexicurity countries—employment
protection legislation. Denmark has liberally oriented employment protection legislation, while the other flexicurity countries, which utilize
a welfare system, have more stringent employment protection legislation (see Table 7.8). Among flexicurity countries, the Netherlands is the
only country characterized by a lower rise in its unemployment rate. It
introduced a temporary STW compensation, while Finland’s is similar
to Denmark, and Sweden does not envisage any.
On the basis of these observations, it clearly emerges that countries
utilizing the welfare system model had lower increases in unemployment rates, while flexicurity countries, especially Denmark, experienced higher rises. Thus, the welfare system model appears to be more
effective in facing the crisis, while the flexicurity system has difficul-
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Table 7.8 OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index
Countries
OECD EPL index
Germany
2.63
Luxembourg
3.39
Malta
—
Austria
2.41
Romania
—
Belgium
2.61
Netherlands
2.23
Italy
2.58
Finland
2.29
United Kingdom
1.09
France
3.00
Sweden
2.06
Poland
2.41
European Union
2.41
Czech Republic
2.32
Portugal
2.84
Slovenia
2.76
Hungary
2.11
Cyprus
—
Denmark
1.91
Bulgaria
—
Greece
2.97
Slovakia
2.13
Ireland
1.39
Spain
3.11
Lithuania
—
Latvia
—
Estonia
2.39

ties controlling the increase in unemployment. This situation seems to
depend on the presence in welfare system models of two complementary and interrelated elements: STW arrangements and a stringent regulation against (individual or collective) dismissal. However, considering social models and labor market policy combinations applied by EU
member states, there is no unique “best solution” to tackle “different
kinds” of economic recessions. It is also important to understand the
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context and the legal framework in which any possible solution has to
be implemented.

CONCLUSION: LESSON FROM THE CRISIS
The financial crisis has created a sort of laboratory in which it was
possible to conduct natural experiments on the functioning of different national systems, created through a combination of the social security system, employment protection legislation, the public employment
services system, and labor market policies. Over the last two decades,
when considering labor market policies to be implemented by European countries, the OECD and European Commission put an emphasis mainly on active labor market policies rather than passive ones,
thus supporting mainly public interventions utilizing active measures.
Therefore, before the crisis, these international institutions largely recommended flexicurity principles dominated by external flexibility and
employment security based on nonrestrictive or low-restrictive employment protection legislation (and dismissal protection legislation), supported by a generous unemployment benefit system, efficient public
employment services, and high levels of ALMPs. From this point of
view, prevailing measures aimed to create employment or, better yet,
promote reintegration, giving momentum to job-to-job transition. In
fact, by launching the EU flexicurity strategy, the EU promoted internal
and external flexicurity “accompanied by secure transition from job to
job” (European Commission 2007).
Looking from this standpoint at policy packages applied by EU
member states, at the beginning of the crisis there was a critical view
of STW arrangements. In fact, observers and commentators constantly
pointed out the labor market distortions and limitations associated with
these schemes. One frequent criticism was that since they were income
support measures, they demonstrated the passive nature of labor market policy. But more recently, and perhaps thanks to the effectiveness
in tackling the crisis, authors look at these schemes in a different way.
Indeed, a report from the Eurofound (Mandl et al. 2010) describing
the effectiveness of STW schemes tries to link these measures to the

164 Tiraboschi and Spattini

flexicurity principle by stressing how they serve the implementation of
flexicurity. Considering how STW schemes function, it is easy to see
them as tools for flexicurity, combining internal flexibility and job and
income security. In fact, the possibility of reducing work hours (up to
zero hours) allows internal flexibility for employers (based exactly on
flexible working-time arrangements). At the same time, this provision
prevents dismissals and helps employees stay in their current positions,
enhancing job security. Moreover, wage compensation linked to STW
arrangements ensures income security for the employees, thanks to the
continuity of income granted through either a wage or unemployment
benefits.
Considering now the other types of labor market policy measures
mentioned above in terms of flexicurity, measures to promote reintegration and to create employment are fundamental resources for guaranteeing employment security, at least through continuity of employment, although not necessarily with the same employer. On the other
hand, income support for unemployed people has the obvious purpose
of ensuring income security in case of dismissal and can be seen as
complementary to external flexibility. Before the crisis, EU institutions pressed for welfare systems to move toward the flexicurity model.
But the economic downturn raised the awareness of the fact that the
EU formulation of the flexicurity strategy was suitable for a period of
economic growth and to face structural unemployment, which needs
particular measures to support (re-)integration by addressing job mismatch, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guidance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employability through training.
Indeed, a flexicurity strategy based on external flexibility and
employment security was not able to withstand the impact of the recession. In such a situation, in fact, in order to limit the related socioeconomic consequences, policy measures to maintain employment and
keep employees at work turned out to be indispensable. A lesson has
been provided by the crisis: both welfare and flexicurity models underwent changes due to the adaptation or introduction of specific labor
market policies to face the crisis. For example, welfare models have
developed activation and training measures, while some flexicurity
models adopted some kind of STW arrangements. Each model has taken
up some elements of the other one, particularly those useful to tackle
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the crisis. This process of adjustment due to the recession resulted in a
convergence of the two social models.
Notes
1. At the international level, the International Labour Conference (2009) adopted a
Global Jobs pact.
2. At the moment of closing the article, Eurostat provided data for 2009 just for a few
EU member states.
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